US embassy cable - 04SANAA673

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, 
NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2014 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, YM, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 22 MARCH 2004 
 
REF: SECSTATE 62362 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Begin summary: Ambassador convened an EAC meeting 
on March 22, 2004, to review security conditions for Embassy 
personnel and the general American community in light of 
Israel's assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin (reftel).  Ambassador commenced the EAC with an 
overview of the Yassin assassination.  ORCA Chief and the 
Regional Security Officer (RSO) assessed that the Yassin 
attack did not pose an increased risk of terrorism against 
U.S. interests in Yemen, but demonstrations were likely and 
violent acts by individuals probable.  Additional threat 
information was also discussed, some of which was assessed to 
be unsubstantiated rumor.  DCM reviewed the 3/19 Ethiopian 
refugee incident.  Prior to the EAC meeting, the Embassy 
issued a Warden message warning American citizens to avoid 
possible demonstrations that may arise as a result of the 
Yassin assassination.  After the EAC Ambassador raised this 
issue at a Warden meeting and emphasized the need for 
Americans to lower their profile.  Key offices and personnel 
represented included: AMB, DCM, POL/ECON, CONS, MO, PD, ORCA, 
OMC, SOCE-Yemen, FPD, AID and RSO.  End Summary. 
 
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Assassination Overview and Threat Assessment 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF)  Ambassador briefed EAC members on the 
assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.  Ambassador explained 
that the Hamas presence in Yemen is political, possessing no 
operational capability.  Ambassador advised that there will 
nevertheless be widespread popular sympathy for Yassin within 
Yemen.  While the Yassin assassination is unlikely to 
increase the likelihood of terrorism against U.S. interests 
in Yemen, Ambassador noted the possibility of violent action 
by an enraged individual, such as the March 2002 Embassy 
grenade attack perpetrated by a lone, mentally unbalanced 
individual. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  ORCA Chief concurred with Ambassador's 
assessment, stating that Hamas focuses on fundraising 
activity but does not maintain an operational wing in Yemen. 
ORCA advised that the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) 
embraces Hamas and that potentially violent demonstrations by 
Yemeni citizens are more likely than a Hamas terrorist attack 
in Yemen.  All EAC elements, including intelligence sources, 
concur that no immediate threat of terrorist attacks is 
indicated; but, demonstration(s) over coming days are 
possible.  ORCA Chief added that the Political Security 
Organization (PSO) currently has no information regarding 
threats or demonstrations relating to this issue. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  RSO advised that the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
does not foresee a major threat emanating from the 
assassination of Sheikh Yassin but assured RSO that the MOI 
would inform the Embassy immediately if a threat was 
recognized.  Furthermore, RSO briefed on two March 22 
incidents that were possibly, but not definitely, linked to 
the assassination, citing a gathering of university students 
in northwest Sanaa and the temporary closing of Tahrir Square 
in downtown Sanaa by ROYG authorities. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  RSO expanded the focus on threats beyond the 
assassination, mentioning: 1) the development of Islah party 
members' ill will toward Jibla Hospital expatriate workers 
who volunteered medical and teaching services at a Jibla 
school.  The services were withdrawn March 12th to placate 
those Islah party members who perceived the Jibla Hospital 
staff's volunteerism as supporting the ruling General 
People's Congress party; 2) improvised explosive devices 
found in Amran, Yemen, thought to be linked to labor disputes 
with a Japanese-owned cement plant; and 3) rumors about two 
vehicular bombs in Sanaa.  RSO and ORCA Chief shared the 
assessment that the rumors about the vehicular bombs are 
false. 
 
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Ethiopian Refugee Clarification 
-------------------------------- 
6.  (S/NF)  DCM discussed the Ethiopian refugee protest that 
occurred outside UNHCR (adjacent to DCMR) on 03/19/2004.  DCM 
clarified that this is a refugee and immigration issue, not 
one of security, and in no way involves the United States. 
RSO added that based on this issue, the MOI reiterated its 
desire to receive riot control training.  Ambassador advised 
that MOI's request made INL's pending offer of such training 
especially timely. 
 
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Post Advisory Actions 
--------------------- 
 
7.  (S/NF)  Consul stated that the Embassy issued a Warden 
message that morning, advising U.S. citizens of the 
possibility for large demonstrations to be held in Sanaa and 
thus to take necessary precautions.  Correspondingly, 
Ambassador raised the Yassin assassination issue at a Wardens 
meeting convened following the conclusion of the EAC meeting. 
 EAC advised Embassy employees, and Ambassador reiterated in 
the subsequent meeting with American community wardens, that 
it is a good time for Americans to lower their profile and 
exercise maximum caution. 
HULL