US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO489

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03/19/14 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Elections, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka:  Competing Muslim groups engage in 
fierce infighting ahead of April 2 election 
 
Refs:  Colombo 477, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Muslim parties are engaged in fierce 
infighting ahead of the April 2 parliamentary election. 
Tensions are particularly high in the east, where there 
have been many incidents of violence between the pro-UNP 
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and Muslims who are 
loyal to President Kumaratunga.  At this point, it is 
difficult to tell which party is ahead in the race, but 
the SLMC's campaign appears to have had difficulty 
picking up traction.  In the meantime, Muslims in the 
east remain worried about the potential ramifications of 
the LTTE split.  If the SLMC does not do well, the UNP's 
chances of forming the next government would be 
seriously impaired.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C) INFIGHTING AMONG MUSLIMS:  Muslim parties are 
engaged in fierce infighting ahead of the April 2 
parliamentary election.  Tensions are particularly high 
in the east, where there have been many incidents of 
violence between the pro-United National Party (UNP) 
SLMC and Muslims who are loyal to President Kumaratunga. 
(The pro-Kumaratunga elements are divided into two 
camps:  the National Unity Alliance, the "NUA," and a 
faction led by A.L.M. Athaullah, a MP who recently 
defected from the SLMC along with four other SLMC MPs. 
The Athaullah faction is running for seats on the ticket 
of the pro-Kumaratunga "United People's Freedom 
Alliance," "UPFA.")  There have been a particularly high 
number of campaign-related incidents of violence in the 
eastern Batticaloa and Ampara Districts.  A SLMC 
campaign worker was reportedly killed in one such 
incident on March 16, for example.  If confirmed, this 
would be the first death related to the campaign among 
Muslims (and the third overall in the campaign).  In the 
meantime, a local election monitoring group has tallied 
almost 80 violent incidents in the east since the 
campaign began, which represents a relatively high 
proportion of the roughly 600 reported incidents in the 
country as a whole. 
 
3.  (C) SLOW START FOR SLMC:  At this point, it is 
difficult to tell which party is ahead in the race, but 
the SLMC's campaign appears to have had difficulty 
picking up traction.  The SLMC and its leader, Rauf 
Hakeem, are running an active campaign in the east, 
where a plurality of Muslims lives.  Instead of running 
for a seat in Kandy, where he is from, Hakeem has even 
decided to run from Ampara District, for example. 
Despite all of this, the SLMC campaign appears to have 
been rattled to some extent by accusations that Hakeem 
supports the UNP's peace process initiative too much. 
The NUA and the Athaullah faction have worked hard to 
press this point home in the east, where many Muslims 
are worried about the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) organization (see below).  It is also the case 
that the campaigns of the NUA and the Athaullah faction 
have been hobbled to some degree by infighting between 
each other.  At this point, there are few hard 
statistics to show how the parties are faring. 
 
4.  (C) WORRIES ABOUT LTTE SPLIT:  In the meantime, 
Muslims in the east are very worried about the potential 
ramifications of the recent split in the LTTE between 
northern and eastern elements.  Muslims have not 
expressed public support for either LTTE leader V. 
Prabhakaran or rebel eastern commander Karuna, the 
antagonists in the LTTE dispute.  The community has deep 
concerns about both men, however.  Karuna, for example, 
has been implicated in the 1990 killings of over 700 Sri 
Lankan policemen in the east, while Pottu Amman, the 
LTTE intelligence chief and a close associate of 
Prabhakaran's, has been linked with attacks on Muslims 
in the east in the past.  There are some reports that 
some Muslims may tend to favor Karuna, believing that 
the split he has caused in the LTTE only helps to weaken 
the larger Tiger organization.  Norwegian diplomatic 
contacts, in their role as peace process facilitators, 
have said that, since the split, Karuna has tried to 
reach out to Muslims to ensure them that he is not a 
threat.  All that said, Muslims are worried that 
possible violence between northern and eastern elements 
could spill over into Muslim-dominated areas in the 
east.  (Most contacts believe that the main LTTE 
organization plans to wait until after the April 2 
election before trying to undermine Karuna by force or 
otherwise.  For its part, the LTTE has said it plans to 
use peaceful means to dislodge Karuna.) 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  If the SLMC does not do well in the 
election, the UNP's chances of forming the next 
government would be seriously impaired.  While the 
amount of seats held by Muslim parties in the Parliament 
is relatively small (the SLMC won 12 and the NUA three 
in the last election out of 225 seats total), Muslims 
could play a big role in forming the next government. 
If the April 2 election is close, for example, even a 
shift of several seats to the NUA and to the Athaullah 
faction could mean the difference between victory for 
President Kumaratunga's UPFA grouping and defeat for the 
UNP.  END COMMENT. 
 
6.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD