US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1845

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SHARON'S CABINET SECRETARY DOES THE MATH AND FORESEES A NEW COALITION... SOON

Identifier: 04TELAVIV1845
Wikileaks: View 04TELAVIV1845 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2004-03-25 14:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Tags: PREL PGOV IS GOI INTERNAL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001845 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IS, GOI INTERNAL 
SUBJECT: SHARON'S CABINET SECRETARY DOES THE MATH AND 
FORESEES A NEW COALITION... SOON 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 1741 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Cabinet Secretary Israel Maimon predicted to 
Ambassador Kurtzer March 23 that the present government would 
not last long.  He cited as evidence of "the beginning of the 
end" the Shas-sponsored no-confidence motion the previous day 
-- hastily withdrawn to show solidarity after the Sheikh 
Yasin assassination -- in which a majority of MKs had been 
set to vote against Sharon.  Maimon predicted that with hard 
work, the PM would be able get his disengagement plan 
approved by the Cabinet, but that the approval would provoke 
the departure of the National Union and the National 
Religious Party from the coalition.  Among the Likud Cabinet 
members, Maimon said the PM could count on the support of 
Ministers Olmert, Mofaz, and Ezra.  Ministers Landau, Katz, 
and Hanegbi are all firmly opposed.  Maimon was clearly 
relieved that Finance Minister Netanyahu's "yes, but" 
approach to the disengagement plan had served to undercut 
would-be Likud rebels.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
"The Beginning of the End" 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (C) "Anyone with any political experience knows this 
government will not last forever....  The break point will be 
when there is a government decision in support of the 
disengagement plan."  So said GOI Cabinet Secretary, Israel 
Maimon, in a March 23 meeting with the Ambassador, in which 
he predicted the departure of the National Union and National 
Religious Party as soon as the Government approves the Gaza 
withdrawal plan. 
 
3. (C) Illustrating the point, Maimon cited the "close call" 
the previous day in the Knesset, where Sharon had barely 
avoided an embarrassing no-confidence motion introduced by 
Shas.  (Note:  The motion was withdrawn, apparently at the 
request of Likud Whip Gidon Sa'ar, to show solidarity in the 
aftermath of the killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin.  End 
Note.)  According to Maimon's calculations, had the 
resolution not been withdrawn, the vote would have gone 
against Sharon 52-47, with several Likud lawmakers among 
those who would have voted in the majority.  While taking the 
point that this vote would not have jeopardized the Sharon 
government, Maimon nonetheless felt that the experience 
represented "the beginning of the end" of the present 
government.  (Note:  To be successful, a no-confidence vote 
must garner at least 61 votes in the 120-member Knesset.  In 
addition, those voting against the PM would have to agree on 
a consensus candidate to replace the PM, something on which 
it is difficult to envision Shas, Meretz, and right-wing MKs 
agreeing.  End Note.)  "It isn't right," he said, "for the 
Prime Minister not to have a majority.  It means the 
government has no right to govern." 
 
------------------- 
NRP and NU Want Out 
------------------- 
 
4. (C) On National Union, Maimon cited a conversation he had 
held recently with Tourism Minister Benny Elon, who told him 
that the NU would quit the coalition, even if the 
disengagement plan is Gaza-only.  Maimon confirmed rumors the 
Ambassador had heard that Transportation Minister Avigdor 
"Yvet" Lieberman, also of NU, wanted to stay in the 
government as long as possible, however.  Emphasizing the 
confidentiality of his information, Maimon said Lieberman 
 
SIPDIS 
would stay in the government "until the first bulldozer moves 
in, or the first settler is evacuated."  He said there was a 
"slight chance" that Lieberman would stay even after such 
moves; indeed it was Maimon's judgment that Lieberman, who is 
not an MK, "would do anything to stay in government."  He 
pointed out that this would cause a split in the party, 
however, noting that Israeli law limits the conditions under 
which political parties serving in government can split. 
(Note: If NU decided to leave the government, Lieberman could 
hypothetically remain in his ministerial seat at the 
discretion of the PM.  Lieberman would probably not be able 
to continue representing the NU, unless that party agreed, 
and he could end up without party affiliation.) 
 
