US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1952

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 001952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, IS, SY, XF, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, GOI EXTERNAL 
SUBJECT: ISRAELI OFFICIALS BRIEF DJEREJIAN ON IMPROVED 
REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION; UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT PLANS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
1. (C) Summary.  In a series of meetings with GOI officials 
between March 26-30, former NEA A/S and Ambassador to Israel 
Ed Djerejian, here as an official guest of the Foreign 
Ministry in his current capacity as Director of the Baker 
Institute, heard that the regional strategic situation faced 
by Israel had improved, largely as a result of the Iraq war, 
but that threats remained.  Drawing on his experience as 
former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and on the U.S.-Syria 
dialogue hosted by the Baker Institute, Djerejian advocated 
"muscular diplomacy" with the Syrians.  Israeli officials 
were uniformly dismissive of any prospect for 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, as long as Arafat is on the 
scene.  PM COS Dov Weissglas briefed Djerejian on the main 
contours of the PM's disengagement plan.  Other 
interlocutors, while accepting the premise that unilateral 
disengagement represented a means of decreasing tension until 
such time as bilateral negotiations with a credible 
negotiating partner could be resumed, raised a number of 
concerns about the plan's implications.  For example, 
Immigration and Absorption Minister Tzipi Livni raised 
questions about the "ambiguous legal status" of the 
territories from which Israel will withdraw.  Others explored 
the issue of what "price" should be paid to compensate Israel 
for its territorial concession.  Djerejian's interlocutors 
widely assumed that, in the absence of a credible Palestinian 
partner, the United States should be prepared to compensate 
Israel.  Ambassador Djerejian emphasized the need to help 
empower the Palestinian security forces to assume security 
responsibility and to avoid the empowerment of Hamas.  NSC 
Director Giora Eiland briefed on his alternative vision for 
achieving a viable, two-state solution through a land swap 
with Egypt.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Israeli Foreign Ministry hosted a March 26-30 
visit to Israel by Ambassador Ed Djerejian, the founding 
director of the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice 
University, who was formerly U.S. Ambassador to Israel, U.S. 
Ambassador to Syria and NEA A/S.  During the four-day visit, 
Ambassador and poloff accompanied Amb. Djerejian to his 
numerous meetings with high-level Israeli government 
officials and opinion leaders, who included PM COS Dov 
Weissglas, National Security Council Director Giora Eiland, 
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, IDF COS MG "Boogie" Ya'alon, 
Military Intelligence Chief MG Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash, MOD DG 
Amos Yaron, MOD Political-Military Affairs Chief Amos Gilad, 
and Immigration and Absorption Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni. 
In addition, Djerejian met with former Mossad Chief (and 
former National Security Council Director) Ephraim Halevy. 
He also participated in a workshop on unilateral 
disengagement at the Economic Cooperation Foundation hosted 
by Executive Director Yair Hirschfeld.  Ambassador Kurtzer 
hosted a well-attended dinner in honor of Ambassador 
Djerejian that included a cabinet minister, a Member of the 
Knesset, Israeli government officials, representatives of 
non-governmental organizations, foreign diplomats, and 
Israeli academics and journalists. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Post-Iraq Situation Assessment: 
Israel's Security Improved, But Threats Remain 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (S/NF) Ambassador Djerejian's first GOI meeting was with 
DMI Chief MG Ze'evi-Farkash, who, drawing on Israel's 
just-concluded National Intelligence Estimate, briefed that 
the regional threats faced by Israel have been reduced as a 
result of the war in Iraq, although significant risks remain. 
 Citing "hard evidence," Farkash was adamant that the Iraqis 
had been trying to achieve the capability to attack targets 
in Israel.  He said that Saddam's Iraq possessed 25-30 bombs, 
some of which were chem./bio-capable; a "few" launchers; and 
30-40 long-range missiles.  Farkash opined that it was 
"possible" that Saddam had transferred such weaponry to Syria 
and it was clear that formerly Iraqi-based "front companies" 
for WMD had relocated to Syria.  He conceded, however, that 
there is no concrete proof of weapons transfers.  Again 
citing "sensitive" information, Farkash said that Saddam 
himself had been involved with Syrian President Bashar 
al-Asad in the shipment to Syria of two truckloads of unknown 
contents, but Farkash took Djerejian's point that the trucks 
might well have been full of hard currency, the protection of 
which was a key concern of Saddam's in the run-up to the war. 
 
