US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT991

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000991 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IR, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (SBU) AMBASSADOR BRIEFS SENIOR GOK OFFICIALS ON 
IRAQ 
 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON:  1.4 (D) 
 
1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: In his capacity as CPA 
Deputy Administrator, Ambassador Jones held separate meetings 
in Kuwait on March 20 with Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid, Chairman 
of Kuwait's National Security Bureau; Shaykh Nasser Sabah 
al-Ahmed, son of the Prime Minister; and Shaykh Nasser 
Mohammed, Minister of Amiri Diwan Affairs, to brief them on 
developments in Iraq.  He stressed that the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL) was a genuinely Iraqi product (all 
but a few of its 62 articles were written by Iraqis), noting 
that the IGC members have begun to understand that democracy 
requires compromise and must not only ensure majority rule, 
but also protection of minority rights.  He thought it likely 
that we would seek another UNSCR in support of the Iraqi 
political process, perhaps in May.  He also described 
progress in decentralizing governance and in strengthening 
control of Iraq's borders.  END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
(SBU) SHAYKH SABAH AL-KHALID 
---------------------------- 
2.  (C) TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY:  Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid said 
"you can see in the eyes of Kuwaitis a big change in one 
year" (i.e. liberation of Iraq, capture of Saddam).  He added 
"We understand the difficulties, but we are seeing a 
difference in all fields in Iraq, and in Iran, Syria, Sudan, 
and Libya -- things are changing."  He asked about the degree 
of sovereignty the Iraqi government would have on July 1, and 
prospects for another UNSCR.  He noted Iraqi Sunni Arabs' 
complaints of being ignored.  The Ambassador explained that 
Iraq has not ceased to be a sovereign nation; CPA will 
transfer full remaining governmental authority on June 30. 
He observed that the Iraqi people themselves want some 
constraints on the interim government, since it will be 
unelected. 
 
3.  (C) BORDER:  The Ambassador said the Coalition was 
working on securing Iraq's borders; this work had acquired 
increased urgency after the Ashura atrocities left the 
population in an uproar.  New entry posts were being built 
and equipped so they could take photographs of all who enter 
and issue some kind of document to them.  Already, there were 
8,000 trained border guards, and the target was to triple 
that number within a year.  Visa instructions were being 
issued to permit legitimate visits of pilgrims and others, up 
to a maximum daily number.  The Syrian border was pretty well 
controlled on the Iraqi side already.  The biggest gap was 
the Iranian border, which was largely uncontrolled. 
Henceforth, traffic to/from Iran will be funneled through 
three entry posts. 
 
4.  (C) UN INVOLVEMENT:  The UN plans to open offices in 
Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. It already has offices in Cyprus 
and Jordan to support Iraq, and is considering Kuwait as 
well.  The USG may seek another UNSCR around May, the 
Ambassador said, to endorse the legitimacy of the interim 
Iraqi government and reaffirm support for the political 
process.  In addition, TAL Article 59 calls for Iraqi 
participation in the multinational force (MNF) to be created 
under UNSCR 1511.  Operational paragraph 13 of that UNSCR 
envisages the MNF remaining in place until the &political 
process8 is complete.  This process is laid out in OP 7, 
which refers to the election of a new Iraqi government under 
a permanent constitution.  In the U.S. view, these two 
paragraphs and Article 59 provide a strong legal basis for 
the MNF.  Nonetheless, some MNF member countries might wish 
to see further clarification of the MNF in an additional 
UNSCR. 
 
5.  (C) SISTANI:  Sabah al-Khalid said that Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani's son Mohammed Ridha and a son-in-law are more 
engaged than he is in politics.  The Ambassador confirmed 
that the son appears very actively engaged and may be 
encouraging greater activity on the part of his father, who 
unfortunately refuses to meet with CPA officials. 
Sistani's influence is strong, but not decisive even among 
all Shia.  People often try to speak in his name, but he 
occasionally slaps them down. Overall, he has probably been 
more helpful than not in maintaining order. 
 
6.  (C) MOQTADA SADR:  In response to a comment from Sabah 
al-Khalid, the Ambassador described Moqtada Sadr as very 
irresponsible, believed to have ordered the Khoei murder. 
His credibility was plummeting as the people realized his 
agenda was just to seek power.  Nonetheless, his Jaish 
al-Mahdi had grown from 3-500 to 2-3,000, which gave him 
power.  It was not clear who was funding it -- perhaps Iran, 
perhaps illegitimate businesses and revenue from his control 
of the Kufa mosque. 
 
