US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU594

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR 
MILLARD; GENEVA FOR PLYNCH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014 
TAGS: PREF, PTER, NP, BH, Bhutanese Refugees 
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: MILITANCY IN CAMPS GROWS 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (S) Summary.  According to Bhutanese refugee human rights 
leader, Ratan Gazmere (please protect), the newly-elected 
camp secretaries and many refugee youth are now advocating 
taking up arms against the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) 
and are requesting financial "donations" to purchase arms and 
ammunition for the movement.  The relationship between the 
camp secretaries, political parties, and radical 
organizations remains unclear, although some connections 
apparently exist.  The growth of militancy in the refugee 
camps, a dangerous response to years of frustration and 
repeated disappointments, will seriously hurt the refugees' 
chances at repatriation.  At the same time, nascent militancy 
increases the urgency of resolving this long-standing issue. 
End Summary. 
 
(S) On March 31, UNHCR Protection Officer Giulia Ricciarelli 
(please protect) expressed "extreme concern" over reports 
that newly-elected leaders in all seven Bhutanese refugee 
camps in eastern Nepal are advocating a militant solution to 
the refugee problem.  On March 29, Ricciarelli met with 
refugee leader Ratan Gazmere (please protect), who had just 
returned from Jhapa District in eastern Nepal where he had 
attended a meeting on March 27 called by the seven camp 
secretaries.  (Note.  In late February, Camp Management 
 
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Committee elections were held in each of the 7 camps.  End 
Note.)  According to Ricciarelli, Gazmere indicated that, at 
the meeting, the camp secretaries and unidentified refugee 
youths threatened him and other leaders of refugee-run NGOs 
with a 7-day ultimatum for providing financial support to the 
Bhutanese Democratic Liberation Force (BDLF) for the purchase 
of arms and ammunition to be used against the Bhutanese 
government.  After ascertaining its purpose, Gazmere 
reportedly attempted to walk out of the meeting, but was 
prevented from doing so.  He is now "in hiding," Ricciarelli 
said.  On March 31, PolOff spoke by telephone with Gazmere 
and received a similar account. 
 
2. (S) On April 1, PolOff obtained a copy of the letter given 
to Gazmere by a group of five young men who followed him home 
from the March 27 meeting.  The letterhead reads "Bhutan 
Democratic Liberation Front" and "Sarpang, Bhutan."  The 
poorly-worded letter, signed by Bishal Rana, President of the 
BDLF, contains the following excerpts. 
 
BEGIN EXCERPTS 
 
"The BDLF in the form of political organization was put 
forward by the handful of cadres, very much exploited, 
patriotic and sacrificing with the view of establishing 
democracy in Bhutan.  We believe that success comes after 
action.  We believe in deeds than in words.  Therefore, we 
spent our precious four years of time in providing training 
to our 35 cadres. 
 
Now the crucial hour has come for steps.  The already set 200 
cadres on training need to be facilitated with provisions and 
arms and ammunitions until the completion of their training. 
 
As such, I would cordially like to request you to extend the 
support of NRs (handwritten) 50,000 (Fifty Thousand only) to 
enhance our program." 
 
END EXCERPTS 
 
3. (S) On March 29, PolOff received an email, which was also 
addressed to UNHCR, from an anonymous individual reporting on 
the March 27 meeting in Jhapa.  Similar to Gazmere's account, 
the author complained that at least two of the camp 
secretaries, who are prohibited from political affiliation, 
 
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are in fact active members of the Bhutan People's Party 
(BPP).  (Note.  The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) 
reportedly branded the BPP as a "terrorist" organization 
after the party led mass demonstrations against the 
government in 1989-1990.  End Note.)  The author noted that 
the camp secretaries are "overlooking the problems of the 
camps" and "holding meetings camp by camp to incite people, 
especially the youth, for armed struggle inside Bhutan." 
 
4. (S) Ricciarelli has tasked the senior protection officer 
in UNHCR's field office in Jhapa District with corroborating 
Gazmere's account.  She added that UNHCR Country Director 
Abraham Abraham was currently in Jhapa and would discuss this 
issue with Government of Nepal officials and the refugees. 
Fearing the repercussions of increased militancy in the camps 
on UNHCR and the bilateral process, Ricciarelli noted that 
many refugees have expressed dissatisfaction with UNHCR's 
plans to phase-out care and maintenance in the camps and have 
suggested that, as a result, they may have to "take their 
lives into their own hands." 
 
5. (S) Connections between the camp secretaries and the 
Bhutanese Democratic Liberation Front (BDLF) remain unclear. 
The BDLF has in the past year distributed flyers in the camps 
and, according to the letter, claims to have been training 
militant cadre over the past four years.  Connections between 
BDLF and the Bhutanese Communist Party (BCP) -- a group that 
allegedly has ties with Nepal's Maoists -- are also unknown. 
In an earlier meeting with refugee leader S.B. Subba, PolOff 
learned that the BCP has been recruiting and now allegedly 
has 2,000 - 4,000 supporters in the refugee camps.  Although 
neither of these organizations is based in the camps, 
Ricciarelli suspects that many refugee youths who are absent 
from the camps have joined one of the two movements.  Both 
Gazmere and the anonymous author indicated that some of the 
camp secretaries have ties with the Bhutan People's Party 
(BPP).  Ricciarelli has also heard allegations that the BPP 
has ties to the BDLF, although she has also heard that the 
BDLF has threatened and attempted to extort money from BPP 
leaders. 
 
6. (S) Comment.  The rise of militancy within the ranks of 
democratically-elected leaders -- who in theory have 
broad-based support -- in the Bhutanese refugee camps, if 
true, could have grave repercussions on finding a durable 
solution for this refugee problem.  We give credence to 
Gazmere's assertion that the secretaries do not have wide 
support among the refugees, but were elected through bribery, 
intimidation and political machinations.)  Although this is 
the first time that open advocacy of armed struggle has 
arisen in the camps, we have witnessed growing discontent and 
radicalization over the past 9 months -- since the May 2003 
announcement of Khundunabari Camp's verification results, 
followed by the rejection of appeals and repeated delays in 
repatriation, and finally the harsh conditions described by 
Bhutanese officials in December 2003. 
 
7. (S) Comment Continued.  The degree and level of support in 
the camps for an armed struggle against Bhutan remains 
unclear.  The possible connection between UNHCR's 
announcement of phased withdrawal from the camps to growing 
discontent and increased activism is further reason for UNHCR 
to amend its position and reassure the refugees that they 
will not be abandoned.  The specter of radicalism in the 
camps will have a very negative impact on the RGOB's 
willingness to repatriate a significant number of refugees. 
However, the prospect also increases the necessity for 
Bhutan's friends, but especially India, to urge Bhutan to 
move quickly to begin repatriation and resolve this 
potentially explosive issue.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI