US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1833

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001833 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 1436 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: The ruling AKP's chances of winning 
municipalities in the Aegean region is hampered by the 
party's uninspiring candidates.  Rather than build support 
through intense door-to-door campaigning, AKP is relying on 
the popularity of P.M. Erdogan and the AKP "brand" to attract 
voters.  A feckless opposition appears unable to mount much 
of a challenge outside of Izmir, historically a bastion of 
the center-left.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (U) Poloff recently traveled to Izmir, Manisa, and Aydin 
provinces in Turkey's Aegean region, which is generally more 
affluent and closer in mentality to the West than the rest of 
Anatolia, and met with a variety of political and 
professional contacts to discuss March 28 municipal elections. 
 
 
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Izmir: Too Close To Call 
------------------------ 
 
 
3. (C) Our contacts in Izmir largely echoed what we have 
heard recently in Ankara, namely that the race in the Aegean 
city, historically a bastion of the center-left, could be 
close.  Osman Gencer, chief editor of the regional daily Yeni 
Asir, asserted that both the ruling AKP and main opposition, 
center-left CHP are running a tight race.  Citing business 
and other journalist sources, Gencer said that on any given 
day either party could be ahead in public opinion polls. 
Niyazi Memur, a senior provincial AKP official, told poloff 
that although AKP has its work cut out for it, the party has 
a "good chance" of pulling off a victory.  Memur noted that 
AKP will do well in Izmir's poorer districts, which are 
overwhelmingly populated by internal migrants mainly from 
Turkey's Kurdish Southeast.  Memur claimed that incumbent 
mayor and CHP candidate Ahmet Piristina has neglected basic 
infrastructure in those districts -- a charge we heard from 
many local businessmen -- providing AKP fertile ground for 
grassroots politicking. 
 
 
4. (C) Not surprisingly, CHP Izmir provincial chairman 
Alaattin Yuksel confidently proclaimed Piristina will win the 
mayoralty again on March 28.  Yuksel cited his party's own 
polling, which showed CHP ahead -- 40 percent to AKP's 32 
percent.  However, betraying fear that AKP is catching up to 
CHP, Yuksel prepared the ground for a possible CHP failure by 
making the same claims to poloff that CHP chairman Deniz 
Baykal made to Ambassador earlier this month (reftel): 1) the 
media is overwhelmingly biased toward AKP; 2) the party in 
power has an advantage in municipal elections; and 3) it is 
too early in the GOT's tenure for the Turkish public to judge 
AKP's performance, which Yuksel claimed has been poor across 
the board.  Adding to the feeling of doubt, local CHP 
official Ulku Caner coyly asked poloff whether there would be 
any military intervention against the GOT if CHP loses Izmir 
-- a symbol of Kemalist rectitude -- as if fishing for any 
sign of USG displeasure with AKP. 
 
 
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Opportunity Lost? 
----------------- 
 
 
5. (C) One factor that is likely to work against AKP in the 
region is the lack of color in its candidates.  In 
left-leaning Izmir, where AKP's success could hinge on its 
candidate's individual appeal and dynamism, the party chose 
previously unknown Taha Aksoy, described by supporters as an 
"honest businessman" and by detractors as a "nobody."  The 
speeches we heard Aksoy make in Izmir were unimpressive. 
Compounding the problem Aksoy's bland personality presents is 
that AKP will have difficulties introducing Aksoy, because 
the party waited until virtually the last minute to announce 
his candidacy.  Indeed, Niyazi Memur conceded that AKP's 
biggest challenge is getting Aksoy's face and name out to 
people in time for March 28. 
 
 
6. (C) For months our contacts on the political right in 
Ankara claimed that AKP had wanted to choose former DYP and 
ANAP M.P. Isilay Saygin as its mayoral candidate in Izmir.  A 
life-long conservative politician -- she began her career in 
the Izmir suburb of Buca at the age of 25 and never married, 
saying she did not have time -- Saygin established a strong 
reputation for service and a common touch.  Our Ankara 
contacts believed Saygin represented the kind of mainstream, 
energetic candidate AKP needed to unseat CHP in Izmir. 
7. (C) Asked about Saygin's candidacy, Memur defensively 
claimed that Saygin never followed proper application 
procedures.  He contended that, in any case, Saygin did not 
have strong ties to the AKP Izmir office or AKP's grassroots 
in the city.  Saygin, he said, had hoped that AKP 
headquarters in Ankara would weigh in on her behalf, but that 
never happened. 
 
