US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1953

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPAL, IS, GOI INTERNAL, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: SHARON'S LIKUD REFERENDUM LIKELY TO STYMIE 
WITHDRAWAL OPPONENTS 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 1941 
 
     B. TEL AVIV 1906 
     C. TEL AVIV 1741 
     D. TEL AVIV 808 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY: PM Sharon's decision to take his unilateral 
disengagement plan to a referendum of the full 200,000-strong 
Likud membership, a body more moderate than its leadership, 
reinforces his hand in dealing with Likud and other-party 
ministers and Knesset members who oppose withdrawal.  The 
action also staves off for the anticipated six-week 
referendum preparation period any leftist or other demands 
for visible action toward withdrawal, and leaves Sharon time 
both to pursue USG assurances and to build a public relations 
bulwark against possible indictment on bribery charges 
(reftels).  In the unlikely event that the Likud referendum 
goes against his plan, Sharon will be able to say that he 
made every effort to work for peace and security.  If he wins 
by a narrow margin, Sharon could put off both the immense 
logistical challenge of settlement dismantlement by calling 
for a national referendum, a process that would require new 
legislation and would eat up additional months before the 
first settler leaves Gaza.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Sharon's 14 Likud cabinet ministers and the remaining 
nine other-party ministers are clearly divided, with 
positions ranging from full support for withdrawal, to 
support with major conditions attached, to solid opposition 
(Ref C).  Among Likud ministers and Knesset members, a solid 
show of rank-and-file Likud support would be extraordinarily 
difficult to ignore, as noted by Likud Education Minister and 
withdrawal opponent Limor Livnat right after Sharon's 
announcement of the party referendum. 
 
3.  (C) A Likud referendum also allows the rightist coalition 
parties, the National Union and the National Religious Party, 
to put off their threatened departures from the coalition, 
and a pro-withdrawal vote could well prompt them to realize 
that an ever more confident Sharon will be justifiably deaf 
to their threats.  Among Labor, such a Likud vote is likely 
to convince at least some of the many skeptical rank and file 
and party leaders that Sharon means business, thus providing 
the political cover for a Likud/Labor unity government (Ref 
A). 
 
4.  (C) Among the broader public, the referendum will likely 
confirm polls showing widespread support for Gaza withdrawal 
and solidify Sharon's reputation as the only Israeli leader 
capable of taking such a step.  Observers say those points 
are likely to be factors in both Attorney General Mazuz's 
possible indictment considerations, and the public's support 
for even a corruption-tainted prime minister (Refs B and C). 
An opinion poll published March 31 by the major daily 
"Yedioth Ahronoth," and a separate internal Likud survey both 
show that, even before any Sharon public relations campaign, 
51 percent of Likud members who would take part in the 
referendum would support his disengagement plan. 
 
5.  (C) Sharon need be in no hurry to finalize a withdrawal 
plan, although he will need to manage the "outcomes" of his 
visit to Washington in mid-April.  The acts of negotiating 
with Washington and conducting broad-based referenda maintain 
him in the public eye as an engaged, strong, confident 
leader, and dissipate pressure to address the bribery 
allegations, both those of the Greek island affair, for which 
the state attorney has recommended indictment, and those in 
the parallel Cyril Kern affair that await state attorney 
recommendations.  They also allow him to put off both the 
immensely difficult logistical task of actually withdrawing 
from settlements, and his possibly even more difficult 
ideological about-face from 37 years of hard-driving support 
for settlements.  Accordingly, Sharon could well determine 
some months from now, once a Likud referendum is out of the 
way, that he needs to go to a national referendum on 
withdrawal as well, a process that would require new 
legislation and eat up additional months before the first 
settler leaves Gaza. 
 
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KURTZER