US embassy cable - 04BRATISLAVA284

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR DAN FRIED 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, LO 
SUBJECT: AN UPDATED SNAPSHOT OF PM DZURINDA 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 161 
 
Classified By: Amb. Ronald Weiser for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
1.  (C) Summary/Introduction.  With increased opportunities 
to engage Prime Minister Dzurinda and the GOS during the NATO 
accession event at the White House on March 29, the FM 
informal in Brussels on April 2, and the Instanbul Summit, 
post offers an updated snapshot of the Prime Minister and his 
relations with coalition partners.  During the autumn of 
2003, Dzurinda created considerable friction within the 
ruling coalition when he fired National Security Office 
Director Mojzis and Defense Minister Simko after losing 
confidence in them.  As a result, Dzurinda now heads a 
minority government because Simko left Dzurinda's party, 
taking six other deputies with him.  Since Simko's departure, 
however, Dzurinda has returned to his consultative approach 
with ANO, the Christian Democratic Movement, and the 
Hungarian Coalition Party.  The Prime Minister discussed his 
actions with the Ambassador several times last autumn and 
provided, from his viewpoint and in the Ambassador's opinion, 
reasonable political justification for his actions, although 
the methods the PM used were illconceived in implementing his 
agenda.  Poor tactics aside, Dzurinda remains strongly 
committed to reform and continues to move Slovakia away from 
the flagrant subversion of democratic norms and institutions 
that flourished under former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. 
End Summary/Introduction. 
 
Reacting Out of Anger 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Last fall, Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda hit 
probably the lowest point of his political career.  In 
August, the press announced that the PM had named a 
"skupinka" or small group of people who were destabilizing 
the Slovak state.  While Smer MP Robert Kalinak named the 
PM's so-called skupinka, Dzurinda never publicly confirmed or 
denied Kalinak's list.  However, the skupinka acted as a 
catalyst for several events, including the removal of 
National Security Office chief Jan Mojzis and Defense 
Minister Ivan Simko.  (See reftel)  During the late summer 
and early fall, Dzurinda appeared to be lashing out at those 
whom he perceived as enemies, including the press, reacting 
with anger rather than with his usual conciliatory approach. 
Even Dzurinda would likely admit now that he handled the 
situation poorly, temporarily damaging public and 
international perception of his leadership and Slovakia. 
Prior to these events, the PM had earned the reputation of 
being a skillful negotiator who had mastered Slovakia's 
political minefields, able to build compromises among 
unlikely, and frequently clashing, political parties. 
According to some coalition politicians, Dzurinda allegedly 
felt that since this coalition was ideologically closer than 
the one he headed in his first term, he could push government 
personnel decisions onto his coalition partners without his 
usual behind-the-scenes negotiations.  They resented this 
treatment, expecting to be consulted as in the past. 
 
Thin-skinned Prime Minister 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The skupinka event also highlighted that Dzurinda 
does not accept criticism graciously.  A disillusioned 
founder of SDKU remarked to emboff that the PM particularly 
dislikes being told what he has to do, whether it is by a 
coalition member, an advisor, or another country.  Between 
August and October, Dzurinda reacted poorly to criticism from 
within his party as well as from his coalition partners, 
which eventually led to the creation of Ivan Simko's 
breakaway Free Forum. 
 
Loyalty or Betrayal 
------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Dzurinda's expectation of loyalty and his strong 
emotional reaction to perceived betrayal influenced his 
decisions.  Dzurinda was angry with Mojzis because the NBU 
Director had been indiscreetly critical of the PM on numerous 
occasions, and those remarks made it back to Dzurinda, 
resulting in a power struggle that Dzurinda was determined to 
win.  Dzurinda told the Ambassador that he felt forced to 
sack Defense Minister Simko because he would not vote with 
Dzurinda in removing Mojzis.  Dzurinda said that he had to 
remove Simko in order to maintain party discipline and 
coalition loyalty because Simko was his appointee to the 
SDKU-designated post.  Dzurinda, however failed to adequately 
 
convince his coalition partners of the reasons why he lost 
confidence in Mojzis and therefore he appeared to be forcing 
personnel decisions onto the coalition without consultation. 
In doing so, he temporarily tarnished Slovakia's 
international image. 
 
A Return to Normalcy 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) During the last several months, Dzurinda has 
solidified the relationship with ANO, and to a lesser extent 
mended fences with the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), the 
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), and his own Slovak 
Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU).  He has subsequently 
tread more carefully in making decisions, consulting with his 
partners quietly.  We note that the appointment of NBU Chief 
Aurel Ugor was handled with no major accusations from 
coalition or opposition members.  More importantly, Dzurinda 
did not "win" with this appointment because of his agreement 
not to appoint a new head withough the coalition's approval. 
 
Still Committed to Reform 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Despite the hiccup last fall, Dzurinda remains 
committed to continuing the reform process, although at times 
slowly.  His campaign pledge to root out corruption has only 
a few big name arrests, primarily from opposition parties. 
The almost dysfunctional judicial system is being reformed 
slowly, but it still hampers the anti-corruption campaign. 
Since 1998, when Dzurinda was first elected, he has 
dismantled the structure that his predecessor, Vladimir 
Meciar, created to steal from the government.  In addition, 
the KDH Ministers of Justice and Interior act as a system of 
checks and balances, having made significant steps in the 
fight against corruption and retooling the judicial system. 
Under Dzurinda's watch, the Slovak Information Service 
recently has been purged of all former employees of the 
communist-era intelligence agency including those purported 
to be responsible for last year's wiretapping scandal. 
 
The Necessity of Personal Politics 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The personality conflicts from last fall appear to be 
behind Dzurinda, but the highly personalized nature of 
politics will remain.  Emboffs constantly are reminded how 
small the leadership elite continues to be as everyone knows 
each other, either from university days or through family 
connections.  Dzurinda's government, and subsequent prime 
ministers, will most probably continue to operate within a 
style of cronyism that remains a legacy from communism.  Most 
Slovaks feel, whether it concerns national politics or a 
simple business transaction like buying flowers, one relies 
on personal connections rather than institutions.  On the 
positive side, Dzurinda's government has enacted many laws 
and regulations to reduce cronyism and to increase 
transparency in government. 
 
Prospects for Working with Partners 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Dzurinda has returned to his more customary approach 
of consultations before announcing government decisions.  In 
conversations with Slovak interlocutors, many have remarked 
that the PM has learned his lesson.  The referendum calling 
for new elections and his lack of parliamentary majority will 
keep Dzurinda focused on coalition health.  Poor tactics 
aside, Dzurinda remains strongly committed to reform and 
continues to move Slovakia away from the flagrant subversion 
of democratic norms and institutions that flourished under 
former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. 
 
WEISER 
 
 
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