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| Identifier: | 04TELAVIV1729 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04TELAVIV1729 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Tel Aviv |
| Created: | 2004-03-22 13:28:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ETRD BEXP IS ECONOMY AND FINANCE LABOR AND COMMERCE U |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001729 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS USTR FOR NOVELLI AND SAUMS STATE FOR NEA/IPA, EB/TPP/MTA/IPC AND EB/IFD/OMA USDOC FOR 4521/HVINEYARD USDOC FOR 4520/CLOUSTAUNAU/NWIEGLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2009 TAGS: ETRD, BEXP, IS, ECONOMY AND FINANCE, LABOR AND COMMERCE, U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS SUBJECT: TRADE MINISTER OLMERT PROMISES COOPERATION, ACTION ON TRADE ISSUES Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Summary. Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor (MOIT) Ehud Olmert told the Ambassador March 18 that he takes U.S. complaints about trade barriers seriously and would seek to correct problems. He said MOIT will be the point of contact on complaints related to government procurement and will intercede with other ministries if necessary. Similarly, MOIT will carefully review the GOI standards' regime, with the goal of introducing U.S. standards whenever possible. Olmert asked his staff to look quickly into the most immediate standards-related issue -- the decision to build the new gas transmission network using obscure Dutch standards. Olmert insisted that the USG would be pleased with new pharmaceutical data protection rules the GOI will unveil within the next few weeks. He said the GOI hoped to be able to tap into new FTAs the U.S. had negotiation through "cumulation" arrangements. He complained about Egypt's "unreasonable" posture on proposed QIZs. End summary. 2. (C) Olmert told the Ambassador that he requested the meeting following the Ambassador's recent public remarks about the imbalance in the bilateral trade relationship. He took the remarks seriously, and saw it as his "moral commitment" to the U.S. to explore ways how the two governments could improve the ability of U.S. companies to compete in the Israeli market. The amount of the U.S. trade deficit with Israel is distorted, he said, by the huge amount of diamonds Israel exports to the U.S. Nevertheless, even without diamonds, Israel's trade surplus with the U.S. is growing. Olmert cautioned that there were limits to what the GOI could do to improve the balance of trade, since individual companies, and not the government, make the great majority of purchasing decisions. The Ambassador replied that the Embassy had identified three areas where we believed governmental action could help "level the playing field" for U.S. firms: procurement, standards and IPR. ----------- Procurement ----------- 3. (C) The Ambassador said the GOI needed to increase the openness and transparency of Israel's government procurement process. He specifically noted problems U.S. firms had encountered in bidding on contracts for the Israel Electric Company, the Jewish Agency, and the Ministry of Defense. The Ambassador said the common practice of awarding contracts without an open and fair bidding process was of special concern. American firms may have won some of these directed contracts. Nevertheless, this approach is fundamentally flawed. A system where the bidder offering the best prices and the best services wins the contract would be in everyone's interest - the GOI, Israeli consumers, and U.S. firms. The Ambassador urged Olmert to establish a central clearing house for all governmental and parastatal tenders, and to designate an ombudsman to which U.S. and other firms could turn when encountering problems with the GOI procurement process. 4. (C) In reply, Ronit Kan, Deputy Director General of the Ministry, cited examples of what she described as the notable success of U.S. companies in obtaining government-related business in Israel. The GOI continuously strives to improve its procurement policies, she said. The Ministry of Finance, in particular, was working on ways to make the bidding process more open and transparent, so much so that it was encountering strong criticism from Israeli companies that were angered at the increased foreign competition. Kan said that representatives of American firms, unlike European businesspersons, had sometimes been unwilling to travel to Israel to promote their products or services, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. was seeking a level playing field so that those U.S. firms that had a presence here and wanted to compete could have a fair shot at contracts. 5. (C) Minister Olmert said he doubted the creation of a central clearinghouse or a designated ombudsman would be possible in Israel. The United States, he said, had no such mechanisms either. The Ambassador replied that the USG has strict, enforceable procurement regulations that must be abided by. Olmert said this was, by and large, the case in Israel as well. The GOI, he continued, was willing to address any procurement deficiencies identified by the USG. He asked that the Embassy provide specifics on any procurement problems that companies face, and said that Ronit Kan would be the point of contact. Her office would investigate all claims brought by U.S. companies. If MOIT received an unsatisfactory answer from the involved GOI agencies, it would insist on a change in policy. --------- Standards --------- 6. (C) The Ambassador asked that U.S. standards be given at least an equal footing with EU and other standards. He told Olmert that U.S. standards institutes and standards developing organizations were ready to engage in a dialogue with their Israeli counterparts to gain improved acceptance of U.S. standards. The Ambassador also asked Olmert to investigate the adoption of an obscure Dutch standard for Israel's natural gas pipeline infrastructure. Olmert said he was unaware of the gas standards issue, but promised the Ambassador that he would investigate. 7. (C) Kan confirmed that Israeli law allows the adoption of more than one standard if both standards are accepted internationally. She said the GOI needed a better understanding of how U.S. regulatory bodies work, and welcomed the Ambassador's message that U.S. regulators were seeking a dialogue. She said EU standards bodies had been very active in Israel. Through the Barcelona Process, an EU policy program aimed at strengthening ties between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean Basin, Israel had developed a strong understanding, and hence acceptance, of EU standards regimes. The Ambassador agreed to communicate the GOI's willingness to discuss standards regimes to the relevant U.S. agencies and organizations. 