US embassy cable - 04BRASILIA794

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR WHA, SA/FO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SA/PAB, SA/A 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, BR, AF, External Relations 
SUBJECT: BRAZIL READY TO RECOGNIZE ITGA, NEEDS BUREAUCRATIC 
NUDGE 
 
 
Classified By: Lawrence E. Cohen, Poloff, reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary and Introduction:  Although the GOB is 
considering reopening a diplomatic mission in Baghdad, there 
has been no public mention of Brazilian intentions towards 
Afghanistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) Division 
Chief responsible for South Asia acknowledged a lack of focus 
on Afghanistan, but affirmed the GOB does desire ties with 
the Afghan Government. The USG, he suggested, could help 
overcome the MRE's bureaucratic inertia regarding joint 
diplomatic recognition with a friendly nudge in New York and 
Washington. He argued that the time is right to come to 
closure diplomatically; once ties are established, Brazil 
could find a way to assist in Phase IV reconstruction 
efforts. End Summary 
 
2.  (C) Poloff delivered powerpoint presentation on Coalition 
nation building efforts in Afghanistan to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MRE) Division Chief for Asia and Oceania Oswaldo 
Biato Junior.  Biato appreciated the presentation, admitted 
that Afghanistan had not received adequate MRE attention, and 
agreed that Brazil, as a current UNSC member, ought to be 
more engaged in Afghan issues. To explain the lack of focus, 
he noted bureaucratic factors.  For example, the MRE 
traditionally uses its representative in Tehran to cover 
Afghanistan -- even though Iran is under a different MRE 
division (Near East). Biato's own tiny division of four 
officers is responsible for all of South Asia and China. 
Recent and upcoming visits of President Lula and Foreign 
Minister Amorin to the region have absorbed all their energy. 
Meanwhile, Afghanistan remains far away and out of sight. 
 
3.  (SBU) While Brazil had enjoyed diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan since the 1950s, Biato acknowledged he was 
unaware of any formal contact with a GOA since the Russian 
invasion in 1979. However, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan poses no 
policy difficulties for the GOB. The GOB is supportive of the 
Bonn Process, understands the importance of Afghanistan in 
the war on terrorism, and has no problem with recognizing the 
Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA). 
 
4.  (C) Biato noted that the Afghan Ambassador in Washington 
recently had approached his Brazilian counterpart three times 
to request permission to present his credentials in Brasilia. 
Bureaucratic inertia is at fault, Biato said, for the lack of 
movement to respond affirmatively. The GOB would have no 
objection to receiving him, Biato said. The division chief 
suggested that specific messages of support from Brazilian 
ambassadors in Washington and New York to the MRE could 
provide the needed bureaucratic nudge and he suggested that 
USUN approach the Brazilian delegation to urge it to 
communicate with MRE in favor of Brazilian recognition of the 
ITGA. 
 
5.  (C) The timing for formalizing Afghan-Brazilian 
relations, Biato sensed, is right. The MRE has decided to 
remove Afghanistan from the plate of their Tehran ambassador 
and give the portfolio to Islamabad. A new ambassador to 
Pakistan, Fausto Godoy, has just been confirmed and will be 
consulting with MRE shortly before departing for Islamabad. 
Biato said that Godoy is eager to travel to Kabul. Moreover, 
diplomatic ties with Afghanistan could help bolster Brazil's 
claim for a permanent UN Security Council seat -- an argument 
Biato wanted to highlight to senior MRE leadership. 
 
6.  (C) Once diplomatic relations are in place, Brazil may be 
eager to help in some way. Biato pointed out that the GOB has 
not received any specific request from the UN or the 
Coalition for assistance, but there are areas in which Brazil 
can contribute.  For example, Brazil had expertise in 
"elections infrastructure and technology" that might be 
applicable to Afghanistan's developmental circumstances. 
Poloff pointed out that it would be more useful for Brazil to 
identify how it could help, perhaps following an 
investigative mission to Afghanistan, than to expect the 
Coalition or the ITGA to come to it with specific requests. 
Biato also described the GOB's G-3 (Brazil, South Africa, 
India) efforts to find common ground for development 
assistance programs. India, in particular, he opined, might 
welcome a joint effort with Brazil to assist Afghanistan. 
While Brazil has few financial resources to dedicate to 
Afghanistan, in-kind support, perhaps in conjunction with 
Indian personnel, could be made available, Biato said. 
 
HRINAK