7.  (C) KUWAIT:  After expressing great appreciation for 
Kuwait's support, the Ambassador noted that it would be 
helpful for Kuwait to open its embassy in Baghdad.  It would 
have to pay close attention to security, but "you don't want 
to be the last Arab country to have diplomatic relations." 
Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid confirmed that the GOK wanted its 
relations with Iraq to be "second to none" among Arab 
countries. 
 
(SBU) SHAYKH NASSER SABAH 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) GOVERNANCE:  In addition to repeating much of the 
same briefing, the Ambassador described to Shaykh Nasser 
Sabah al-Ahmed the progress achieved in governance:  CPA now 
has offices in all provincial capitals and is allocating 
money to provincial councils so they learn to make budgetary 
decisions themselves.  Iraqis enjoy participating in 
governance -- voting, discussing, etc. -- and exchange views 
very politely.  CPA is committed to a real process and will 
pay close heed to what the UN recommends.  The interim 
government should be formed by early June, if possible, so it 
has time to get organized by June 30. 
 
9.  (C) KURDS:  The Ambassador said the Kurds understand that 
it is in their interest to be part of a strong Iraq, with a 
fair role.  The TAL recognizes the Kurds' gains of the past 
twelve years, and extends protection for their rights as well 
as for those of other communities. 
 
10.  (C) ELECTRICITY:  The Ambassador confessed he was a bit 
puzzled by the GOK's slow response to a US company's 
initiative to supply electric power to southern Iraq via 
Kuwait by:  building transmission lines, buying 200 MW from 
Kuwait and sending it north, while building a 1,000 MW power 
plant to be run on Iraqi gas.  Shaykh Nasser commented that 
the Prime Minister (his father) did not understand the 
project properly.  He asked for a short description of the 
project in writing, and promised to present it to his father. 
 Replying to the Ambassador's mention of the Prime Minister's 
apparent concern that a future Iraqi government could somehow 
lay claim to the plant, Shaykh Nasser commented that the 
involvement of a US investor would protect the project. 
 
11.  (C) STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS:  Shaykh Nasser said the GOK 
is moving ahead with construction of a harbor on Bubiyan 
island, has formed a high-level Development and Planning 
Council, and is enthusiastic about its strategic partnership 
with the US.  The Ambassador saw good progress in the signing 
of a bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with 
Kuwait, designation of Kuwait as a Major Non-NATO Ally, and 
the upcoming bilateral Joint Military Commission.  GOK 
liberalization of investment rules and visa issuance would be 
helpful steps. 
 
12.  (C) LOOTED ART:  Shaykh Nasser (a world-class art 
collector), informed the Ambassador that "all" the looted 
Iraqi art recovered in Kuwait was fake.  It turned out that 
the Metropolitan Museum in New York had a lot of the best 
pieces, as part of an exhibit on the three ancient cities of 
Akkad, Ashur and Babel. 
 
(SBU) SHAYKH NASSER MOHAMMED 
---------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) TAL:  The Ambassador expressed thanks for Kuwait's 
strong partnership on Iraq, and hoped the Arab League Summit 
(Tunis, March 29-30) would produce a statement of support for 
the Iraqi political process.  He repeated to Shaykh Nasser 
Mohammed much of his earlier briefings on the TAL, 
governance, and border security.  He explained the specific 
point that had caused delay in signing the TAL:  adoption of 
the permanent constitution will fail if two-thirds of the 
voters reject it in any three provinces.  Shaykh Nasser 
appreciated this information which he agrued should be 
distributed more widely to offset negative messages on the 
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya satellite TV stations:  "Sistani is 
against" the TAL, "there is chaos in Iraq now8, Iraqis are 
struggling against &U.S. imperial occupation8, etc. 
 
14.  (C) INTERIM GOVERNMENT:  The Ambassador said there was a 
wide-range of options for interim government (IG), which 
would take power on June 30. Most Iraqis he had talked to 
preferred an IG that was more broadly representative than the 
current Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).  Most Iraqis also do 
not want religious or ethnic based government. The IGC could 
be broadened on geographic and professional bases through 
involvement of the provincial councils and professional 
associations, to which doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. must 
belong in order to practice the relevant profession.  The 
IG's main purpose will be to prepare elections, which cannot 
be held before end 2004 but must be held by January 31, 2005; 
the resulting transitional government will draft the 
permanent constitution and prepare elections for the 
permanent government by end 2005.  The UN will see whether 
the ration-card records can serve as electoral rolls; such 
issues should be decided by May 2004, as it takes eight 
months to prepare elections. 
 