 
8. (C) For her part, Saygin did not dispute Memur's 
accusations in a private meeting with poloff and noted that 
AKP headquarters actually undermined her candidacy in the 
end.  She claimed that former ANAP deputies, now AKP 
ministers Abdulkadir Aksu, Cemil Cicek, and Erkan Mumcu had 
lobbied for her candidacy but that F.M. Abdullah Gul, whom 
she termed a "fundamentalist" -- rejected her candidacy 
outright.  She suspected the influence of Milli Gorus, which 
Memur separately later acknowledged with reluctance.  He said 
cryptically that although Milli Gorus has influence in Izmir, 
today's Milli Gorus "is not the same as in the past" -- a 
turn of phrase Milli Gorus-linked AKPers often use to suggest 
they are not as outwardly "Islamist" as they once were. 
Milli Gorus (MG) is the problematic, lodge-like movement of 
1996-97 Prime Minister Erbakan.  With links to Saudi, and in 
the past Iranian, money and with major support from a western 
European network principally in Germany and Belgium, MG wraps 
itself in Islamism and anti-U.S./anti-Israel rhetoric. 
However, MG is as much a money-making machine for Erbakan and 
his inner circle as a religious lodge in the more traditional 
sense. 
 
 
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Manisa and Aydin: AKP Winner By Default? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
9. (C) In both Manisa and Aydin, where center-right parties 
have historically performed well, AKP may win through no 
effort of its own.  As in Izmir, AKP has chosen uninspiring 
candidates and, based on our conversation with party 
officials, will rely heavily on the party's drawing power as 
the party of government.  In Manisa, where AKP will face a 
strong challenge from an incumbent ANAP mayor, who has been 
successful and is confident he will win a third term, the 
local AKP boss Ramis Siyak could only say that the party's 
chances are "good."  Despite prodding, he did not mention the 
AKP candidate once during our meeting and instead focused on 
Tayyip Erdogan's national appeal as the party's most critical 
asset.  AKP officials in Aydin also did not discuss the 
merits of the party's candidate, the incumbent mayor who is 
technically still a member of ANAP.  In a wide-ranging 
discussion with party hacks and local journalists, AKP 
provincial chairman Mehmet Erdem asserted that the party will 
win because of the government's nationwide popularity. 
 
 
10. (C) Working to AKP's advantage in both cities is the 
weakness of the opposition in the region.  Although AKP faces 
a stiff challenge in Manisa from the incumbent, other 
opposition parties are likely to have little impact on 
election day in either city.  In Aydin, where DYP has 
historically performed well, the AKP candidate and incumbent 
mayor was confident that DYP voters would turn to AKP "as the 
only center-right party."  In Manisa, CHP officials received 
us in a room full of T.V. cameras and tape-recording 
journalists in an obvious attempt to draw public interest to 
the party.  In Aydin proper, CHP simply refused to meet with 
us, citing the press of business (party chairman Baykal was 
due in town the next day).  In a meeting in Soke sub-province 
of Aydin, CHP officials were resigned to a poor performance 
nationally and hinted that the party base is ready for 
leadership change. 
 
 
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Women's Roles Still Circumscribed 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
11. (C) The Isilay Saygin episode described above highlights 
an important issue for Turkish political life in general and 
one that is especially acute in AKP.  The dearth of women 
candidates for AKP nationally -- some 18 out of over 3,000 
possible municipalities -- reflects the persistent problem of 
women's socialization and participation in politics.  During 
our discussions at the local level, AKP officials were at 
pains to point out the large and increasing number of women 
that they claim to have brought into the party ranks. 
Manisa's Siyak, for example, said that he made sure some 50 
women -- 38 of whom have no headscarves, he pointedly noted 
-- became members of the provincial assembly.  However, he 
could not explain why women have not occupied more 
influential positions in the party organization, simply 
noting that "very few women even applied to be candidates." 
 
 
12. (C) AKP officials in Soke sub-province of Aydin echoed 
their counterpart in Manisa.  Soke AKP chairman Kemal Ozbek 
said only a handful of women had applied for any of the 
sub-provincial mayoralties.  The AKP supporters in attendance 
all acknowledged that there is a problem but none of the men 
present had any ideas as to how to address it.  One member, 
clearly frustrated with a pointed line of questioning, sought 
to turn the tables, asking defensively whether women are 
involved in American politics.  After all the men had spoken, 
the lone woman in attendance explained that AKP women face 
two challenges: 1) education -- a nationwide problem for 
women; and 2) self-confidence, which better education could 
enhance.  If women feel more confident, she argued, they will 
be more inclined to be politically active. 
 
 
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Comment 
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13. (C) AKP may pull out victories in all three provincial 
capitals, although its chances of winning Izmir metropolitan 
municipality appear doubtful.  In any case, our discussions 
in the region revealed three noteworthy trends in the party: 
1) the paucity of energetic, three-dimensional AKP mayoral 
candidates; 2) the concurrent reliance on Erdogan and the 
party name to win votes as opposed to building up the 
personality of local party candidates; and 3) the absence of 
women on AKP ballots and in decision-making positions at the 
local level.  Septels will show that these themes are not 
confined to the Aegean region.  The fallout will have an 
enormous impact on AKP's ability to respond effectively to 
public demands, which will only increase on the party 
following its expected widespread victory March 28. 
EDELMAN