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| Identifier: | 04DJIBOUTI429 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04DJIBOUTI429 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Djibouti |
| Created: | 2004-03-24 13:15:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PTER ASEC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000429 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/ITA, M, S/CT, CA/OCS, AF/E, AF/EX, DJ NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, ASMARA, KHARTOUM, SANAA AND CAIRO FOR RSO PARIS FOR RSO AND POL-NEARY CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD, ATFP, J2, J2X E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014 TAGS: PTER, ASEC SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI EAC 03/24/2004: RESPONSE TO THREAT ADVISORY REF: STATE 64477 Classified By: RSO Marc Ramos for reason 1.4 (g) 1. (S) Post convened a meeting of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on 24 March, 2004 to review threat information as outlined in reftel. The EAC discussed the potential of attacks on western targets and the addition of needed security measures to mitigate the threat. Potential targets in Djibouti include the Embassy, the U.S. Military Base Camp Lemonier, and frequented establishments in the downtown area. In addition, due to the recent death of Palestinian Hamas leader Sheikh Yasin, the potential for inspirational or revenge attacks by non-traditional terrorist groups or persons adds a new dimension to an already serious situation. 2. (S) The EAC was composed of the Ambassador, RSO, ORA, USLO, MgtOff, ConOff, CLO and newly appointed Force Protection Officer (FPO). The contents of reftel were discussed in detail and all parties agreed that current physical security measures at the Embassy remain sufficient to deter or disrupt, but not prevent, an attack. The Ambassador will be requesting authorization from the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to reposition the US Embassy's concrete barriers on the Saudi lot. The lot adjacent to the Embassy is owned by the Saudi Arabian Government and has been vacant for several years. Although parking is not allowed on the lot, it's size and emptiness provides an unimpeded approach to our perimeter and is a vulnerability that needs to be corrected. 3. (S) Appropriate Military representatives from Camp Lemonier are aware of the current threat and will take measures IAW their SOPs. US Military elements are also coordinating with the host nation and the French Forces in Djibouti (FFD) who have a formal defense agreement with the Government of Djibouti. 4. (S) The American community has been living at a heightened level of threat. The EAC agreed that due to the general threat of attacks against Americans world wide and the specific threat emanating from Hamas in the wake of the Yasin killing, it would be prudent to reiterate the need for vigilance and personal security measures. In addition the Embassy will seek clearance on a warden message urging American Citizens to maintain a low profile and strongly consider postponing activities that involve large groups of Americans or Westerners. 5. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or 253-35-26-73 (secure). RAGSDALE
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