US embassy cable - 04RANGOON471

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: RANGOON MISSIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR BANGKOK II 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 456 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. BANGKOK 2413 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. KUALA LUMPUR 1403 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Our recent calls on six Rangoon-based EU and 
ASEAN diplomatic missions to discuss the second meeting of 
the "Bangkok Process" on Burma revealed a range of 
assessments on the road that lies ahead.  Most of the 
missions believe that the SPDC will release ASSK within days 
or weeks and they almost uniformly view the Bangkok Process 
as a helpful mechanism to achieving forward movement.  To the 
contrary, we see every sign that the SPDC has agreed to 
participate in Bangkok as a means to pacify the international 
community.  The generals intend, as always, to go where they 
want, how they want, and when they want.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) April 7-8 COM and P/E Chief called on a half dozen 
available EU and ASEAN Ambassadors (and one Charge) to 
discuss recent political developments and to gain insight 
into the upcoming Bangkok meeting on Burma on April 30.  Key 
highlights follow in paras 3-7. 
 
3. (C) The British: 
 
-- Ambassador Vicky Bowman said that the RTG had not issued 
an invitation to the UK to attend the Bangkok meeting nor had 
the UK requested one.  "However," she added, "we would go if 
invited," noting that Foreign Secretary O'Brien was keen to 
use any opportunity to press the GOB on the need to make 
forward movement.  In the interim, the UK is helping to push 
for the EU to get a seat at the table. 
 
-- Bowman expressed her strong "gut feeling" that the SPDC 
will allow ASSK to meet with the entire NLD CEC o/a April 15 
and then release her from house arrest a day or two later. 
She cited a number of factors that lead her to this 
conclusion:  UN Special Envoy Razali's assessment that ASSK 
will be released o/a April 17; pressure from the Thai and 
other ASEAN countries; the upcoming ASEM meeting on April 
17-18, the success of which hinges in part on progress in 
Burma (on the latter point, Bowman said that the Japanese 
have been telling the ASEAN countries that the EU "will 
crumble" and let Burma participate in ASEM). 
 
-- Bowman said her Home Office has prepared a draft statement 
should ASSK be released within the next week or so.  In that 
statement, the UK would welcome ASSK's freedom and note that 
their Ambassador in Rangoon "intends to see her as soon as 
possible."  We noted our doubts about ASSK's imminent 
release, but agreed that contingency language was sensible, 
given that Rangoon will shut down for water festival April 
12-16.  However, we advised that it might be more helpful to 
note that the British Ambassador "hopes" to see ASSK, given 
that ASSK's intentions are unknown.  We also noted that if 
Washington issued a statement upon her release, the USG would 
also likely call for the reopening of NLD offices. 
 
4. (C) The Germans: 
 
-- Charge d'affaires Christoph Retzlaff said that an MFA Asia 
Director (A/S equivalent) would represent Germany at the 
Bangkok II meeting.  He said that new participants for the 
next round include Norway, Switzerland, Bangladesh, Laos, and 
Malaysia.  He added that the EU wants an invitation, but the 
Thai are being "cautious." 
 
-- Retzlaff said that Germany had no illusions about the 
value of the Bangkok Process, observing that it was not a 
decision-making mechanism and Burmese FM Win Aung had no 
mandate from the SPDC to negotiate.  However, he said, it is 
a positive development that the GOB actually agrees to 
discuss internal matters and, in turn, may be "influenced 
when exposed to the international community." 
 
-- Retzlaff observed that it is very clear that the entire 
road map process depends on the participation of the NLD. 
The SPDC may now be in a "comfortable" position, having 
announced the reconvening of the National Convention, but the 
regime will lose all credibility if the process is not open 
and inclusive. 
 
-- According to Retzlaff, the German Embassy recently took 
the lead on an EU joint demarche on the GOB which provided 
suggestions for a successful National Convention and urged 
the adoption of democratic procedures in drafting a new 
constitution.  "The problem," he said, "is that these guys 
don't react to the outside world." 
 