4. (C) Running though a "before" and "after" checklist of 
regional powers prior to and after the Iraq war, Farkash 
offered the following assessments.  (Commentary from other 
GOI interlocutors identified by name.) 
 
-- Arafat/Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:  The PA Chairman has 
made no strategic change as a result of the Iraq war.  He 
continues to reject a two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  IDF COS Ya'alon accused Arafat 
of sowing "deliberate anarchy," assessing that the only 
effective response would be to completely isolate Arafat. 
Foreign Minister Shalom went even further, reiterating his 
long-held view that Arafat should be expelled.  MOD DG Amos 
Yaron asserted that even after 1,000 Intifada-related 
casualties the Israeli population would not succumb to 
terror.  "If they want to fight," he said, "We'll fight!" 
Making an obscene gesture, he continued, "And if they demand 
a 'right of return,' no way!" 
 
-- Iraq:  The United States effectively eliminated the 
"eastern front" threat.  The tension between the "Bremer 
vector" and the "terror vector" continues to play out, 
however, leaving the situation in Iraq "very fragile."  Not 
unlike Arafat, the terrorists' goal is to survive until the 
U.S. national elections. 
 
-- Libya:  Qaddafi has undergone a "huge shift," 
characterized by "deep, real change."  (Note:  Farkash took 
Djerejian's point that multilateral sanctions had played a 
decisive role in this context.  End Note.) 
 
-- Iran:  The regime is under pressure, but it has not taken 
a strategic decision to change.  MOD DG Yaron made clear that 
Iran remains an "existential threat" to Israel.  He also said 
Israel would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapons 
capacity. 
 
-- Syria/Lebanon/Hizballah:  Not only has the SARG's posture 
not changed for the better as a result of the Iraq war, the 
situation has worsened, with Bashar facilitating the delivery 
of weapons to Hizballah and inviting Iranian mullahs to 
cultivate the Shi'a population.  Ya'alon asserted that Syria 
now plays a "key" role in the external support structure for 
Palestinian terror.  While some support is generated in Iran 
and funneled through Damascus and Lebanon, Syria plays host 
to the external leadership of Palestinian terror organizations 
 
-- Al-Qaeda:  In the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, 
al-Qaeda turned increasingly to countries like Sudan, 
Somalia, Mauritania, and Algeria as hosts.  This represents a 
tactical, as opposed to a strategic, change, however.  There 
has been no diminution of al-Qaeda's jihadist efforts as a 
result of the war in Iraq.  Citing interdisciplinary 
"scientific" studies commissioned by the DMI, Farkash 
emphasized that it is important not to look at Al-Qaeda as a 
military organization.  Rather, it is an "amoeba-like" 
network of cells.  As such, it is most vulnerable at the 
intersection points between various cells. 
 
-- Turning to the rest of the Arab world, FM Shalom said that 
he could feel a palpable change in Arab countries, such as 
Qatar and Bahrain, where there is a greater openness to 
Israel.  Even Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, he said, is so 
inclined. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Unilateral Disengagement Scenarios: 
Answers and Questions 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) PM COS Dov Weissglas told Ambassador Djerejian that PM 
Sharon intended to "fully withdraw" from the Gaza Strip and 
to evacuate from "a couple" settlements in the northern West 
Bank.  (Note:  At a private dinner hosted by Dahlia 
Rabin-Pelesoff, Weissglas specified the number of West Bank 
settlements would be six.  End Note.)  He qualified that the 
decision on whether to leave the Philadephi Strip in Gaza 
would be a military decision, dependent on the outcome of 
negotiations with Egypt.  Asked about the Egyptian role in 
securing Gaza, Weissglas said that the Egyptians did not want 
to be seen as "replacing" the Israeli occupation.  He said 
that Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Sulayman had given his 
assurances to a trusted interlocutor in Washington that Egypt 
would not allow chaos to emerge in Gaza.  Weissglas said he 
hopes Jordan will play a similar role in the West Bank.  NSC 
Director Giora Eiland evaded Ambassador Kurtzer's question 
about whether the GOI has a fall-back position on the 
"assurances" it is seeking from the United States as a quid 
pro quo for withdrawal, stating that "it is not a question of 
fall-backs." 
 
