US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1009

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GOVERNORS, MAYOR: A SNAPSHOT OF 
VENEZUELA'S CRISIS 
 
REF: A. A.) CARACAS 00809 
 
     B. B.) CARACAS 00950 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) 
. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  The violence that hit Venezuela February 27 to March 
4 unmasked the radical bent of President Hugo Chavez's 
revolution, Caracas Mayor Alfredo Pena and Governors David De 
Lima (Anzoategui) and Luis Lippa (Apure) told the Ambassador 
March 16.  They noted the influence of Cubans in the 
Venezuelan security forces institutionally and in De Lima's 
case, in the violence aimed at the opposition.  The three 
also acknowledged the difficulties the opposition faces 
entering the regional elections, especially competing 
candidacies and possible government harassment using 
prosecutions.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) The Ambassador hosted the most recent of his periodic 
dinners with Venezuelan Governors March 16.  Caracas Mayor 
Alfredo Pena and Governors David De Lima (Anzoategui) and 
Luis Lippa (Apure) attended. The three Chavista governors 
regretted (no surprise there).  The smaller group meant that 
Pena was more expansive than usual.  PolCouns and Conoff 
accompanied Ambassador. 
 
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Demonstrations February 27-March 4 
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3.  (C) The Ambassador asked about their perspective of the 
demonstrations that occurred February 27-March 4.  The three 
guests said they believed that the disturbances revealed the 
radical bent of President Hugo Chavez's revolution.  Lippa 
said Apure had been relatively quiet during those days.  The 
governor attributed this to his having coordinated with the 
local National Guard commander.  One anomaly, Lippa noted, 
was that some of the National Guard troops he encountered on 
duty did not appear to be from Apure.  He confirmed that the 
government had had to move troops around the country to cover 
needs, and a contingent had been sent from Apure to Caracas. 
 
4.  (C) De Lima said the GoV had not moved troops from 
Anzoategui because they had been needed there.  The state is 
too much of a problem for Chavez, De Lima said.  The greatest 
problem in Anzoategui had been the government's use of armed 
civilians against demonstrators (ref A), the governor 
asserted.  He said the Anzoategui police has identified 470 
members of these armed groups.  They receive weapons and 
tactical training from Cubans, De Lima asserted.  He also 
charged that the Cubans lead some of the groups which 
attacked middle-class neighborhoods in Anzoategui cities (not 
further specified). 
 
5.  (C) Metropolitan Caracas Mayor Pena recounted that prior 
to the February 27 opposition March, the Minister of Interior 
had asked him to contribute Metropolitan police forces to 
help control the demonstrators if needed.  Pena said he 
refused because, under the GoV plan, the MP would have formed 
the first line of confrontation.  He had issued the permit 
for the march to end at Plaza Morales, so how, he asked, 
could he use his own police to stop the march short of that 
goal?  He told the group that the GoV had wanted to repeat an 
April 2002 scenario so that when violence erupted, the 
Metropolitan Police would be blamed for deaths.  Pena said he 
instead chose to deploy the Metropolitan Police along the 
march route to protect the opposition demonstrators. 
 
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Revolutionary Commitment 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) De Lima and Lippa commented on the changes in 
attitude they had witnessed in Venezuela's authorities.  De 
Lima illustrated recounting an incident which occurred when 
his daughter was stopped by National Guardsmen while driving 
 
 
with a friend in early March.  Anzoategui State police 
attempted to resolve the matter, but could not.  The Governor 
went to the location to intervene, and after some verbal 
wrangling, which the Governor said he exploited because a 
friendly crowd had gathered, he attempted to move the vehicle 
himself.  The Guardsmen reacted by aiming their loaded 
weapons at him, and reiterating that only on orders from 
their General would they let him pass.  De Lima said he was 
impressed by their animosity, contempt for him and their 
overt commitment to Chavez's revolution.  Both he and Lippa 
commented that the new attitude is the result of Cuban 
training aimed at making the first and second lieutenants 
identify "with the process." 
 
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Opposition Unity and Regional Elections 
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7.  (C) Opposition governors are now meeting regularly, the 
three reported.  The principal topics for the week's meeting, 
they said, was what to do about competing opposition 
candidacies as the deadline for filing (March 23) approaches. 
 The three concurred that the biggest concern was the 
possible impact of going into the races with various 
candidates for an individual position.  Lippa noted that his 
old party, Democratic Action (AD), continued to function as 
in the past, attempting to control candidacies from Caracas. 
He said, for example, they were still supporting candidacies 
of persons with little popular support, including his rival 
in Apure, because of their history with the party.  The three 
also concurred that the opposition eventually would come to 
agreement on the majority of the candidacies.  (Note: AD has, 
in fact, inscribed a candidate in Apure to run against Lippa 
and the MVR candidate.) 
 
8.  (C) Lippa noted that another obstacle the opposition 
faces in proceeding with the candidacies for the regional 
elections is GoV intimidation using the threat of criminal 
charges.  (On March 15, Caracas newspapers reported that that 
the Comptroller's Office had begun investigations into 
alleged malfeasance by Lippa, Pena and a number of other 
elected opposition officials.)  As they discussed the issue, 
Pena received a call advising him that a detention order had 
been issued for Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles (ref B).  The 
three asserted that the GoV's intent was to disqualify them 
legally, and politically. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C) The news of the opposition governors meeting 
regularly, and having a forum where to discuss relevant 
issues, is welcome.  The need for such a mechanism had been 
among the topics of discussion in earlier governors' dinners 
with us.  The focus on the on the violence during the 
demonstrations on this occasion reflected how the theme 
dominated discussions among Venezuelans in the wake of events 
that have left more than a dozen dead, numerous injured and 
detained, and a black mark on the GoV's human record. 
 
10.  (C) The opposition governors and mayors are, in fact, 
important factors in resisting President Chavez's ideas for 
controlling all Venezuelan institutions.  It is difficult to 
imagine what Venezuela would be like today if mayors and 
governors were still appointed, as was the case prior to 
1989.  We are adjusting our AID and PAS activities to put 
more emphasis on federalism and decentralization. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA01009 - CONFIDENTIAL