15.  (C) TERRORISTS:  Asked who is behind the terrorist 
bombings in Iraq, the Ambassador said Zarqawi's group is most 
likely.  We caught one of Zarqawi's couriers in possession of 
a CD that contained a letter outlining a strategy to incite 
sectarian violence between the Shia and Sunnis.  The document 
also credibly claimed responsibility for 25 bombings.  Most 
foreign terrorists probably enter from Syria; and come from 
Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia ) so far, only one was Kuwaiti. 
Shaykh Nasser guessed he was a member of the Ajmi tribe 
(plural: Ajman) -- "most extremists are Ajmi."  It is not 
clear whether Syria is actively supporting terrorists, but it 
is certainly not doing all it can do to stop them.  The 
Ambassador recounted Iraqi FM Zeibari's remark to him that 
Syria's effective control of its border used to make life 
very hard for him in previous career as a Kurdish smuggler. 
 
16.  (C) IRAN:  Iran is building intelligence networks 
everywhere in Iraq, but is not yet stirring things up, said 
the Ambassador.  It is clearly biding its time and preparing 
for long-term influence. 
 
17.  (C) SADDAM:  He is in Iraq, held in isolation, and 
treated according to the rules, the Ambassador said.  We 
captured a lot of information along with him.  His supporters 
are much weakened; nothing is heard anymore about Hizb 
al-Awda (Party of the Return).  It is unclear whether Izzat 
al-Douri is alive.  Shaykh Nasser dismissed al-Douri as "not 
at all important."  On the other hand, Shaykh Nasser was 
unhappy that the Coalition had let Saadoun al-Hamadi and 
Mohammed al-Sahhaf go free:  Hammadi had committed crimes, 
and Sahhaf murdered a prostitute, according to press reports. 
 
 
18.  (C) SECURITY:  The Ambassador said the Coalition had 
destroyed enormous quantities of weapons, but staggering 
amounts remained.  In reply to Shaykh Nasser's questioning, 
he said all heavy equipment, long-range, missiles/launchers, 
and military airplanes had been destroyed.  36 battalions of 
Civil Defense Corps and 3 Army battalions exist now; the goal 
is to increase both figures substantially.  Some officers who 
had broken with the former regime years ago may return to 
duty.  About 70 percent of the new security forces are 
ex-army.  The IGC across the board is leery of any army role 
in internal security.  The Ambassador thought Iraq would be 
quite stable within a few years.  There had already been a 
noticeable decline in attacks on Coalition forces since the 
November 15 agreement and the December capture of Saddam. 
Unfortunately, terrorists were now focusing on soft, civilian 
targets with increasingly deadly effect. 
 
19.  (C) UTILITIES:  Water supply exceeds the pre-war level. 
Baghdad has about 18 hours/day of electricity; total 
electrical output is higher than before the war, and 
distribution is more equitable now.  Nation-wide, supply is 
still about 2,000 MW short of demand.  Basra has electricity 
about 23 hours/day, because much less of Basra's power is 
being sent north than before.  (A desire to keep power in the 
Basra area, where it is generated, may explain much of the 
sabotage of transmission lines carrying power north.)  The 
Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had promised 
Secretary of State Powell earlier that day that he would ask 
 
SIPDIS 
the Minister of Energy to look into provision of electricity 
to Iraq.  A US company had submitted all the required forms 
for a power project as an investment.  The Ambassador had 
just that afternoon briefed Commerce Minister Abdullah 
al-Taweel, who said he had not seen the application.  It 
seemed that July was the earliest that 200 MW of power from 
Kuwait could start to flow to Iraq, and it was urgently 
needed.  In reply to the Ambassador's request for help, 
Shaykh Nasser promised to call al-Taweel. 
 
20.  (C) IRAQI OIL:  The Iraqi/Turkey line is again flowing 
oil at a modest rate; Iraq signed contracts to export 6 
million barrels of oil from the Turkish part of Ceyhan last 
week.  Most oil exports are going through Fao and Basra. 
Production is now about 2.5 million bpd -- nearly the same 
level as pre-war -- of which less than 2 mbpd is exported. 
 
21.  (C) BIAP:  Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) now has 
about 25 non-military charter flights/week.  The Coalition 
will soon begin to move military operations out of BIAP, 
which may help reduce the security threat there. 
 
22. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
URBANCIC