6. (C) Immigration and Absorption Minister Tzipi Livni made 
clear that no one in the GOI views unilateral disengagement 
as a way to end the conflict with the Palestinians.  Rather, 
in the absence of a credible partner, disengagement is simply 
a means of easing tension.  The problem is that Palestinian 
terrorists will be tempted to view any Israeli withdrawal as 
evidence that terror pays.  Therefore, it must be clear that 
the Palestinians will achieve less as a result of unilateral 
disengagement than they would had they pursued good faith 
bilateral negotiations, whether in the context of the roadmap 
or some other vehicle.  Thus, she advocated remaining in the 
northern three settlements in the Gaza Strip, rather than 
evacuating it entirely.  This would also avoid a "dangerous 
precedent" of withdrawing to the 1967 borders, she reasoned. 
Asked whether these northern three settlements would become 
the "Shabaa Farms" of the Palestinians, Livni shrugged that 
even if those settlements were evacuated, "the whole West 
Bank could be the Palestinian Shabaa." 
 
7. (C) Moreover, she said, there is a growing understanding 
that time is working against those who favor a two-state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The question, 
then, becomes how to convince those who seek to use terror 
that time is working against them?   To some extent, she 
said, the construction of the separation barrier, which 
represents "the beginning of the two-state solution," is 
doing just that.  In this context, she noted that the 
principles that guided decision-making on the routing of the 
fence -- inclusion on the "Israeli side" of the barrier 
Jewish holy places and strategically important places, while 
requiring the minimum displacement of Israeli citizens from 
the "other side" of the barrier -- would be the same as those 
that guide GOI policy on the final borders. 
 
8. (C) As a long-time advocate of an explicit negation of the 
Palestinian "claim of return," Livni argued that it is 
precisely because of Palestinian refusal to give up this 
claim that Israel needs the United States to make some kind 
of assurance on the matter.  Explaining her rationale, she 
said that the final status issues as defined by Oslo include 
refugees and statehood (which were linked); borders and 
settlements (which were linked) and Jerusalem, which is a 
"unique" issue.  Emphasizing the sanctity of the "historical 
deal," Livni said that the establishment of a Palestinian 
state as a "homeland for the Palestinian people" obviates any 
claimed right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. 
To continue to insist on that right is tantamount to 
challenging Israel's right to exist as a secure, Jewish, 
democratic state.  She took umbrage that the Palestinians had 
"switched the pairs" by attempting to link the refugees issue 
with Jerusalem, a mistake to which she said the architects of 
the Geneva document had also fallen prey. 
 
9. (C) Livni also expressed reservations about the "ambiguous 
legal status" of the territories from which Israel withdraws. 
 On the one hand, she said, Israel must still control the 
international passages and the airspace over Gaza.  Israel 
would also insist on the ability to veto the presence of any 
"foreign forces" in Gaza.  "So in these senses," she said, 
"the occupation will continue," and the evacuated territories 
would not constitute a sovereign state.  On the other hand, 
Israel does not want to have responsibility for the economic 
and humanitarian situation of the Palestinians.  In a 
separate meeting, former NSC and Mossad Director Ephraim 
Halevy opined that Israel should make clear that it is 
"vacating territory, not authority," since Israel is not 
currently the governing authority in the Gaza Strip.  He 
argued that the Palestinian Authority, at least 
theoretically, has "full authority" in the Gaza Strip, even 
if the PA has not been exercising this authority coercively. 
 
