US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI429

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DJIBOUTI EAC 03/24/2004: RESPONSE TO THREAT ADVISORY

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI429
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI429 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-03-24 13:15:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER ASEC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/ITA, M, S/CT, CA/OCS, 
AF/E, AF/EX, DJ 
NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, ASMARA, KHARTOUM, SANAA AND CAIRO FOR 
RSO 
PARIS FOR RSO AND POL-NEARY 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD, ATFP, J2, J2X 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI EAC 03/24/2004: RESPONSE TO THREAT 
ADVISORY 
 
REF: STATE 64477 
 
Classified By: RSO Marc Ramos for reason 1.4 (g) 
 
1. (S) Post convened a meeting of the Emergency Action 
Committee (EAC) on 24 March, 2004 to review threat 
information as outlined in reftel.  The EAC discussed the 
potential of attacks on western targets and the addition of 
needed security measures to mitigate the threat.  Potential 
targets in Djibouti include the Embassy, the U.S. Military 
Base Camp Lemonier, and frequented establishments in the 
downtown area.  In addition, due to the recent death of 
Palestinian Hamas leader Sheikh Yasin, the potential for 
inspirational or revenge attacks by non-traditional terrorist 
groups or persons adds a new dimension to an already serious 
situation. 
 
2. (S) The EAC was composed of the Ambassador, RSO, ORA, 
USLO, MgtOff, ConOff, CLO and newly appointed Force 
Protection Officer (FPO).  The contents of reftel were 
discussed in detail and all parties agreed that current 
physical security measures at the Embassy remain sufficient 
to deter or disrupt, but not prevent, an attack.  The 
Ambassador will be requesting authorization from the Saudi 
Arabian Ambassador to reposition the US Embassy's concrete 
barriers on the Saudi lot.  The lot adjacent to the Embassy 
is owned by the Saudi Arabian Government and has been vacant 
for several years.  Although parking is not allowed on the 
lot, it's size and emptiness provides an unimpeded approach 
to our perimeter and is a vulnerability that needs to be 
corrected. 
 
3. (S) Appropriate Military representatives from Camp 
Lemonier are aware of the current threat and will take 
measures IAW their SOPs.  US Military elements are also 
coordinating with the host nation and the French Forces in 
Djibouti (FFD) who have a formal defense agreement with the 
Government of Djibouti. 
 
4. (S) The American community has been living at a heightened 
level of threat.  The EAC agreed that due to the general 
threat of attacks against Americans world wide and the 
specific threat emanating from Hamas in the wake of the Yasin 
killing, it would be prudent to reiterate the need for 
vigilance and personal security measures.  In addition the 
Embassy will seek clearance on a warden message urging 
American Citizens to maintain a low profile and strongly 
consider postponing activities that involve large groups of 
Americans or Westerners. 
 
5. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or 
253-35-26-73 (secure). 
RAGSDALE 

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