5. (C) The French: 
 
-- Ambassador Jean-Michel Lacombe said that the Quai's Asia 
Director (A/S equivalent) will represent France at Bangkok 
II, but will first travel to Rangoon to "see as many people 
as he can."  France, said Lacombe, wants to give the Bangkok 
Process a chance to work. 
 
-- Lacombe said he believed ASSK would soon be released and 
opined that the GOB would not have announced the reconvening 
of the National Convention "without some understanding with 
her."  We observed that the regime had likely made the 
surprise announcement to reconvene at an earlier date than 
expected simply to be in a position to bring a "deliverable" 
to the Bangkok meeting. 
 
-- Lacombe added that he felt enhancing EU sanctions would be 
counterproductive and described such action as "more for 
domestic consumption in Europe" than for having an impact in 
Burma where the GOB has ample economic support from 
neighboring countries. 
 
6. (C) The Italians 
 
--  Italy plans to "downgrade" their participation at Bangkok 
II from Deputy Foreign Minister to the Asia Director level. 
Ambassador Raffaele Miniero said that Italy would advocate a 
carrot and stick approach to the SPDC.  "We must be careful 
and not say the road map is rubbish," Miniero said.  "We 
didn't react when the regime released ASSK in 2002 and they 
failed to continue forward progress." 
 
-- In this regard, Miniero said, Italy was prepared to 
discuss at Bangkok II possible assistance to Burma if the 
regime takes appropriate steps.  COM replied that simply 
reconvening the National Convention should not be the only 
measure of progress; the regime must release ASSK and other 
NLD leaders and allow full participation and transparency in 
the drafting of a new constitution. 
 
-- Miniero said he recently met with Burmese Deputy Foreign 
Minister U Kyaw Thu and told the DFM that the GOB needed to 
have ASSK and the NLD on board in order to have a successful 
road map process.  The DFM responded, "Don't expect too 
much."  Miniero concluded that the GOB is not worried about 
the National Convention process, but has greater concerns 
about national elections and how some among the international 
community will respond.  He added that the GOB only wants to 
do something that is acceptable to ASEAN, especially in time 
to host the ASEAN Summit in 2006, and doesn't care about the 
West. 
 
7. (C) The Lao and the Cambodians: 
 
-- Lao Ambassador Chanthavy Bodhisane said that Laos would 
join Bangkok II "to gain understanding about how the process 
is unfolding."  He said he had no confirmation from Vientiane 
that the GOL had accepted an invitation from the RTG, but 
said that Laos would participate as recognition of "growing 
Lao-Thai cooperation." 
 
-- We inquired if Laos intended to approach the Burmese 
pro-democracy opposition to gain their perspective before 
Bangkok II.  Bodhisane replied, "No way." 
 
-- Cambodian Ambassador Hul Phany said he had read in Bangkok 
papers that Cambodia would be invited to Bangkok II.  "We 
would go if invited," he said, "but we have received no 
invitation." 
 
-- Phany said that a National Convention without ASSK and the 
NLD "would not be interesting."  He said that all political 
parties must be allowed to participate and he expressed hope 
that negotiations would lead to a new constitution. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  If the Rangoon missions are any indication, 
EU governments will use Bangkok II as an opportunity to 
gently prod the GOB in the right direction, while the ASEAN 
governments are prepared to accept the minimal steps taken 
thus far as sufficient evidence the GOB is already on the 
right track.  Both approaches are premised in part on the 
assumption that SPDC leaders accept that the Bangkok Process 
will provide sign posts that they need to follow on their 
road map to democracy.  To the contrary, we see every sign 
that the SPDC has agreed to participate in Bangkok as a means 
to pacify the international community.  They intend, as 
always, to go where they want, how they want, and when they 
want.  End Comment. 
 
Martinez