10. (C) Ya'alon contended that, "Unilateral withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip will not improve Israel's security," since the 
Palestinians would not have to "pay a price."  Ambassador 
Kurtzer urged that the GOI not underestimate the 
transformative power of the PM's unilateral withdrawal plan. 
Noting that the PM had changed the strategic environment, he 
questioned the underlying assumption that the unilateral 
approach ruled out the possibility of seeking a quid pro quo 
from the Palestinians.  For lack of a Palestinian partner 
with whom to negotiate, the GOI had understandably turned to 
the USG to pay a price.  An alternative approach, he said, 
would be to empower a partner on the other side through the 
one thing that no other Palestinian leader had been able to 
extract from the Israelis -- territorial withdrawal.  The GOI 
could potentially extract a price from a so-empowered 
Palestinian leader.  Ya'alon rejected this reasoning, 
asserting that it is unrealistic to expect the empowerment of 
anyone as long as Arafat is on the scene.  NSC Director 
Eiland was skeptical, but he did not completely rule out this 
scenario.  Eiland's predecessor in that position, Ephraim 
Halevy, mused out loud that if the GOI had "invested 
yesterday in Abu Mazen what we're prepared to invest today 
unilaterally, we'd be looking at a different story.  Why we 
didn't do it, I can't say." 
 
11. (C) Ambassador Djerejian urged his GOI interlocutors to 
work actively to empower the PA security forces to take 
control of the areas from which Israel withdraws and to 
eliminate Hamas.  The empowerment of Finance Minister Salam 
Fayyad could serve as a model, he argued.  Yaron responded to 
this point by noting that "it is no secret" that the GOI has 
been keeping in touch with former PA Interior Minister 
Mohammed Dahlan to this end.  In his meeting with Ya'alon, 
Djerejian asked whether the Israelis had considered 
imprisoned Fatah/Tanzim leader Barghouti as a potentially 
viable Palestinian leader.  Ya'alon simply shook his head. 
Halevy asserted that, "There will come a time when it becomes 
necessary to try to recruit Hamas as part of the solution." 
Assessing that Fatah is weak, he opined that Fatah leaders 
will ultimately need to co-opt at least some elements of 
Hamas into the body politic -- in order to isolate the real 
extremists.  Moreover, he said, Hamas leaders are "practical 
people."  They have assiduously avoided a confrontation in 
which they would stand to lose their assets in a fight 
against the PA, and they can be expected to continue to do 
so. 
 
------------------------------- 
Israeli-Palestinian End-Game: 
Eiland Proposes Sinai Land Swap 
------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Repeating a personal view that he had previously 
expressed to other USG visitors, NSC Director Eiland laid out 
for Ambassador Djerejian a different end-game solution than 
that which is commonly envisioned as the two-state solution. 
Eiland's view, he said, was prefaced on the assumption that 
demographic and other considerations make the prospect for a 
two-state solution between the Jordan and the Mediterranean 
unviable.  Currently, he said, there are 11 million people in 
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and that number will 
increase to 36 million in 50 years.  The area between Beer 
Sheva and the northern tip of Israel (including the West Bank 
and Gaza) has the highest population density in the world. 
Gaza alone, he said, is already "a huge concentration camp" 
with 1.3 million Palestinians.  Moreover, the land is 
surrounded on three sides by deserts.  Palestinians need more 
land and Israel can ill-afford to cede it.  The solution, he 
argued, lies in the Sinai desert. 
 
13. (C) Specifically, Eiland proposed that Egypt be persuaded 
to contribute a 600 square kilometer parcel of land that 
would be annexed to a future Palestinian state as 
compensation for the 11 percent of the West Bank that Israel 
would seek to annex in a final status agreement.  This Sinai 
block, 20 kms of which would be along the Mediterranean 
coast, would be adjacent to the Gaza Strip.  A land corridor 
would be constructed connecting Egypt and this block to 
Jordan. (Note:  Presumably under Egyptian sovereignty.  End 
Note.)  In addition, Israel would provide Egypt a 200 square 
km block of land from further south in the Negev.  Eiland 
laid out the following advantages to his proposed solution: 
 
-- For the Palestinians:  The additional land would make Gaza 
viable.  It would be big enough to support a new port and 
airport, and to allow for the construction of a new city, all 
of which would help make Gaza economically viable.  It would 
provide sufficient space to support the return of Palestinian 
refugees.  In addition, the 20 km along the sea would 
increase fishing rights and would allow for the exploration 
of natural gas reserves.  Eiland argued that the benefits 
offered by this parcel of land are far more favorable to the 
Palestinians than would be parcels Israel could offer from 
the land-locked Negev. 
 
