US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT1003

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 001003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA, D, PM, S/WCI 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP 
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR VPOTUS MEETING WITH FONMIN 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 368 
     B. KUWAIT 379 
     C. KUWAIT 728 
     D. KUWAIT 758 
     E. SECTO 42 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON:  1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) Meeting with the Vice President March 31 will be the 
highlight of Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed 
Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah's visit to Washington.  It will also 
be the GOK'S highest-level meeting with the USG since Prime 
Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah's September 
10 bilateral and lunch with the President at the White House. 
 Dr. Mohammed has said he would like Deputy Prime Minister 
and Defense Minister Shaykh Jaber Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah 
to attend his meetings with senior US officials.   He is also 
scheduled to meet with NSA Rice and Deputy Secretary 
Armitage, and participate in the Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) 
ceremony on April 1. 
 
(U) KUWAIT:  THE ONE INDISPENSABLE ALLY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Kuwait was the one indispensable ally for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  It is unique:  the only Arab state 
where both the government and public opinion openly supported 
us in eliminating Saddam Hussein's regime by force.  Besides 
granting unqualified permission for basing and unlimited 
overflight/landing clearances for OIF, Kuwait built fuel 
pipelines for our forces and provided free fuel, as discussed 
in detail below.  The Kuwaitis understand that they need us 
to succeed in Iraq, and they are eager to help.  They have 
provided strong political support to the Iraqi Governing 
Council, most recently by inviting Iraq to the Neighboring 
Countries Ministerial held here February 14-15, as a full and 
equal participant.  The Government and private sector are 
working together to crystallize a creative vision of an Iraq 
integrated into the Gulf region and beyond.  Kuwait's total 
pledge at the Madrid Conference, $1.5 billion, encompasses 
about $1 billion already spent in support of the liberation 
of Iraq, including over $122 million for humanitarian 
operations.  The GOK says it will consult with the Iraqis on 
how best to spend the remaining half-billion dollars.  The 
MFA Undersecretary confirmed to Charge March 28 that Kuwait 
is in the process now of transferring its $10 million pledge 
for IRFFI, half to UNDP and half to the World Bank. 
 
(C) SHARING THE BURDEN 
---------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The GOK continues to view the US as its long-term 
partner and protector.  It understands, perhaps better than 
most, that even though we do things in a very heavy, 
expensive way, we get results.  They like being on the 
winning team, and feel vindicated for having sided with us in 
the liberation of Iraq.  That said, this is a small country, 
rich on a small scale, and our Iraq operations dwarf its 
income:  the US $87 billion supplemental is more than double 
Kuwait's GDP of $35-40 billion.  The Kuwaitis also want their 
contributions acknowledged, and they need to know what we 
expect them to provide and for how long. 
 
4.  (C) The GOK's Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) fuel for US and 
Coalition forces is a significant issue that needs to be 
addressed:  from $8 million in 2002, it rose to well over 
$400 million in 2003, and is projected to be over $400 
million for 2004.  This represents about 22 percent of 
Kuwait's jet-fuel production, 4.5 percent of government 
revenues from oil sales, and 1.2 percent of GDP, 
proportionately equivalent to some $150 billion in the US. 
Since Assistant Secretary Bloomfield's successful visit in 
January (refs A, B), the fuel has continued to flow at the 
rate of about 1.3 million gallons/day (worth approx. $1.2 
million), but who ultimately will pay for it remains 
undetermined.  The GOK says it needs an agreement spelling 
out quantities to be provided and for how long, in order to 
fend off parliamentary criticism.  However, the Kuwaiti 
leadership has been reluctant to specify any limit, 
apparently hoping we will put a cap on the AIK ourselves. 
Meanwhile, the fuel comes out of the MOD budget, severely 
constraining the Kuwait military's ability to pay for its own 
operations and development.  (NOTE:  Deputy Secretary 
Armitage will set the stage for follow-on discussions April 2 
between Dr. Mohammed and a State-DOD team.  END NOTE.) 
 