5. (C) Turning to the National Religious Party, Maimon noted 
that there are differences between MKs Effi Eitam and Zevulun 
Orlev about how to proceed.  He predicted, however, that, "In 
the end, all six NRP MKs will be outside government."  He 
also wagered that the threshold for the NRP's departure would 
be much lower than that of the NU's Lieberman. 
 
6. (C) Asked why the right-wing MKs would not choose to stay 
in government, where they would be better positioned to block 
the disengagement plan, Maimon answered that "This is where 
values come into the equation."  Beyond the MKs' own 
ideological motivations, it would be inconceivable that the 
YESHA (settlers) constituency would allow these ministers to 
remain in government.  Moreover, with the exception of 
Lieberman, these cabinet members would still be able to bring 
their opposition to the Knesset.  Indeed, some of them have 
already been doing so, he said, pointing out that NU MK Arieh 
Eldad had voted against the PM in a no-confidence motion 
earlier in the week. 
 
---------------- 
Likud Head Count 
---------------- 
 
7. (C) Asked about the PM's support within the Likud, Maimon 
said that he could at least "see the horizon" thanks to the 
"yes, but" offered by Finance Minister Netanyahu in response 
to Sharon's presentation of his disengagement plans at the 
March 21 Likud faction meeting (reftel reports on that 
faction meeting).  Had Netanyahu instead said "no, but," 
Maimon continued, things would look quite different.  Noting 
that Netanyahu was the second to speak at that session, 
Maimon said Bibi's speech "took the wind out of the sails of 
those who were to speak afterwards."  (Note:  Education 
Minister Livnat, who came out against the plan, had spoken 
prior to Netanyahu.  End Note.) 
 
8. (C) Ultimately, Maimon predicted, the PM would have the 
votes he needs from Likud, but he said it would take a great 
deal of pressure -- even if Netanyahu succeeds in securing 
U.S. guarantees on settlement blocs, the right of return, and 
moving the separation barrier.  Ticking through the definite 
"yes's", he boasted that Minister-Without-Portfolio Gideon 
Ezra could always be counted on to do "whatever the PM 
wants."  He added that Defense Minister Mofaz and Industry 
and Trade Minister Olmert could also be counted on to support 
the PM's plan.  He acknowledged, however, that Likud members 
Uzi Landau, Tzachi Hanegbi, and Yisrael Katz were all opposed 
to the plan and that there was "no chance" of convincing them 
otherwise.  He did not anticipate that any of them would 
resign, however. 
 
9. (C) Maimon commented that even the "moderates" within 
Likud have reservations about unilateral disengagement. 
Minister-Without-Portfolio Sheetrit reportedly told Maimon 
that Israel should receive some benefit for withdrawing from 
Palestinian territories -- preferably from the Palestinians 
or, failing that, from the United States.  In addition, 
without having spoken directly to Immigration and Absorption 
Minister Tzipi Livni, Maimon was convinced that her support 
would be contingent on some kind of trade-off on the right of 
return.  Asked about Foreign Minister Shalom's views, Maimon 
pled ignorance. 
 
10. (C) On the subject of Shalom, Maimon took satisfaction 
that, unlike Construction and Housing Minister Effi Eitam, 
the FM toed the PM's line on disengagement on his overseas 
trips.  He confided that Sharon had taken Eitam to task for 
his transgressions on this score, albeit without any 
noticeable effect.  Eitam reportedly told Sharon that, absent 
a binding government decision on the issue of disengagement, 
"everything is fair game," a point on which Maimon 
editorialized that Eitam would probably not consider himself 
bound even after a government decision. 
 
------------------------------------- 
"What are We Going to Do About Arik?" 
------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Noting that he had been closely watching the body 
language of Sharon's Cabinet and Likud faction colleagues 
ever since the PM's announcement of his disengagement plan, 
Maimon said it is not only the far Right that no longer 
recognizes Sharon.  The eyes of Likud members "were literally 
bulging," he said, during the PM's March 22 speech to the 
faction.  Limor Livnat's face, according to Maimon, had "Who 
IS this guy?" written all over it.  He had also overheard two 
MKs clucking, "What are we going to do about Arik?" 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 

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