US embassy cable - 04STATE61816

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EXCEPTION TO VANCE MEMORANDUM - APPROVAL FOR U.S. DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATIONS TO INSTALL MONITORING EQUIPMENT IN "WALK-IN" ROOMS.

Identifier: 04STATE61816
Wikileaks: View 04STATE61816 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Secretary of State
Created: 2004-03-19 19:16:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ASEC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 NP-00 AF-00 AIT-03 AOP-00 AEX-00
AS-00 A-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 CCOE-00 WHA-00
PERC-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 CSEP-00 VC-00
FSI-00 OBO-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 IO-00 L-00
CAC-00 VCE-00 MED-07 MMP-00 MOFM-00 M-00 AC-00
NEA-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 OIG-00 OPR-00 PM-00 ACE-00
P-00 SCT-00 FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SA-00
ASDS-00 R-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 ALM-00 SAS-00

R 191916Z MAR 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
S E C R E T STATE 061816 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: ASEC 
 
SUBJECT: EXCEPTION TO VANCE MEMORANDUM - APPROVAL FOR U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATIONS TO INSTALL MONITORING EQUIPMENT 
IN "WALK-IN" ROOMS. 
 
REF: APPROVED DEPUTY SECRETARY ACTION MEMO DATED 
2/13/04. 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, DS 
REASONS: 1.4 (C) AND (D) 
 
1. (S) IN VIEW OF CHANGING WORLD CONDITIONS AND THE GLOBAL 
WAR ON TERRORISM, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAS APPROVED A 
MODIFICATION TO THE 1977 VANCE MEMORANDUM. 
WHICH STATES, IN PART, THAT NO OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT OR FOREIGN SERVICE SHALL DIRECT, ARRANGE FOR, 
PERMIT, OR UNDERTAKE THE MONITORING OR MECHANICAL OR 
ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF ANY CONVERSATION, INCLUDING ANY 
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF 
ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE CONVERSATION. 
ANY DEVIATION FROM THIS RULE MUST BE APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE OR DEPUTY SECRETARY. 
 
2. (S/NF) THE EXCEPTION APPROVED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ON 
FEBRUARY 13, 2004 NOW PERMITS REGULAR MONITORING AND RECORDING 
OF INTERVIEWS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS AT "WALK-IN ROOMS" 
AT OVERSEAS POSTS. THIS MODIFICATION ONLY APPLIES 
TO RECORDING OF INTERVIEWS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISOS LISTED IN PARA 7. 
 
3. (S/NF) BACKGROUND: PEOPLE WHO VOLUNTARILY COME TO A 
U.S. EMBASSY AND OFFER INFORMATION ARE COMMONLY 
REFERRED TO UNDER THE GENERIC NAME OF WALK-INS. IN 
MOST INSTANCES, DS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE REGIONAL 
SECURITY OFFICE IS THE FIRST OFFICER TO CONDUCT AN INITIAL 
INTERVIEW WITH THE WALK-IN (THIS MAY VARY IN ACCORDANCE TO 
THE POST'S WALK-IN PLAN). IT IS THE FIRST-CONTACT OFFICER'S 
RESPONSIBILITY TO BEGIN TO ESTABLISH THE SUBJECT'S BONA 
FIDES AND REASON FOR VISITING THE POST. COORDINATION 
IS THEN EFFECTED WITH OTHER APPROPRIATE 
EMBASSY OFFICERS REGARDING ADDITIONAL QUESTIONING OR ANY 
FUTURE HANDLING OF THE INDIVIDUAL. IN SOME CASES, 
OTHER AGENCIES (E.G., DEA, FBI, RAO) MAY ALSO BE INVOLVED 
IN SUBSEQUENT STAGES. 
 
4. (S/NF) HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT WALK-INS COME IN MANY SHAPES 
AND SIZES. WHILE SOME RELAY INFORMATION THAT IS CORROBORATED 
AS VALID, MANY OTHERS HAVE PROVEN TO BE MENTALLY DISTURBED 
PERSONS, INTELLIGENCE VENDORS, FABRICATORS, AND PROVOCATEURS 
FROM HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OR PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE 
BEEN SENT TO GATHER INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF TERRORIST OR 
NARCOTICS-TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
5. (S/NF) ALMOST ALL EMBASSIES HAVE A ROOM DESIGNATED AS AN 
INTERVIEW OR WALK-IN ROOM. THIS IS NORMALLY LOCATED BEHIND 
THE INITIAL SCREENING POINT, BUT STILL OUTSIDE OF THE 
EMBASSY HARDLINE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW EXCEPTION, 
POSTS MAY EQUIP THESE PERMANENT ROOMS WITH HIDDEN AUDIO 
AND VISUAL MONITORING DEVICES TO MONITOR CONVERSATIONS 
OCCURRING IN THE ROOM. SUCH MONITORING WILL ATTAIN TWO 
OBJECTIVES: A) ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF THE U.S. PERSONNEL 
CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW IN THE EVENT THE SUBJECT BECOMES 
VIOLENT, AND B) PERMIT AN ACCURATE CAPTURING OF INFORMATION 
CONVEYED (MOST INTERVIEWS ARE CONDUCTED IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
AND A TAPE CAN SUBSEQUENTLY PERMIT DETAILED REVIEW OF THE 
WORDS UTILIZED). 
 
