US embassy cable - 04MADRID1099

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SPAIN: RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III DEMARCHE

Identifier: 04MADRID1099
Wikileaks: View 04MADRID1099 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2004-04-01 14:31:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KNNP SP NPT IAEA Non
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NP/MNA (B. WARD), GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: KNNP, SP, NPT, IAEA, Non-Proliferation Issues 
SUBJECT: SPAIN:  RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III DEMARCHE 
 
REF: STATE 63169 
 
Classified By: KATHLEEN FITZPATRICK, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. 
REASON: 1.4 (B) & (D). 
 
1.  (C) We presented reftel points to Marcos Rodriguez 
Cantero in the office of International Disarmament Affairs at 
the MFA on March 30.  Rodriguez, who will be Spain's delegate 
to the PrepCom, said Spain would support U.S. proposals to 
strengthen the IAEA Board of Governors and the Proliferation 
Security Initiative to ensure that nations comply with 
international safeguard obligations on non-proliferation.  He 
also agreed that linking procedural issues to agreement on 
substantive issues at the PrepCom is a non-starter.  Gaining 
consensus on non-proliferation issues should be the top 
priority, he said. 
 
2.  (SBU) Rodriguez pointed out that Spain ratified the IAEA 
Additional Protocol in 1999.  As current chair of the Board 
of Governors, Spain expects the Protocol to come into force 
before May 1, so that the countries that join the EU on May 2 
will be bound by it. 
 
3.  (C) Rodriguez expressed concern about restricting exports 
of sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle technology.  He cautioned 
that such restriction could create a more lucrative market 
for nuclear fuel-cycle technology, which could either 
influence more countries to develop nuclear technology or 
give countries of concern, like the Iran and the DPRK, a 
stronger economic impetus to continue to develop and share 
sensitive technology.  Rodriguez believes export restrictions 
could also create an international export 'cartel' that would 
exclude smaller producers of nuclear fuel-cycle technology in 
countries like Brazil and Mexico.  Rodriguez does not foresee 
export restrictions becoming an issue at the PrepCom. 
However, he expects the issue will be raised at next meeting 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and may pick up momentum 
leading up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. 
ARGYROS 

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