5.  (S/NF) A Serious Operational Impact:  reaching final 
agreement on the AIK fuel issue is critical to our continued 
ability to deploy forces into Kuwait.  In but the most recent 
example of deployment problems caused by this lack of 
agreement, in February USCENTCOM requested the basing of two 
(2) EC-130H Compass Call aircraft at Kuwait's Ali al-Salem 
Airbase.  These aircraft were being deployed specifically to 
provide jamming and sophisticated electronic warfare support 
to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are 
responsible for the majority of coalition casualties in Iraq. 
 The Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Armed Forces did not allow 
the deployment, based on the need to reach an arrangement on 
the provision of fuel.  Essentially we are now unable to move 
any additional aircraft into Kuwait pending resolution of 
this issue.  To date, ground force deployment has not been 
affected (presumably because the forces are rotating to Iraq 
and not remaining in Kuwait).  However, the freeze on 
aircraft basing is having an operational impact. 
 
6.  (C) With the fall of Saddam's regime, Kuwait is in the 
process of reviewing its security and defense requirements. 
The Ministry of Defense is increasingly concerned with its 
budget, and has begun to evaluate the costs associated with 
support to U.S. and Coalition Forces.  We expect exercises, 
Foreign Military Sales, Assistance in Kind, and 
Burden-sharing costs to receive close scrutiny.  Kuwait has 
already scaled back participation in bilateral military 
exercises, we believe primarily for budgetary reasons.  OSD 
will host the bilateral Joint Military Commission (JMC), the 
first since 1999, on March 30-31 in Washington.  Minister of 
Defense Shaykh Jaber Mubarak will attend. 
 
7.  (C) Iraq Debt Relief:  Secretary Baker obtained the Prime 
Minister's support for substantial reduction of Iraq's debt 
this year.  The GOK has made clear it intends to act in 
concert with the Paris Club, and only when there is a 
sovereign Iraqi government to negotiate with directly. 
Iraq's bilateral debt to Kuwait is estimated at $8 - 15 
billion.  This is apart from Gulf War reparations which are 
dealt with by the UNCC under UNSC resolutions. 
 
(C) COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (S) Although general CT cooperation has been excellent 
throughout OEF, since a change in Ministers of Interior last 
summer, the GOK has become slow to grasp the seriousness of 
the Sunni Islamist threat among Kuwaitis.  It needs to 
respond more quickly and substantively to our requests for 
information on Kuwaiti Sunni extremists, especially those 
active in Iraq. 
 
(C) GUANTANAMO 
-------------- 
9.  (S) Improved cooperation would strengthen the GOK's case 
on Guantanamo detainees:  during Secretary Rumsfeld's 
February 22 visit, Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah spent much of 
their meeting pressing for the Kuwaiti Guantanamo detainees 
to be repatriated.  Even after SECDEF made clear they are 
dangerous individuals, the PM insisted he wanted them back, 
stating they could be incarcerated pending trial and the GOK 
could adequately monitor their activities if they were 
released.   Shaykh Sabah reiterated this to Secretary Powell 
March 20.  The GOK is now putting together a team to visit 
Washington for detailed talks on charges that could be 
brought against the thirteen Kuwaiti detainees, what 
penalties could be imposed, and how the GOK could ensure they 
would not cause harm if they were to be released. 
 
(C) ARTICLE 98 
-------------- 
 
10.  (C)  Kuwait signed an Article 98 agreement with 
Undersecretary Bolton last June, but has so far dragged its 
feet on bringing the agreement into force.  This is perhaps 
no surprise, given the GOK's basic policy of maintaining good 
relations with all major powers, especially UNSC members. 
The MFA Undersecretary told Charge March 28 he would push to 
have enabling documentation sent to Embassy Kuwait before the 
Foreign Minister's arrival in Washington.  As MFA made clear 
later in the day, this step requires the Minister's approval, 
and he has already left the country. 
 
(C) MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
--------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Kuwait condemned the Israeli killing of HAMAS 
founder Ahmed Yassin.  Dr. Mohammed publicly accused Israel 
of trying to kill the peace process.  We have seen no 
acknowledgment from the GOK or the Kuwaiti media of HAMAS's 
commitment to terrorist violence and rejection of the 
principle of peace with Israel. 
 
