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| Identifier: | 04MANAMA431 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04MANAMA431 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Manama |
| Created: | 2004-03-29 14:22:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PREL IZ BA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000431 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2014 TAGS: PREL, IZ, BA SUBJECT: BAHRAINI VIEWS ON IRAQ: WONDERING ABOUT IRAQI SHIA, AND SUNNI BUY-IN Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4(B)(D). 1. (S) Summary: Bahrain's King Hamad remains concerned about the extent of Shia and Iranian influence in Iraq but is strongly supportive of our efforts there. His son the Crown Prince urged us to take care with the de-Baathification process to avoid alienating Iraqi Sunnis. The King and Crown Prince both recognized that reestablishing the Iraqi state is a long-term process. The Crown Prince commented that he could imagine Iraq's permanent government set up in 2006 might look like the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s: pro-Western, no threat to its neighbors but plagued with problems of corruption and bad governance. This outcome, while not ideal, would be a big plus over the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. End Summary. 2. (S) Bahrain's King Hamad bin Issa told CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid on March 24 that he fears Iraqi instability after the turnover of sovereignty to an Iraqi government on June 30. Hamad discounted the political courage of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and expected the IGC would not make tough political decisions about Iraq's future over the coming months. Hamad sharply criticized Ayatollah Sistani for engaging too much in politics in such a way that would aggravate sectarian divisions in Iraq. He urged the U.S. to be careful of Iran's trying to use Iraqi Shia to aggravate the situation in Iraq. General Abizaid assured the King of American commitment to reestablishing stability in Iraq. He also highlighted the Coalition's effort to build up capable Iraqi security forces. Achieving durable stability in Iraq would be a long process, he concluded, and Iraq would need the help of the United States as well as its neighbors. 3. (C) Ambassador explained to the King, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister on March 28-29 the key events and issues over the next year as it now looks. The U.S. is committed to the June 30 transfer of sovereignty. The Coalition understands that the IGC must be more credible and is looking at ways to establish a credible Iraqi authority which will receive power on June 30. The U.N. might be able to offer useful ideas and will definitely be part of the process. At the end of 2004 or early 2005, there will be national elections to elect a temporary parliament. In order to prepare for those elections, the UN, CPA and the IGC are working on a new electoral law and how to establish an election commission to oversee the polls. The temporary parliament will then operate under the framework established by the temporary administrative law - a "temporary constitution" designed to compel competing Iraqi groups to work together. The temporary parliament will have a three-man presidency and will also name the rest of the government. It also will prepare the draft permanent constitution. Once drafted, that constitution will go to a public referendum and if approved new elections to establish the new, permanent government will be held. All three Bahraini officials underlined their support for the process as laid out. 4. (S) Bahrain's Crown Prince, Shaikh Salman bin Hamad, told Ambassador that the Bahraini government has two main concerns about Iraq over the next six months. First, he urged that the de-Baathification process in Iraq be undertaken in such a way as to not alienate the majority of Iraq's Sunnis. Salman commented that with Ahmed Chelabi in charge the odds of alienating most Iraqi Sunnis seem to be higher. Bahrain and other Gulf states want to see Iraq's Sunnis brought into the process. The Ambassador noted greater contacts in recent months between the Coalition Provisional Authority and Sunni leaders, and he pointed to Sunni political groupings and associations starting to form in order to take a more active role in the future Iraqi government. Second, Salman urged that the United States stand up a capable Iraqi defense force to assume a great burden on the war against terror in Iraq. Ambassador Neumann pointed to progress to date and assured Salman that establishing adequate Iraqi security forces is a high priority for the United States and the Coalition. 5. (S) Salman observed that rebuilding the Iraqi state almost from zero is an enormous challenge. He mused that over the longer term if the United States is successful in Iraq, he could imagine that Iraq might resemble the Philippines of the 1980s and 1990s. Salman said in this case Iraq would be pro-western, and would represent no threat to its neighbors. It would have a better record on human rights as well. It also, however, would be plagued with problems of poor government and corruption. Salman concluded that despite these shortcoming, such an Iraq would be a vast improvement in the strategic picture from what Iraq had represented under Saddam and that it could further develop over time. NEUMANN
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