US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE771

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TERRORIST FINANCE: AL-HARAMAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE771
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE771 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-03-24 12:31:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ETTC PTER SA NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000771 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS(GLASS), S/CT (NAVRATIL), INR/EC(BROOKS) 
TREASURY FOR ZARATE 
JUSTICE FOR OIA/FRIEDMAN 
BRUSSELS FOR LEGATT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2014 
TAGS: ETTC, PTER, SA, NL 
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: AL-HARAMAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
REF: STATE 62199 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel.  reason 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: Al Haramain does operate in the 
Netherlands under the name "Stichting Al Haramain 
Humanitarian Aid," located at Jan Hanzenstraat 114, 1053SV 
Amsterdam, telephone number 020-618-2645.  Embassy/ROAL have 
no substantive information indicating that the Dutch 
Al-Haramain chapter supports terrorist organizations.  The 
Dutch government has indicated in public that it is aware of 
press allegations --which often draw on information from the 
9/11 victims lawsuit -- of the chapter's connections with a 
radical Amsterdam mosque and possible links links to 
Al-Qaida.  Other than admitting that it attempts through the 
Dutch security service (AIVD) to monitor Al-Haramain 
activities, the government has not offered additional 
information concerning the possible substance behind these 
allegations declaring that it cannot comment on ongoing 
intelligence activities. The best documented allegation of 
terrorist-related activity by the local Al- Haramain chapter 
regards the possible Al-Qaida involvement of two local 
Al-Haramain chapter board members  -- Saudi sheiks Aqeel 
Abdulaziz Alaqeel and Mansour Abdulrahman Hammed Al-Kadi. 
The Dutch government has noted, however that these two sheiks 
are non-resident board members and that it is unclear how 
much of a role they have in the operations of the Dutch 
Al-Haramain branch.  We expect the Dutch government would be 
open to considering designation of the local Al-Haramain 
chapter should we be able to present more detailed 
information on its possible terrorist links.  The GONL would 
likely be reluctant to proceed with a designation based only 
on the activities of these two board members.  We will 
continue to keep a close watch on this issue.  Prior to any 
decision to designate the Dutch branch of Al-Haramain, we 
would appreciate authorization to to approach Dutch 
authorities through intelligence channels to determine if 
they have additional information that can be shared or have 
objections or other considerations that we should take into 
account.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) The Dutch government has been called upon several 
times by members of the Dutch parliament to testify to any 
links between Al- Haramain activities in the Netherlands and 
terrorist-related activities.  On March 2, the Dutch 
Ministers of Justice and Interior noted press allegations 
that local Al-Haramain board members -- Saudi sheiks Aqeel 
Abdulaziz Alaqeel and Mansour Abdulrahman Hammed Al- Kadi -- 
had connections with the Bosnia branch of Al-Haramain 
(designated by the UN as al-Qaida linked) and a terror cell 
at the Al-Nur mosque in Berlin.  According to the press, 
Al-Kadi had some contact with Osama bin Laden's private 
secretary, Wadih el-Hage, who also had connections with 
 
SIPDIS 
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) -- also designated 
as Al-Qaida-linked.  The Ministers would not comment on the 
substance of the allegations citing operational intelligence 
concerns.  In December 2001, (then) Interior Minister de 
Vries affirmed that the Dutch security service "continues to 
investigate the activities of (the Al-Haramain foundation, 
International Islamic Relief Organization, World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth, and Muwaffaq foundation)." 
 
3.  (U) Much of the Dutch parliamentary, press, and (at least 
public) government attention the local Al-Haramain chapter 
focuses on its support for the radical Amsterdam Al-Tawheed 
mosque/foundation which delivers an extremely anti-Western, 
anti-Semitic message.  Al Tahweed and Al-Haramain share the 
same Amsterdam address and have shared Alaqeel and Al- Kadi 
as directors. The Dutch security service (AIVD) noted in its 
annual report that "in view of the very close (financial) 
connection between (the Al-Tawheed) mosque and Al-Haramain, 
it cannot be ruled out that orthodox-radical wahabitic ideas 
are also dissemenated one way or another in the mosque via 
this NGO."  Alaqeel and Al-Kadi, the Dutch interior and 
justice ministers told parliament, resigned from the 
Al-Tawheed board of directors at the beginning of 2004 but 
continue as Al-Haramain directors.  Alaqeel also holds 
approximately half of El Tawheed's mortgage.  The Dutch 
government was careful to point out that being on the board 
of directors of an organization does not necessarily mean 
familiarity or active involvement in the organization's 
activities.  The government also noted that Alqeel and 
Al-Kadi are not resident in the Netherlands. 
4. (S/NF) Should the USG indicate an intention to designate 
the Dutch chapter of Al-Haramain, the Dutch government would 
give our position serious consideration.  The availability of 
sufficient information linking the local chapter of 
Al-Haramain to terrorist activities or organizations would be 
the most important factor in Dutch decisionmaking.  The 
circumstance of Alqeel and Al-Kadi being on the local 
Al-Haramain's board of directors would likely not be 
sufficient to generate active Dutch support. The Netherlands 
would also give consideration to the position of the Saudi 
government in an Al- Haramain designation.  Should a decision 
to push a designation forward be made, the GONL would want to 
consult with us closely ahead of time to ensure that movement 
of local Al-Haramain funds could be blocked, or at least 
monitored. 
 
 
5.  (U) Members of the Stichting Al-Haramain (NL) board of 
directors are 
 
Chairman/Treasurer:  Alaqeel, Aqeel Abdulaziz Aqeel, DOB: 
April 29, 1949, Address: Sharie Ahmed ben Omeira 6, Riyad 
Olaya, Saudi Arabia 
 
Secretary: Al-Kadi, Mansour Abdulrahman Hameed, DOB: November 
 
SIPDIS 
28, 1962, Address: Ibne Majah Rd. Haie Salam, Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Director: Al Tuwaigri, Mohamed Fahed Sulluman, DOB: November 
6, 1964, Address: Jaie Malaz Amarabulla Rd., Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Director: Alaqeel, Abdulrahman Mohammed Galifa, DOB: November 
18, 1963, Address: Haie Al Jazeria Road 1, Villa 839, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Director: Al-Tayyr, Muteb Sulluman Rachid, DOB: November 18, 
1963, Address: Haie Sualie. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
 
Representative: El Shershaby, Mahmoud Abd El Fattah Ahmed, 
DPOB: December 21, 1957, Sanaded, Egypt,  Address: Piet 
Mondriaanstraat 107H, 1061TP, Amsterdam 
SOBEL 

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