US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1840

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001840 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR U/S GROSSMAN 
NSC FOR FRANK MILLER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2014 
TAGS: ECIN, ETRD, IZ, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: THE SECOND IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER CROSSING; ANKARA'S 
THOUGHTS ON A WAY FORWARD 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1788 
     B. ANKARA 1653 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  Iraq and Turkey agreed in December 2003 to 
build a second border crossing; however, they have not been 
able to reach agreement on the location and associated 
issues, such as the connecting road in Iraq and financing 
(ref b).  Although the backlog at the border has improved 
somewhat of late, we are concerned that traffic will increase 
significantly as normal trade increases and as material and 
equipment is delivered to Iraq for large infrastructure 
projects.  We recommend that Washington consider funding a 
feasibility study to help Iraq and Turkey reach agreement on 
the second border.  End Summary. 
 
 
Border Talks Stalled 
 
 
2.   (C) Although political/security concerns are a 
significant factor, both sides use economic arguments to 
promote their competing proposals.  The Turks say that their 
proposal to build a second crossing to the west with a 50 km 
road to Mosul would diversify routes (reduce potential 
bottlenecks) and avoid the rough terrain of the current route 
through Zakho.  The Iraqis counter that a crossing nearer to 
the present Habur Gate would be cheaper and would not require 
bridges across the Tigris or significant new roads.  These 
arguments have not been resolved because neither side has 
done the necessary feasibility studies to examine the costs 
and benefits of the competing proposals.  Although the 
political/security concerns will need to be worked out by the 
Turks and Iraqis, we think that we can help them resolve the 
economic issues by funding a feasibility study of the 
proposals.  We recommend that State Department officials 
discuss this proposal with TDA. 
 
 
Next Steps 
 
 
3.  (SBU) We have discussed this idea with local TDA rep. 
Jennifer Snyder, who explained that a feasibility study would 
require at least 6 months to complete.  She said the Turkish 
government and an entity in Iraq must request the study, and 
there must be adequate potential financing to complete the 
project.  Turkish officials offered to finance the entire 
project but were not clear about the details.  The first step 
would be for TDA to hire a consultant to examine the sites 
and prepare the terms of reference and budget for the 
feasibility study.  It may be possible, Snyder noted, for TDA 
to hire the consultant even before receiving a formal request 
from the Turkish government.  She said the consultant could 
prepare a preliminary cost estimate of the competing sites. 
 
 
4.  (U) If Washington agrees, we will approach Turkish 
authorities about the proposal and ask them to submit a 
formal request to TDA.  We will consult with TDA and CPA 
about a corresponding request from an Iraqi entity. 
 
 
Potential Problems 
 
 
5.  (C) Although we hope the GOT will endorse our offer, 
Turkish officials may be somewhat reluctant to agree to an 
independent examination of the cost/benefits of the two 
proposals.  On the political side, Turkey is extremely 
sensitive about issues in Iraq, especially concerning the 
Kurds and Turkmen (ref a).  The Turkish-proposed route would 
skirt the Kurdish-majority territory in northern Iraq and 
connect to the Turkmen city of Tal Afar.  Turkish officials 
on the margins of the February talks in Ankara confided that 
the site of the crossing was of secondary importance; what 
mattered to them was the road through Tal Afar.  In addition, 
an independent study would highlight the higher cost of the 
Turkish proposal and might reveal some cost padding by the 
Turks.  In January, Turkish officials on the margins of the 
talks in Cizre estimated the cost of their proposal at about 
$80 million and offered to take care of the financing.  One 
option they floated was to swap Iraqi crude to cover the 
construction costs, which we suspect would not turn out to be 
a great deal for Iraq. 
 
 
Comment:  A More Ambitious Vision 
 
 
6.  (SBU) The recommendation for a TDA study would help to 
address an important near-term need to enlarge the capacity 
at the border to process needed supplies and growing 
bilateral trade.  However, we think that Washington should 
also begin to think about the medium and long term 
opportunities presented by the growing commercial 
relationship between Iraq and Turkey.  Our experience with 
Turkish cooperation on our Caspian policy may provide a model 
for using Turkey as a hub for Iraq's energy and commercial 
ties to the West.  Turkey has been a committed partner in our 
initiative to bring Caspian energy resources to world markets 
and bolster the independence and development of the Caspian 
countries.  Some Turkish officials have suggested that we 
build on that model of Turkey as a energy hub -- in this case 
Turkey would provide the corridor for Middle Eastern 
(primarily Iraqi) energy to Europe and other world markets, 
helping us achieve our goal of greater diversity and security 
of energy supply routes.  Separately, Turkish officials have 
been eager to take advantage of the liberation and 
reconstruction of Iraq to build a strong commercial 
relationship with Iraq.  These Turkish initiatives can help 
to promote U.S. policy goals for Iraq and the Greater Middle 
East.  And as Turkey moves closer to the EU, its success as a 
progressive, predominantly Moslem country can be a compelling 
model for the aspirations of Iraq and others to emulate.  We 
propose that Washington consider additional TDA 
infrastructure studies of projects using Turkey as an energy, 
commercial and transportation corridor linking Iraq and the 
Greater Middle East to Europe.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN