US embassy cable - 04YEREVAN844

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, AM 
SUBJECT: A NOT-SO-HOT SPRING?  WHAT IF WE'RE WRONG... 
 
REF: YEREVAN 809 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (SBU) We continue to believe that the current round of 
opposition protests across Armenia is unlikely to develop 
into a revolution, rose, velvet or otherwise (reftel).  The 
Ambassador has urged restraint in the strongest possible 
terms during meetings this week with both senior government 
officials and key opposition leaders, and we remain convinced 
that the leadership on both sides wants to avoid violence. 
As both the opposition and government raise the rhetorical 
stakes, however, and skirmishes around the opposition rallies 
make headlines, we want to explore potential alternative 
Armenian scenarios:  what happens if we're wrong?  End 
Summary. 
 
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AMBASSADOR URGES RESTRAINT 
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2. (C) The Ambassador has strongly urged restraint during 
meetings this week with the most prominent opposition 
leaders, Stepan Demirchian and Artashes Geghamian, as well as 
with Foreign Minister Oskanian.  The Ambassador warned 
Oskanian that the government had a special responsibility to 
avoid violent outbreaks at the upcoming demonstrations, and 
noted our concern that the police stood by and did not 
intervene during the incident March 5 when members of private 
security forces (as identified by Oskanian) destroyed 
journalists' cameras and equipment.  The Ambassador noted 
that if there were significant violence at upcoming rallies 
the government would be held accountable in international 
public opinion, and that any serious disturbances would harm 
Armenia's economy. 
 
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VIOLENCE COULD UP THE ANTE CONSIDERABLY... 
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3. (SBU) The authorities have been concentrating their 
efforts on reducing the number of possible demonstrators. 
They are reportedly using the police in provincial towns and 
villages to pressure people to stay out of Yerevan on April 
9, and will undoubtedly undertake measures to impede traffic 
into the city that day.  These actions, along with arrests of 
opposition activists, opening a criminal investigation of the 
opposition Justice Alliance, and calling in selected 
opposition MPs for questioning by the procuracy, are 
increasing an already tense situation.  Some prominent 
opposition leaders (but not Geghamian or Demirchian) are much 
more inclined to confrontation, even violent confrontation. 
Both senior government and opposition leaders continue to 
emphasize their commitment to keeping the situation peaceful. 
 During similar election-related demonstrations in 2003, both 
sides acted with considerable restraint.  That outcome seems 
somewhat less likely this time as the mood has turned harsher 
across the board.  If security officials on the street become 
involved in further violent altercations and if anyone were 
seriously injured or killed we expect that public emotions 
could well lead to large-scale demonstrations (with 50,000 or 
more people on the streets) which would open the door to even 
more opportunities for violence. 
 
4. (C)  There is at least one intriguing sign that even 
senior government officials are concerned about the outcome. 
One source in a sensitive position claimed that President 
Kocharian and Defense Minister Sargsian have hedged their 
bets and sent their families to Moscow, while Prime Minister 
Margarian has sent his family to France.  (However, at a 
dinner on April 4 the Ambassador spent several hours with 
Mrs. Bella Kocharian.  In the course of an extended 
conversation, she showed no concern about the current 
political situation, although she did mention that she had 
just returned from several days in Moscow.) 
 
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...BUT THEN WHAT? 
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5. (C) Even if we assume that sufficiently large, widespread, 
prolonged demonstrations would lead Kocharian to resign we 
are still faced with the question of what would happen then. 
Constitutionally the next person in line is the Speaker of 
the National Assembly Artur Baghdasarian.  While he is not a 
Kocharian "crony" he is certainly not part of the opposition, 
and would not be likely to make things easy for the 
opposition.  There is no clear opposition figure who could 
replace Kocharian, and there is little that various factions 
in the opposition agree on except for their desire to remove 
Kocharian. 
 
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BAGHDASARIAN A POSSIBLE WINNER 
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6. (C) Baghdasarian has been developing a stronger public 
profile over the past ten months, and his recent statements 
urging government restraint and calling on the government to 
stop using detentions to intimidate opposition politicians 
are notable in their moderation.  It is not inconceivable 
that, were Kocharian to resign, a disgruntled Armenian 
electorate would turn to him rather than to any of the 
opposition politicians.  As part of the current governing 
coalition, he might also be acceptable to current members of 
the Kocharian government. 
 
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"PEACEMAKER" ROLE COULD WIN BIG FOR DASHNAKS 
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7. (C) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF - 
"Dashnaksutyun") Party attempted to fill the widening 
political divide in late March by offering a "consultative 
role" for the opposition.  Prominent ARF Party leader and 
National Assembly Deputy Speaker Vahan Hovanessian even went 
so far as to urge the governing coalition to find better ways 
to consider opposition policy concerns.  The role of 
potential peacemaker is relatively new for the ARF, whose 
polarizing rhetoric (on topics such as Turkey and N-K) is 
periodically the source of contention among the governing 
coalition or a target for opposition criticism.  Even though 
the opposition categorically rejected the offer, the ARF's 
political olive branch was the only such offer and gives the 
party a serious, policy-focused appearance in the midst of 
emotional political rhetoric.  If Kocharian were to resign, 
the ARF would likely maintain its seat at the table given the 
constructive face it has put forward thus far this Spring. 
 
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FINAL COMMENT 
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8. (C) As we noted initially, we still believe that the 
current round of protests will lose steam after several 
demonstrations.  The potential for violence exists, however, 
and if peaceful protesters were to be killed or seriously 
injured we would expect to see a significant backlash that 
could well provide momentum for much larger rallies with 
greater risks of violence.  The opposition simply does not 
have the resources to force Kocharian out of office if he 
doesn't choose to resign -- and we see no sign that he is 
about to leave office voluntarily. 
ORDWAY