(C) REFORM 
---------- 
12.  (C) Secretary Powell was able to reassure the Kuwaiti 
leadership that the Greater Middle East Initiative is not a 
program that we intend to impose, and that we understand 
reform must come from within the Arab world.  Prime Minister 
Shaykh Sabah had earlier been quoted as saying that Kuwait 
had received nothing on GME and did not want to.  When put 
into its proper context, however, the GOK, and the Prime 
Minister in particular, seemed less concerned about 
cooperating with the US on essential reforms. 
 
(C) IRRITANTS 
------------- 
 
13.  (C) Special 301:  After a promising upsurge in 2002, 
Kuwait took little action to protect IPR in 2003.  Its rate 
of piracy of optical media is considered the worst in the 
Gulf, partly because other states have made dramatic 
improvements in the past few years.  In keeping with 
industry's recommendation, Kuwait is likely to be escalated 
to Special 301's Priority Watch List this year (ref C). 
 
14.  (C) Trafficking In Persons (TIP):  Since Secretary 
Powell raised the issue with Dr. Mohammed (then Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs) last April, the GOK has made 
progress on the major TIP problem in Kuwait, the exploitation 
of (mostly female) domestic servants by some employers.  The 
GOK has not fully engaged with us, however, and lags behind 
other GCC states that have had more time to come to grips 
with the issue because they were listed in the TIP Report 
earlier than Kuwait. 
 
15.  (U) US Visas:  Student-visa applications in Kuwait rose 
about 25 percent in 2003, rebounding from the post-9/11 
decline.  The Kuwaiti government and public have not made an 
issue of the recent requirement for biometric data 
(electronic fingerprint) collection. 
 
(C) ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON MILITARY COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
16.  (C) Our estimate of Kuwait's financial support to the 
US-led coalition follows for the period 1 November 2002 - 31 
October 2003: 
 
- Kuwait MOD Budget: $2.145 billion. 
 
--- Burden-sharing payments to US amount to $207 million. 
Includes costs for base operations, supplies, personnel 
support and military exercises. 
 
--- Assistance in Kind (AIK).  Estimated cost sharing of $73 
million. Includes fuel, food, TELECOM, laundry, and utilities 
for 20,000-40,000 US military personnel. 
 
--- Foreign Military Sales (FMS):  Kuwait also pays $308 
million in FMS payments to the US Treasury annually. 
 
--- Total paid to the U.S.: $644 million or approx. 30 
percent of MOD budget. 
 
- Previously planned and agreed construction:  Kuwait 
previously agreed, and began construction of, Camp Arifjan in 
order to move ARCENT/CFLCC current operations off Camp Doha 
and return that site to Kuwait.  The remaining $55 million 
for completion has been delayed by GOK.  This delay has 
resulted in extending "split base" operations for CFLCC 
at increased cost and loss of efficiency.  An extensive 
program of safety and maintenance upgrades to Kuwait's 
airbases has likewise been delayed, apparently for financial 
reasons.  While not as mission critical as the Camp Arifjan 
project, this $50 million project also should be completed by 
Kuwait as it previously agreed. 
 
- In addition to the above, and as discussed in paragraph 3 
above, Kuwait continues to provide AIK fuel for US forces 
associated with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM operating in/from 
Kuwait; through February 2004, this is estimated at 551 
million gallons worth $463 million (rate: $0.84/gal.), 
currently averaging 35 million gallons per month. 
 
17.  (S) Strategic Aerial Port of Debarkation/Embarkation 
(APOD):  The principal APOD servicing not only Kuwait but 
also Iraq is located at Kuwait City International Airport 
(KCIA).  Kuwait has requested the US relocate that operation 
to enable it to pursue commercial development there. 
USCENTCOM has briefed the Chief of Staff of Kuwait's armed 
forces on a proposal to relocate the APOD to Kuwait's Ali 
al-Salem Airbase, to include a significant amount of 
construction of runway and facilities, with a price tag 
approaching $500 million.  The Chief of Staff, who is not the 
decision-maker on funding, indicated that Kuwait does not 
need this project, implying that if we want it, we should be 
prepared to pay for it.  In the meantime, USCENTCOM plans to 
ask for a delay in relocating APOD functions from KCIA to May 
2005. 
 
18. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
URBANCIC