US embassy cable - 04RANGOON382

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, MARR, SNAR, BM, Ethnics 
SUBJECT: DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS: ONE 
GENERAL'S VIEW OF BURMA'S ETHNIC GROUPS 
 
REF: RANGOON 131 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  While spending ten days in remote Shan State 
with a senior military intelligence officer during the annual 
USG-Burma opium yield survey, we were constantly told that 
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt has undertaken a full-court press 
to implement his "road map" to democracy.  This focus has 
interesting implications for General Khin Nyunt's 
subordinates, who now carry much of the water on his regular 
duties, including relations with Burma's ethnic groups.  Our 
principal interlocutor on the survey, Brigadier General Kyaw 
Thein, underscored the political challenges of dealing with 
the country's diverse ethnic groups and we observed him 
interact with leaders of cease-fire groups ranging from SPDC 
"vassals" to former adversaries who now enjoy considerable 
autonomy.  One measure of the SPDC's influence in the ethnic 
areas of Shan State is the manner in which each ethnic group 
treats poppy cultivation.  For some, it is a fading 
extracurricular activity, while for others it is a way of 
life.  End Summary. 
 
General Kyaw Thein 
------------------ 
 
2. (C) Our recent USG-Burma joint opium yield survey, 
conducted throughout remote locations in Shan State March 
3-12, gave us an extended opportunity to exchange views with 
Brigadier General Kyaw Thein, leader of the Burmese survey 
team and a senior official in the Office of the Chief of 
Military Intelligence (OCMI).  Gen. Kyaw Thein had oversight 
of the entire Burmese portion of the opium survey, which 
involved months of preparation, several Burmese military 
aircraft, dozens of extremely remote survey sites, and 
hundreds of military and government personnel. 
 
3. (C) Kyaw Thein, who reports directly to deputy OCMI chief 
General Kyaw Win and OCMI chief (and Prime Minister) General 
Khin Nyunt, has long held the regime's lead on narcotics 
issues, including oversight of the Central Committee for 
Drugs Abuse Control (CCDAC), the GOB's principal 
counternarcotics unit housed at the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and staffed by police and military intelligence officers. 
Kyaw Thein's working title is Chief of the OCMI Internal 
Relations Division (IRD), within the military intelligence 
directorate. 
 
Life Under the Road Map 
----------------------- 
 
4. (C) Kyaw Thein confided to us that he and several of his 
colleagues have picked up additional duties following the 
appointment of his senior boss, Khin Nyunt, to the Prime 
Minister position in August 2003.  Contrary to general 
speculation, he said, Khin Nyunt did not, and will not, lose 
his existing military intelligence and ethnic relations 
portfolios, nor did he simply take on ceremonial duties as 
Prime Minister.  Rather, General Khin Nyunt had taken on an 
array of new responsibilities as head of government, yet 
counted on his subordinates to carry much of the weight of 
his existing "work requirements." 
 
5. (C) As a result of Khin Nyunt's promotion, according to 
Kyaw Thein, the deputy chief of OCMI (Kyaw Win) has 
subsequently shouldered much of the burden for managing the 
day to day operations of the SPDC's vast military 
intelligence apparatus.  Meanwhile, Kyaw Thein and several 
other officers have taken on responsibility for managing many 
of the regime's relations with Burma's ethnics, including the 
coddling of cease-fire groups and courting of insurgent 
hold-outs. 
 
6. (C) BGen Kyaw Thein, who indicated that he relished the 
opportunity to spend ten days in the field and away from the 
burdens of his office, said that under the direction of PM 
Khin Nyunt, life for senior OCMI officials had become "the 
road map, all day and every day."  Khin Nyunt is keen to 
implement initial steps in the road map plan as early as 
possible and, particularly for Kyaw Thein, oversight of 
counternarcotics activities had become a secondary priority 
in recent months. 
 
A Convention Cast of Thousands? 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Kyaw Thein offered his view that despite the 
full-court press on implementing the road map, reconvening 
the National Convention would not take place before at least 
the end of June.  He said the regime was finding it a 
challenge to accommodate all of the ethnic groups, 
particularly those who had reached cease-fire arrangements 
with the SPDC since the last ill-fated National Convention, 
which lasted from 1993 until 1996 (Note: approximately 15 
armed ethnic opposition groups and splinter organizations 
have made peace with the SPDC since 1993.  End note).  The 
SPDC, said Kyaw Thein, anticipated a vast increase in the 
number of delegates participating in a new Convention, 
perhaps as many as double or triple the 700-plus who 
participated in 1993. 
 
8. (C) Regarding discussions involving a National Convention 
and a new constitution, Kyaw Thein said the regime had to 
approach each ethnic organization as a unique entity, as 
every ethnic grouping had its own distinct "personality" and 
identity.  As an example, he noted that during the peak of 
insurgent conflicts in the 1980s, the Burmese Army 
categorized the major armed ethnic groups by their favored 
battle tactics:  the Wa preferred full frontal assaults, the 
Karen favored ambushes, the Kachin used snipers, and the Chin 
were well know for digging in and holding solid defensive 
positions. 
 