6. (S/NF) BECAUSE THE U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL INITIATE AND 
AGREE TO THE MONITORING ACTIVITY, THIS AMENDED PROCEDURE 
IS CONSIDERED CONSENSUAL MONITORING. CONSENSUAL MONITORING 
IS THE RECORDING OF CONVERSATIONS WHEN ONE PARTY TO THE 
CONVERSATION CONSENTS TO THE RECORDING AND IS A STANDARD 
LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUE THAT IS WIDELY USED IN FEDERAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE A COURT ORDER AND 
IS SPECIFICALLY PERMISSIBLE UNDER 18 USC 2511 (2)(C). 
 
7. (S/NF) POSTS SHOULD CONVENE THEIR CIWGS TO DISCUSS 
SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE APPROVED EXCEPTION WITH 
THE FOLLOWING PROVISOS IN MIND: 
A) THE MONITORING OF THESE INTERVIEWS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE PARTY BEING INTERVIEWED MAY ONLY OCCUR WITH FOREIGN 
NATIONALS. CONVERSATIONS WITH U.S. CITIZENS AND LEGAL 
PERMANENT RESIDENTS (LPR) CONTINUE TO FALL UNDER THE VANCE 
MEMORANDUM GUIDELINES, AND IN SUCH CASES ALL 
PARTIES MUST CONSENT TO ANY RECORDING/MONITORING ACTIVITY. 
FOREIGN NATIONALS DO NOT/NOT HAVE TO BE ADVISED 
THAT THE INTERVIEW IS BEING RECORDED OR MONITORED. 
B) AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE, AN IDENTIFYING DOCUMENT 
SHOULD BE REQUESTED OF THE WALK-IN PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF THE INTERVIEW. IN ADDITION TO COPYING THE 
DOCUMENT FOR PERMANENT RECORD, THIS WILL ALSO ASSIST IN 
DETERMINING IF THE PERSON IS A U.S. CITIZEN OR LPR. 
C) THE MONITORING DEVICES DO NOT/NOT HAVE TO VISIBLE. 
THEY MAY BE CONCEALED FROM THE PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED. 
D) VIDEO DEVICES MAY BE PLACED SO THAT THE U.S. PERSONNEL 
CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW ARE NOT NECESSARILY CAPTURED ON 
VIDEOTAPE. 
E) THE MONITORING DEVICES MAY NOT BE AUTOMATIC. PRIOR TO 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW, THE INTERVIEWING 
EMBASSY OFFICER MUST MAKE A DELIBERATE DECISION TO MONITOR/NOT 
MONITOR (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GUIDANCE IN POINT B ABOVE). 
MOST POSTS WILL OPT TO HAVE THE ACTIVATION SWITCHES LOCATED 
AT MSG POST 1 OR ANOTHER CONVENIENT LOCATION. THE POST 
WALK-IN PLAN WILL ESTABLISH A MECHANISM FOR COMMUNICATING 
THE MONITOR/DON'T MONITOR DECISION TO MSG POST 1 OR WHEREVER 
THE ACTIVATION SWITCHES ARE LOCATED. F) RECORDINGS/TAPES OF 
THE INTERVIEWS MAY BE DISSEMINATED TO THOSE AGENCIES AT POST 
WITH INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS 
CONNECTED TO THE MATTER DISCLOSED BY THE PERSON INTERVIEWED 
OR AS PER GUIDANCE ESTABLISHED BY THE CIWG. 
G) THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE WILL RETAIN COPIES OF ALL 
RECORDED/TAPED INTERVIEWS FOR A MINIMUM OF NINETY (90) DAYS. 
RECORDS OF SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION OR TRANSFER MUST BE RETAINED 
TO INCLUDE DATE OF INTERVIEW, NAME OF SUBJECT INTERVIEWED, 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION DIVULGED IN INTERVIEW, 
SUBSEQUENT REFERRAL OF INFORMATION AND DATE TAPES/RECORDINGS 
DESTROYED. 
H) REPORTING OF THREAT INFORMATION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS 
MODIFICATION. THREAT INFORMATION IS TO BE REPORTED AS 
OUTLINED IN 2001 STATE 114250. IN THE EVENT AN INTERVIEW 
RESULTS IN CREDIBLE THREAT INFORMATION BEING DIVULGED, RSO 
WILL ALSO FORWARD A COPY OF THE TAPE/RECORDING VIA CLASSIFIED 
POUCH TO DS/PII. 
 
8. (U) DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT DUE TO RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS 
THESE ITEMS MUST BE EITHER POST FUNDED OR PROVIDED BY A 
PARTICIPATING AGENCY OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKING 
GROUP (CIWG). 
 
9. (U)QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS POLICY SHOULD BE DIRECTED 
TO DIRECTOR, DS/DO/ICI, (571-345-2944, STU). 
POWELL 

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