US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE867

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2014 
TAGS: KCRM, KJUS, MOPS, PREL, NL 
SUBJECT: DUTCH TO CONTINUE POLICE TRAINING IN SOUTHERN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 58021 
     B. 03 THE HAGUE 2476 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Mary E. Daly Reasons 1.5 (b) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Dutch government is not/not able to 
contribute any trainers for CPA Iraqi police development 
programs in Iraq and Jordan (ref a).  However, the Dutch 
remain actively involved in training Iraqi police in the 
province of Al-Muthanna.  The Dutch have also seconded a 
military police (Marechaussee) officer to work as Advisor and 
Mentor to the provincial Chief of Police (Iraqi Police 
Service) at the request of the British government.  Following 
ref a demarche, the GoNL has instructed its Marechaussee 
officers to be in closer coordination with CPA officials in 
Baghdad.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C)  The Dutch government is currently not/not able to 
contribute either civil or military (Marechaussee) police 
trainers to aid in Iraqi police development in either Jordan 
or Iraq.  PolOff delivered ref A demarche to MFA Security 
Policy Advisor Hester Jonkman in March.  Following 
interagency consultations, Jonkman advised post on April 1 
that the GoNL would unfortunately not be able to assist in 
the call for international trainers.  Dutch military police 
trainers are already executing police training programs via 
CIMIC (civilian-military cooperation) programs in the 
Al-Muthanna province, where Dutch troops are deployed.  The 
GoNL is unable to spare any additional Marechaussee police 
training officers for the Jordan or Baghdad training sites. 
(Note:  Further information on the police training program in 
Al-Munthanna will be provided septel.  End note.) 
Additionally, due to strict security considerations and 
regulations, civilian police are not able to be sent to Iraq. 
 Jonkman noted that the approval process for sending civilian 
police officers to Jordan is so time-consuming and 
complicated that the GoNL preferred not to begin the process, 
as approval would not be certain, and even a best-case 
scenario would be sending a mere one or two officers. 
Jonkman added that if the security situation in Baghdad 
significantly improves and stabilizes, the GoNL might 
reconsider this request in the future. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The GoNL, upon request from the British 
government, recently seconded a Marechaussee officer to act 
as advisor and mentor to the Chief of Police for the 
Al-Muthanna.  The Dutch were pleased to be able to assist in 
this request.  According the Political Counselor at the 
British Embassy in The Hague, this individual has the 
following responsibilities: 
 
a)  Working with the Iraqis and international civilian and 
military staff to build capacity within the new Iraqi Police 
Service 
b)  Mentoring the provincial Chief of Police.  Providing 
professional guidance to ensure s/he develops the necessary 
skills and abilities commensurate with the role.  Ensuring 
the Chief of Police carries out his/her duties in line with 
regional and national policies as determined by the Ministry 
of Interior. 
c)   Developing sufficient capacity within the provincial 
Governate to introduce effective local accountability within 
the IPS 
d)  Providing coordination, guidance and advice to the Field 
Training Coordinators and Officers who will be monitoring and 
mentoring IPS in the province 
e)  Assisting in the development of the provincial police 
committee in accordance with CPA Baghdad and Ministry of 
Interior policy. 
 
 
4.  (C) Further to reftel request, the GoNL has instructed 
its Marechaussee officers conducting police training in Iraq 
to ensure adequate contact and coordination with CPA police 
trainers in Baghdad. 
SOBEL