US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1087

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON 
USCINSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER PEREZ: RELATIONS COULD NOT GET 
WORSE 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for Reason 1.4(d) 
 
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Summary: 
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1. (C) In a March 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign 
Minister Jesus Perez said the relationship between the U.S. 
and Venezuela could not get worse.  Perez said there was a 
lot of fear in the GoV that the USG was planning to overthrow 
the Chavez regime.  The Ambassador told him that there is no 
USG plan to topple Chavez, but noted that relations could 
indeed get much worse unless Chavez tempers his anti-U.S. 
remarks, personal insults and invective.  The Ambassador said 
it was in the GoV's interest to speak with the USG so that we 
can understand their point of view.  The Ambassador 
reiterated that U.S. policy seeks a democratic solution and 
noted our concern that the GoV was slowly taking control of 
public institutions.  End Summary. 
 
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Could Relations Be Worse? 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) On March 23, the Ambassador met with newly-installed 
Foreign Minister Jesus Perez for a frank and open exchange of 
views on U.S.- Venezuela relations.  The Ambassador brought 
up an interview with Perez published March 21 in the Caracas 
daily El Universal, in which Perez said the relationship 
between Venezuela and the U.S. "could not be worse."  The 
Ambassador noted with surprise that this article included a 
version of the Ambassador's last conversation with Perez. 
The Ambassador stressed that diplomatic conversations are 
confidential.  He told the Foreign Minister that contrary to 
 
SIPDIS 
what Perez had told the reporter, bilateral relations could 
indeed get worse.  Relations, he continued, are bad because 
President Chavez appeared determined to use the U.S. as a 
foil to build his own domestic support. 
 
3. (C) Perez responded that he wanted to be transparent and 
honest and hoped to compliment the Ambassador by calling him 
disciplined.  He then backtracked somewhat and said the 
article misquoted him and distorted what he had told the 
reporter.  Perez said he hoped that he and the Ambassador 
could be "sincere" and solve whatever problems in the 
bilateral relationship the Ambassador saw needed improvement. 
 He recalled telling a colleague that the relationships 
between our governments are "tense," but that he could "speak 
to Shapiro as a man," not just as a government 
representative.  Perez noted that the rhetoric between 
Presidents Bush and Chavez was "very hot," but the Ambassador 
and FM could speak with mutual respect.  Perez said his job 
was to work with the Ambassador to see ways in which they 
could improve matters between their countries. 
 
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Fear of the U.S. 
---------------- 
 
4. (C) Perez said there was a lot of fear in the GoV that the 
USG was planning to overthrow the Chavez regime.  He pointed 
to Haiti, and said remarks by POTUS at the recent Summit in 
Monterey had not helped.  The Ambassador responded that there 
is no USG plan to topple Chavez, and that such rumors were 
only the product of a vivid imagination.  On the other hand, 
the personal insults and invectives hurled at the USG by 
Chavez in regular broadcasts are from the highest levels of 
the GoV.  The Ambassador listed personal attacks against 
President Bush, the Secretary and the National Security 
Advisor, insults that contained elements of racial slurs, or 
profanity, and suggestions that the Bush administration 
represented the activity behind the assassinations of Martin 
Luther King and President John F. Kennedy.  Perez said he 
thought relations could improve if the two presidents were to 
meet.  The Ambassador replied that it is most unlikely that 
President Bush would meet with someone who regularly insults 
him. 
 
 
5. (C) Perez distanced himself from Chavez's remarks, noting 
that he had been trained in Europe and was therefore 
unaccustomed to engaging in such displays.  Perez said that 
while he trusted Chavez implicitly, he recognized that Chavez 
was a military man who held the "people in his heart."  Perez 
said it was his assignment, and that of the Ambassador, to 
communicate with their respective presidents and eliminate 
such excess language.  Perez said he believed in a stronger 
relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela in the future. 
But it was difficult now because the USG speaks with the 
opposition.  Perez also asserted that the U.S. is unpopular 
because of its international policies.  If the U.S. can talk 
with Libya, he added, then surely Venezuela and the U.S. can 
talk.  We have to solve this, said Perez, and not allow the 
press to invent problems between the two countries. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador told Perez the USG speaks with 
representatives of both sides and would continue to do so to 
gain a thorough understanding of the country.  The Ambassador 
noted that few from Chavez's ruling MVR party would speak 
with emboffs, but that was in spite of the USG continuing to 
extend invitations.  The Ambassador said it was in the GoV's 
interest to maintain contact with the Embassy so that we can 
understand their point of view.  If one reporting overly 
represents the views of the opposition it is because the GoV 
has ordered its officials and supporters to have to contact 
with the Embassy.  Perez acknowledged that the GoV has 
embargoed the Embassy. 
 
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Dynamics of the Bilateral Relation 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador said the press had not invented 
problems between the USG and the GoV.  Diosdad Cabello and 
A/S Noriega had agreed to avoid "microphone diplomacy." 
Nonetheless, the GoV had almost immediately implemented a 
public relations campaign about alleged U.S. intervention in 
Venezuela.  The USG does not publicly respond to insults by 
Chavez because the issue is not a bilateral one, but a 
problem between Chavez and his Venezuelan opposition.  The 
USG policy is to support OAS Resolution 833, i.e., to find a 
peaceful, democratic, constitutional and electoral solution 
to the on-going crisis, and to support the on-going efforts 
by the OAS and the Carter Center in their roles as observers 
and facilitators. 
 
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Democracy With an Asterisk 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador concluded that our hope is that 
Venezuela will prosper in peace and democracy with an 
improving economy.  But this cannot be a democracy with an 
asterisk, where the GoV slowly takes control of public 
institutions, or where GoV officials including Chavez say 
that signing a petition permitted under the constitution is 
considered the equivalent of conspiring against the 
government.  Perez conceded that the GoV had overreacted and 
had in fact gone beyond the constitution.  But he justified 
those actions as the result of April 2002.  Just as the U.S. 
responded to September 11 by infringing somewhat on citizens' 
rights, so too had the GoV responded to the "coup" of 2002 
and the "economic sabotage" of 2003. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Update on Approval for New Ambassador 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) The Ambassador asked for an update on the pending 
request for agreement for the new Ambassador.  Perez 
apologized for any delay and said the ministry bureaucracy 
had been very busy, but hoped the paperwork would be done in 
a week or so.  The Ambassador explained the internal process 
in the U.S. to confirm a nominated ambassador through the 
Senate, and noted that during an election year, the 
legislature would be out of session sooner than normal. 
Accordingly, getting the approval from Venezuela would be 
 
 
particularly helpful.  Perez agreed to look into it. 
 
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Comment: 
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10. (C) Perez speaks in platitudes and shows little 
understanding of the complexities of the U.S.-Venezuela 
governmental relationship.  He largely built his life in 
France, and peppers his conversation with references to his 
experience there, having little regional experience from 
which to draw.  He demonstrates a fundamental lack of 
understanding of the United States government and culture. 
He is, however, smooth, and so serves the GoV as a 
shock-absorber in the wake of the tough Chavez statements. 
It is doubtful that Perez will be a useful conduit to Chavez. 
 He has some access to Chavez-- he is said to be Chavez's 
half-brother or, if not, a childhood friend.  But it is 
unclear that Chavez will listen to him. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA01087 - CONFIDENTIAL