-- For Egypt:  Israel would compensate Egypt with a parcel of 
land on a 1:3 ratio, which is the ratio of the size of Israel 
to the Sinai.  Egypt would enjoy the land corridor to Jordan, 
thereby controlling the shortest distance between Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia to Europe. 
 
-- For Jordan:  The greater the capacity of the Gaza Strip to 
absorb Palestinian refugees, the fewer the number of refugees 
who would "return" to settle in the West Bank, thereby 
resulting in less pressure on Jordan. Jordan would also 
benefit economically from the land bridge. 
 
14. (C) Eiland, having previously debated the merits of this 
proposal with Ambassador Kurtzer, conceded the point that 
Egyptian President Mubarak "would never agree" to it, and he 
also took the point that in negotiating the Israel-Egypt 
peace treaty Israel had foregone the entire Sinai and 
accepted the Palestinian issue as an "Israeli" problem.  He 
nonetheless refused to be dissuaded from exploring the idea, 
noting that he had reason to believe that Prime Minister 
Sharon would support such a proposal, if it were tabled by a 
third party. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Syria:  Muscular Diplomacy Needed 
---------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) Ambassador Djerejian briefed his GOI interlocutors on 
the three face-to-face meetings he has held with Bashar 
al-Asad since Bashar assumed office.  He noted that Bashar 
had initially been quite dynamic and determined to move 
forward on economic and social reforms.  Bashar had been 
enthusiastic about the idea of developing a Track II 
U.S.-Syria dialogue, three rounds of which had now been 
hosted at the Baker Institute.  Bashar himself had suggested 
that the agenda include terrorism, U.S.-Syria bilateral 
relations, regional issues, and Israel-Syria negotiations. 
By the time of the second round of the dialogue, however, 
Bashar was exhibiting much less interest in the economic and 
social reform issues, perhaps as a result of the growing 
corrupting influences of money and power. 
 
16. (C) Asked whether he believed Bashar was sincere in his 
professed interest in revisiting Israel-Syria negotiations, 
Djerejian answered affirmatively.  He noted two caveats, 
however:  First, Bashar made clear that just as Arafat broke 
ranks with the rest of the Arab world in pursuing 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Oslo, Syria would be 
prepared to break ranks with the Palestinians in pursuing the 
Syria track.  Bashar argued that it would be impossible to do 
so, however, without some improvement in the 
Israeli-Palestinian situation.  In addition, Bashar had 
emphasized to Djerejian that Israel-Syria negotiations should 
not start from scratch but rather should be conducted on the 
basis of the "legacy" of previous negotiations. 
 
17. (C) Without addressing the veracity of Bashar's claims, 
Djerejian conveyed in his meetings here the gist of his 
conversations in Damascus, in which the Syrian President had 
maintained that Palestinian rejectionist groups housed in 
Damascus were conducting only "political" activities. 
Djerejian's interlocutors uniformly rejected the Syrian 
leader's claims.  As Ya'alon put it, the Syrian leader quite 
simply was lying, and the GOI had ample evidence to prove it. 
 
18. (C) As for how to influence the Syrian regime, Ambassador 
Djerejian advocated an approach of constructive engagement 
coupled with "muscular diplomacy," rather than a strategy 
focused on isolating and pressuring Bashar.  Most of 
Djerejian's interlocutors favored a more aggressive approach. 
 Ya'alon, however, agreed in principle with a measured carrot 
and stick approach -- "as long as it's a big stick and a 
conditional carrot." 
 
19. (C) Eiland argued that Israel should not pursue a peace 
treaty with Syria, because it would necessitate Israel's 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights.  In this context, he 
asserted that it had also been a mistake to make peace with 
Egypt, among other reasons because Israel had set a precedent 
by withdrawing from the entire Sinai, thereby raising 
expectations that Israel would also ultimately withdraw 
completely from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as from 
the Golan.  Eiland argued passionately that any potential 
benefit to Israel's security that would be gained in the 
context of a peace accord with Syria would be outweighed by 
the cost associated with withdrawing from the Golan Heights. 
"Israel needs the space, the water -- even the views" on the 
Golan. 
 
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