US embassy cable - 04MADRID1096

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND DEPUTY SECRETARY 
ARMITAGE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF AND DEPSECSTATE 
MEETINGS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER-DESIGNATE BONO 
 
REF: A. MADRID 919 
 
     B. MADRID 1052 
     C. MADRID 1074 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Goerge L. Argyros, reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  When you meet with Jose Bono April 5 in 
Washington, you will find this long-time Socialist party 
"heavyweight" an affable, smooth politician who could be a 
pro-U.S. voice of reason in the new government headed up by 
Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. 
We suggest focusing on the positive aspects of the 
Spanish-U.S. defense relationship and caution against trying 
to force Bono, in this first meeting, to define the new 
government's policies in all areas of cooperation, in 
particular the U.S.'s use of Spanish bases at Rota and Moron. 
 We think that allowing Bono and other members of the new 
government some time to adjust to their new roles will 
increase the possibility the U.S. can persuade them to take 
positions favorable for American interests.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Bono is one of the PSOE's key party bosses and 
narrowly lost to Zapatero in a struggle for party leadership 
in 2000.  (Refs A and B contain more detailed bio 
information).  He is well respected by those in his party as 
well as by members of the soon-to-be opposition Popular Party 
(PP).  He is also highly regarded by the Spanish military. 
Bono is likely to be a strong and highly influential figure 
in the Zapatero administration. 
 
3.  (C) In my meeting with him March 30, Bono said he was a 
friend of the U.S. and looked forward to continuing Spain's 
excellent defense relationship with the U.S. (ref C).  He 
asked to meet with Secretary Rumsfeld to convey personally on 
Zapatero's behalf the new government's position on Spanish 
troops serving in Iraq.  He politely declined to preview the 
position for me in the meeting.  We are unsure as to what 
Bono plans to say on the issue.  Nonetheless, it seems odd 
that Bono would not be willing to discuss the Spanish 
position with me if he simply planned to repeat to Secretary 
Rumsfeld Zapatero's publicly declared position on Iraq. 
There is at least some chance Bono plans to pass on 
information Zapatero has not mentioned in public. 
 
4.  (C) Although Zapatero made a big campaign issue out of 
his opposition to the Iraq war and to Spanish troops in Iraq 
reconstruction, neither he nor any other PSOE leaders made an 
issue out of U.S. use of Spanish bases at Rota and Moron.  We 
thus think it is important to steer clear of pressing Bono 
and the Spanish too hard to define their position at this 
early stage on the U.S.'s use of the bases.  The U.S. is more 
likely to be able to favorably influence Zapatero government 
thinking on the bases if we allow Zapatero, Bono and others 
to assume their new positions and become familiar with this 
complex issue (including learning from their own military how 
positive our cooperation has been up to now).  Forcing their 
hand now may make them take a hard line position they might 
not otherwise take. 
 
5.  (C) On the Spanish troop deployment to Iraq, we believe 
that Zapatero and his PSOE advisors have not yet made up 
their minds about whether a new UN resolution could cover 
their campaign promise to withdraw Spanish troops if there is 
no UN mandate.  We also believe that Zapatero and his 
advisors have not yet fleshed out the kind of content they 
would need in such a resolution to provide them with 
political cover to allow the troops to remain.  Therefore, 
this is a moment in which outreach at the senior leadership 
level can have some influence, as long as we are not seen as 
pushing them on other politically sensitive issues on which 
the as-yet-to-be-formed government has not determined its key 
interests. 
 
ARGYROS