US embassy cable - 04AMMAN2634

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SECURITY IN JORDAN AND VIP VISITS

Identifier: 04AMMAN2634
Wikileaks: View 04AMMAN2634 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2004-04-06 04:41:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: ASEC JO OREP OTRA OVIP PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS AMMAN 002634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR DS A/S TAYLOR, H A/S KELLY, NEA A/S BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC, JO, OREP, OTRA, OVIP, PREL 
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN JORDAN AND VIP VISITS 
 
REF: A. STATE 74372 
     B. AMMAN 2594 
 
(SBU) I am very concerned about the security threat posed 
to the large and growing volume of USG VIPs traveling 
to and through Jordan.  Reftel A makes a convincing 
case that we are entering a period of sustained, 
prolonged, and grave al-Qaeda threats to U.S. 
interests.  Ref. B references the recent steps 
Jordanian authorities have taken against an apparent 
Zarqawi/al-Qaeda operation to target critical facilities 
in Jordan, including the American Embassy.  As a Muslim 
Arab state and forthright supporter of U.S. policy in 
the region, Jordan is a particularly desirable al-Qaeda 
target, tarred as an &apostate regime.8  The general and 
Jordan-specific threat environment is juxtaposed against 
the swelling numbers of VIP and other travelers transiting 
Jordan ) almost inevitably spending one or multiple nights 
in Amman's five-star hotels, which are exceptionally 
vulnerable soft targets. 
 
(SBU) In the next two weeks, we have ten codels and 
two senior military delegations visiting Jordan.  The 
country team and I know well the importance of providing 
unstinting support to these visits.  Their success is 
crucial to advancing U.S. foreign policy interests.  But 
the reality is that in this threat environment, we do not 
have the resources ) especially FAVs and LAVs ) to move 
this volume of visitors around Jordan with the safety the 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) believes is warranted. 
Furthermore, the vulnerability of hotels, by their very 
nature, is difficult to alter.  It is critical that the 
security conditions outlined in refs A and B, the latest 
Department public announcements on security, and these 
particular concerns be relayed directly to prospective 
codels and Hill leadership, and that they carefully 
reevaluate their travel plans, to include consideration 
of other nearby states which could provide staging ground 
for trips to Iraq. 
 
(SBU) Without a doubt, VIPs who decide to visit Jordan 
will continue to receive the very best support this Embassy 
can muster.  However, the threat to soft targets 
) Amman,s hotels ) is very real.  I must be and am equally 
concerned about the safety and security of my own staff. 
Supporting a codel requires mobilizing a sizeable number of 
Embassy staff in and around the hotels, to provide control 
and hospitality rooms as well as motor pool support. 
I cannot in good conscience order any employee to undertake 
any activity that jeopardizes his or her life.  We have not 
reached that stage, but we could so with little notice. 
GNEHM 

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