Friends, Former Foes, and Those In Between 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) During our opium survey travels, we encountered 
numerous cease-fire groups and observed Kyaw Thein take a 
slightly different approach with each.  He was clearly most 
at ease with the so-called "vassal" groups, ethnic entities 
which were among the first to cut mutually beneficial deals 
with the SPDC in the late 1980s and early 1990s such as the 
Pa-O National Organization (Special Region 6), the Kokang 
(Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army-MNDAA, Special 
Regional 1), and the Kachin Defense Army-KDA (Special Region 
5).  Kyaw Thein was also at home among the residents of a 
unique tri-village region known as "Lon-Htan" in northern 
Shan State, where locals gave early support to the Burmese 
Army against the Burmese Communist Party and were rewarded 
with limited autonomy, including the right to run their own 
people's militia. 
 
10. (C) Kyaw Thein's relations were less relaxed with the 
more aggressive leaders of the Shan State Army-SSA (Special 
Region 3) and the United Wa State Army-UWSA (Special Region 
2).  These cease-fire groups occupy the largest of Burma's 
dozen-plus special regions and arguably have the greatest 
autonomy.  However, in exchange for self-rule, many observers 
believe these regions have received little in terms of 
assistance from the GOB and consequently continue to tolerate 
and "tax" the drug business as a means of procuring 
development funds.  Kyaw Thein's last field command, before 
his promotion to HQ positions in Rangoon, was on the front 
lines against the UWSA. 
 
It's My Poppy and I'll Grow If I Want To 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) We visited several Shan and Wa villages where local 
leaders were particularly defiant about their poppy 
livelihoods.  In one Shan village under SSA control, farmers 
said they had no knowledge of the illegality of growing poppy 
and declared that they would continue to produce opium for 
the foreseeable future as their only source of supplemental 
cash income.  Kyaw Thein conceded that in many parts of Shan 
State fully under central authority, the GOB had low 
expectations for weaning "hold out" farmers off of poppy and 
did not expect substantial progress until the GOB's goal of 
becoming poppy-free in 2014. 
 
12. (C) Wa territory is a different story, however.  UWSA 
authorities have declared a deadline of 2005 for ceasing the 
cultivation of poppy, but not all Wa villages are on board 
with this objective and several local leaders took advantage 
of Kyaw Thein's presence, as well as the rest of our joint 
survey team, to declare their own intentions. 
 
13. (C) One example of local Wa defiance was the village of 
Yaung Luhk, located in close proximity to the border with 
China, where the entire population of 113 families cultivates 
poppy and farmers fetch over $300 per kilo of opium, almost 
three times the average market price in the interior of Shan 
State.  The local UWSA chairman belligerently declared to 
Kyaw Thein, in our presence, that he and his villagers were 
fully aware of the 2005 deadline but had no intention of 
stopping poppy cultivation unless the Burmese and the 
international community provided them with cash assistance. 
In another Wa village we met up with Pao Yu Lian, younger 
brother of UWSA Chairman Pao Yu Xiang, who encouraged local 
leaders to press General Kyaw Thein for assistance in 
exchange for ceasing poppy cultivation. 
 
Comment: An Uneasy Peace 
------------------------ 
 
14. (C)  The GOB has, since the augmentation of our bilateral 
sanctions in July 2003, instituted a de facto 
non-fraternization policy that prohibits most Burmese 
military and civilian officials from unauthorized contact 
with U.S. diplomats.  Spending ten days in remote Shan State 
with Brigadier General Kyaw Thein was a rare opportunity to 
observe a senior military officer interact with foreign 
diplomats, subordinates, local officials, and especially 
diverse ethnic groups.  Although he enjoyed the basic perks 
of a one-star general, he was friendly and professional with 
the ethnic groups and we did not see him exact a "visit tax" 
like other senior officials we have observed in the field 
(reftel). 
 
15. (C) We took particular note in the hearty laughs he 
shared with leaders of ethnic groups in the SPDC camp, 
including a friendly exchange with KDA officials who pitched 
him on revisiting the terms of their 1991 cease-fire 
agreement to broaden their share of jade mining concessions. 
As for relations with the Wa, it has been 15 years since the 
UWSA reached a cease-fire with the GOB.  However, it was 
abundantly clear during our survey that, at best, an uneasy 
peace exists between the two sides and Kyaw Thein was merely 
a guest while in Wa territory.  He appeared embarrassed by 
our encounters with defiant Wa poppy growers, and privately 
acknowledged that UWSA authorities will have a difficult time 
meeting their 2005 poppy-free deadline.  End Comment. 
Martinez