US embassy cable - 04AMMAN2198

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CPA FOR WETHINGTON, VARDAMAN 
TREASURY FOR ZARATE, MILLS, DEMOPULOS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014 
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: IRAQI ASSETS IN JORDAN - INVITATION TO THE CPA 
 
REF: A. VARDAMAN-LAWLESS EMAIL (03/21/04) 
     B. LAWLESS-PELOFSKY-SCHEDLBAUER EMAIL (03/12/04) 
     C. HALE-SCHEDLBAUER EMAIL (03/11/04) 
     D. BAGHDAD 25 
     E. AMMAN 1539 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM.  REASONS 1.5 (B, D). 
 
1.  (U)  This is an action message.  See last Para. 
 
2.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The Government of Jordan (GOJ) late on 
March 11 passed to Embassy a list of Iraqi counterparties 
earlier requested by Iraqi and CPA officials to review Iraqi 
assets frozen in Jordan.  The local Rafidain Bank manager has 
stated his satisfaction with the information and CPA's Office 
of the General Counsel confirmed (Ref A) that the information 
the GOJ provided was sufficient.  Although the main reason 
for CPA's proposed trip to Jordan (Ref D) may seem to have 
been obviated by the GOJ action, senior Jordanian officials 
have heard conflicting information from Iraqi counterparts on 
Baghdad's level of satisfaction.  In the interest of forging 
strong Jordan-Iraq relations and ensuring continuing 
Jordanian cooperation on the return of Iraqi assets, Embassy 
believes an Iraqi/CPA team should proceed to Amman.  A 
face-to-face exchange will help resolve questions, secure the 
transfer of all remaining frozen Iraqi assets to the DFI, and 
develop the strong and positive relationship that we all 
believe is essential in Jordanian-Iraqi relations in the 
future.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (C)  Late on March 11, Minister of Finance Mohammad Abu 
Hammour delivered to the Embassy a list of 113 transactions 
detailing Iraqi counterparties in Jordan-Iraq commercial 
dealings, as the USG had earlier requested (Ref E).  A member 
of the technical committee reviewing the information 
explained to Acting ECON/C that the source of some of the 
information is sensitive, in that Jordanian banking laws 
offer broad protections to account holders.  He asked that 
the source of the information -- the Ministry of Finance -- 
be protected. 
 
4.  (SBU)  The same day, Acting ECON/C delivered the list to 
the manager of the Amman branch of the Rafidain Bank, Mr. 
Hasan Aba-Thar, who reviewed the contents (Ref C).  Mr. 
Aba-Thar reviewed the information on counterparties and said 
it met the needs of the Iraqi side.  The information would be 
used to confirm independently the counterparty information 
his bank employees had already been able to assemble, he 
asserted.  When asked, he said that he was satisfied with the 
number of accounts listed.  He said that he would report the 
information back to the CBI on the next business day. 
 
5.  (SBU)  March 12, Embassy sent copies of the 
counterparties list to CPA and to NEA/ARN  (Ref B), and 
subsequently followed up with John Vardaman of the CPA Office 
of the General Counsel.  According to initial reviews of the 
documents provided, CPA Office of the General Counsel 
confirmed that the information the GOJ provided was 
sufficient to conduct a meaningful review of individual 
Jordanian commercial claims against Iraq (Ref A). 
 
6.  (C)  In a more recent conversation with the Ambassador 
and CPA Deputy Administrator Amb. Richard Jones (details 
septel), Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher said that he had 
heard conflicting reactions to GOJ actions on Iraqi assets. 
While the U.S., including in testimony to Congress, had 
welcomed the GOJ's actions, Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari was 
less warmly receptive.  Iraqi Finance Minister Kamel 
al-Keylani seemed cool to Jordan's actions to date and 
insisted on a higher level of cooperation from Jordanian 
authorities, including on unspecified amounts beyond the USD 
550 million in Iraqi assets initially identified.  Muasher 
stressed to Ambassadors Gnehm and Jones that he was very 
emphatic with his Iraqi interlocutors that Jordan desired 
only the very best of relations with the new Iraq and he 
committed himself and the GOJ to do whatever was necessary to 
resolve any and all problems, including the assets claims 
issue.  When al-Keylani said that they (the Iraqis) were 
aware of a larger number of accounts in Jordanian banks with 
assets the Iraqis believed should be seized, Muasher urged 
al-Keylani to give him more specific information and he 
promised to pursue a Jordanian government investigation into 
those assets. 
 
7.  (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  We strongly believe a CPA/Iraqi 
team visit to Amman, as we have previously discussed, should 
proceed.  While the information provided by the GOJ appears 
adequate and responsive to CPA/Iraqi requests, in and of 
itself it does not get us to the bottom line we all seek -- 
mutual resolution of any existing Jordanian claims that then 
leads to the immediate transfer of all remaining frozen Iraqi 
assets to the DFI.  Abu Hammour has told us that he would 
hold off paying further commercial claims against the Iraqi 
trade ledger accounts, but he has repeatedly stated that he 
is under growing pressure to pay off proven claims.  It is in 
the long-term interest of the USG to resolve this matter 
expeditiously (Ref D), which in turn facilitates strong 
Jordan-Iraq relations and continuing Jordanian cooperation on 
many fronts.  The CPA/Iraqi team visit, with Muasher's 
involvement, would also help clear up any lingering 
misunderstandings and forge a more direct dialogue on assets 
-- thus easing us out of a mediating role.  We would hope a 
visit could move all parties a big step closer to reaching 
closure on this matter. 
GNEHM