US embassy cable - 04HARARE541

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P AND AF; NSC FOR SR ADVISER FRAZIER; BRUSSELS 
FOR USEU; LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI, SF, Zimbabwe South African Relations 
SUBJECT: REENERGIZING SADC AND SOUTH AFRICA ON ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: PRETORIA 1338 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Joseph G. Sullivan for reasons 
1.5 b/d 
 
 1. (C) We endorse the well-considered and timely proposal of 
Embassy Pretoria in reftel to make an urgent effort to 
reenergize SADC and South Africa on Zimbabwe. Such an effort, 
particularly if we can find a way to engage the EU, SADC and, 
most importantly, South Africa could help unlock an 
increasingly frozen political crisis based on ever increasing 
repression. While there is no assurance that Mugabe would 
respond positively to a US or regional initiative, a combined 
initiative would have greater prospects of success and the 
absence of African, and particularly South African 
involvement in the effort would give Mugabe all the excuse he 
would need to refuse compromise. 
 
2. (C) Timing is urgent because Mugabe is proceeding apace to 
utilize violence, intimidation, ballot stuffing, and rigging 
of the electoral rules and media coverage to ensure that 
ZANU-PF wins an overwhelming majority in the March,2005 
parliamentary elections. The GOZ's withdrawal last month of 
an earlier request for UN assistance in organizing next 
year's elections was the giveaway to Mugabe's intentions to 
win through whatever means necessary and to renounce any 
pretense of engaging in dialogue with the opposition or 
utilizing the 2005 elections to address Zimbabwe's political 
crisis. The GOZ's violent conduct of this past weekend's 
by-election in the Harare suburb of Zengeza(septel) signal 
ZANU-PF's intention to use violence and intimidation and to 
ignore international (read Western) opinion/protests and the 
will of its own populace. While we think that MDC is unlikely 
to boycott even a rigged election, such an unfair contest 
will only ensure that Mugabe or a hand-picked successor, 
rubber-stamped through a constitutional amendment by the new 
parliament continues until 2008, prolonging for years 
Zimbabwe's multi-faceted crisis. 
 
3. (C) Establishing a healthier environment for next year's 
elections will take time and considerable effort and should 
be a central priority for all with an interest in resolution 
of Zimbabwe's political crisis.  The tepid response of SADC 
and other regional governments to our demarches on Zimbabwe 
underscores their sensitivity to taking on a "liberator" of 
Mugabe's stature.  Framing the issue around the primacy of 
the election environment and SADC-Parliamentary Forum norms 
and standards may be a useful means of de-personalizing the 
issue and attracting SADC members on their own terms. 
 
4. (C) With respect to Embassy Pretoria's specific proposals, 
we endorse the recommendation of sending an emissary to talk 
with President Mbeki and other African leaders, ZANU-PF and 
MDC officials to determine the status of the putative 
dialogue and steps needed to resolve Zimbabwe's political 
crisis.  We do not expect the GOZ to welcome this initiative, 
but they would not be able to ignore renewed US engagement, 
and if we were able to engage President Mbeki and other 
African leaders in the effort, it would be much more 
powerful.  Indeed, such an effort would depend for its force 
on Mbeki and other Africans telling Mugabe at the end of the 
day that he must agree to compromise. We also find the idea 
of a continuing contact group positive, believe the 
engagement of UNSYG Annan could be helpful along with perhaps 
another African leader. Nor would we object to discussing 
changes in US and EU sanctions with regional leaders, since 
these sanctions alone are unlikely to produce positive 
change, provided the quid pro quo of establishment of a free, 
fair and fully monitored election is fully agreed to by 
African interlocutors and then signed onto by the GOZ. 
Pretoria's final proposal for joint meetings with Zimbabwean 
parties aiming for a comprehensive agreement on elections, 
political change and economic recovery has merit, since a 
serious good faith dialogue among the Zimbabwean parties 
would be the best way to resolve the country's crisis, but is 
unlikely to happen without coordinated international pressure. 
 
5. (C) Timing a US emissary's arrival for shortly after the 
South African election may be additionally propitious. 
ZANU-PF fears that a newly elected Mbeki might be more ready 
to press Mugabe harder.  Moreover, ZANU-PF is going through 
its own internal turmoil, fueled by exposure of high-level 
corruption and Mugabe's obsession with his wife's infidelity. 
 On their own, Mugabe and ZANU-PF are likely to hang 
together, but a new international initiative could open new 
opportunities. 
SULLIVAN