8. (C) Olmert, Kan and Yair Shiran, MOIT Director for International Affairs, pushed for Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) between the United States and Israel. Shiran said, for example, that the Israeli Ministry of Health accepted the findings of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration when approving drugs in Israel, but the FDA did not accept MOH findings. He told the Ambassador that the GOI was interested in reaching a mutual recognition agreement with the FDA. The Ambassador said the Embassy would forward the Israeli interest to Washington, but added that the GOI's position would be greatly enhanced if Israel would adopt an acceptable data protection regime (see para 9 below). The Ambassador noted that the Embassy was expecting further guidance from Washington in regard to MRAs with Israel. ----------------------------------- Protection of Intellectual Property ----------------------------------- 9. (C) Minister Olmert told the Ambassador that the GOI is convinced that Israel is living up to its WTO obligations regarding the protection of proprietary pharmaceutical data. Olmert said the U.S. was "exaggerating" the importance of the issue, which in his mind primarily reflected the business interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies. Still, the GOI wanted to find a solution to this problem because it wants to make it easier to do business in Israel and because it takes USG concerns seriously. Olmert told the Ambassador that there will be a "dramatic change" in Israel's policy. Shiran said that the interagency working group would deliver its suggestions to the ministerial level probably by the end of March. Kan added, however, that the group had yet to reach a final recommendation on the changes that Israel should make, and was still exploring alternative models. 10. (C) The Ambassador said the USG had long been puzzled by the GOI's policy towards the rights that U.S. music companies enjoy when collecting broadcast royalties in Israel. We were disturbed by the GOI's recent submission for the current Special 301 review. If the GOI did not really intend to deny national treatment to U.S. music companies, then it might consider amending its submission very quickly. Olmert said the issue was new to him. He promised the Ambassador that his staff would approach the Ministry of Justice, which was responsible for the issue within the GOI, and report its findings to the Embassy. --------------------------------------------- - Issues of Concern to the GOI - Rules of Origin --------------------------------------------- - 11. (C) Kan told the Ambassador that the GOI was "amazed" by the tempo with which the U.S. was concluding new free trade agreements (FTAs). Israel was concerned that these agreements were causing an erosion of Israel's competitive position in the U.S. market. Kan told the Ambassador that the GOI hoped that Israeli content would be accepted when another U.S. FTA partner calculated the minimum content requirement needed to enjoy duty free access to the U.S. market. Olmert added that the GOI was particularly interested in such treatment for textile products. 12. (C) The Ambassador told Olmert and Kan that the GOI should bring the issue up at the planned April meeting of the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Committee. He added, however, that the GOI should understand that it would need to make a compelling case - it should not expect this to be an easy sell in Washington. The Ambassador said the GOI might find a more positive response if it focused on the new FTA trading partners of the U.S. in the Middle East. As part of its economic agenda in the Middle East, the United States was interested in improved economic cooperation between those countries in the region that were willing and able to sign FTAs with the U.S. Olmert replied that Israel was interested in a broader solution, whereas Kan added that Mexico and the CAFTA countries were the most interesting cumulation partners for Israel. ------------- Egyptian QIZs ------------- 13. (C) The Ambassador said the USG takes the view that the GOI should engage in a Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) agreement with Egypt if it believes that such cooperation would be in Israel's commercial and political interest. At the same time, he urged the GOI to "widen its lens" and consider the broader benefits that QIZs could bring to Israel's relations with Egypt. Olmert replied that, on balance, it was questionable whether QIZs with Egypt had any real economic benefits for Israel. Many Israeli companies were scared by the potential competition from Egyptian QIZ companies. 14. (C) Olmert added that it was "unthinkable" that the GOI would immediately give Egypt the same benefits -- i.e. 8% minimum Israeli content -- that Jordan now enjoys. The Jordanians received this low input concession only after several years of productive, fruitful cooperation. Egypt had also made the process difficult for Israel, he said. At first the GOE was unwilling to talk to the GOI directly, but sent businessmen as surrogates. "Just because Mubarak is now in a different mood won't compel us to act and give them what they want", he told the Ambassador. Nevertheless, Olmert said the GOI was willing to compromise. He believed that an agreement would eventually be signed. ------- Comment ------- 15. (C) This was a positive and constructive meeting, but the jury is still out on the GOI's commitment to take the sustained action needed to remove trade barriers. We are encouraged by Olmert's pledge of cooperation on procurement and standards issues, but recognize that improvement in these areas is likely to require continued and persistent pressure before real changes will become evident. One indication of the GOI responsiveness will be the government's action in regard to Israel's natural gas transmission system Key tests on IPR will be the level of protection offered by Israel's promised new data protection policy and a positive resolution of the broadcast royalties issue. End comment. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER
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