US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS1151

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARMENT FOR PRM - MIKE MCKINLEY AND AF/RSA - MIKE 
BITTRICK; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR ROGER WINTER AND 
KATE ALMQUIST; NAIROBI FOR LISA PETERSON; USUN FOR GREG 
D'ELIA; OSLO FOR ERIKCA BARKES-RUGGLES; LONDON FOR CHARLES 
GUERNEY; GENEVA FOR NANCE KYLOH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, PHUM, CD, SU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: COORDINATION FOR THE CHAD CONFERENCE ON DARFUR: EC 
OBJECTIVES AND SUPPORT 
 
REF: STATE 58545 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The European Commission (EC) is in agreement 
with USG thoughts on Darfur mediation (reftel), and is 
prepared to financially support the talks in Chad with 
400,000 euros channeled through the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue (CHD).  According to the EC, important outstanding 
issues include the composition of the rebels' delegation and 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that a humanitarian ceasefire 
is respected.  The EU currently plans to be represented at 
the Chad meeting by its heads of delegation in Khartoum and 
N'djamena.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On 3/18, PRMOff delivered reftel talking points to 
Roger Moore, DG DEV Head of Unit for the Horn and East 
Africa, and to Christian Manahl, DG DEV desk officer for 
Sudan.  Manahl said the EC supports the role of the CHD as 
facilitator for the Darfur mediation effort.  He said that he 
had met with two representatives of the CHD who had just 
traveled to Brussels from Chad on 3/17.  The CHD reported 
that all sides had agreed to a meeting and that the CHD would 
facilitate logistics for the rebels to attend.  Although the 
Government of Chad had asked CHD to serve as chair, they 
declined the invitation but will act as advisor and support 
to the chair. 
 
3. (C) The EC agrees to N'djamena as a venue, although it had 
hoped for a more neutral location.  Regarding the proposed 
date, Manahl said he felt that the March 23-24 timeframe was 
too early and that the meeting probably should not take place 
until at least the 27th.  He said that it was important for 
the right rebels to be identified and for them to be allowed 
adequate time to prepare for in depth talks, rather than just 
rounding up anyone to represent the rebel side.  He indicated 
that the rebels who had been in contact with CHD requested 
more time themselves to prepare for the meeting in Chad. 
Manahl said the EC also favored a five to six day meeting 
with a break in the middle so that the negotiating parties 
could consult back with Khartoum and the military leaders in 
the field.  Furthermore, he suggested a follow-up meeting to 
take place a month after the mediation effort in order to 
assess progress (or lack thereof). 
 
4. (C) Manahl said that the EC is prepared to use its Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism (a funding line controlled by DG RELEX 
which can be disbursed quickly) for a contribution of up to 
400,000 euros to support a series of meetings they think will 
be needed to bring about a lasting humanitarian ceasefire and 
sustained humanitarian access.  (Note.  CHD will revise its 
earlier proposal for a February mediation meeting in 
Switzerland, an event which never occurred.  End Note.) 
 
5. (C) Regarding participation, Manahl said that EU heads of 
mission and U.S. representatives in Khartoum had discussed 
delegations of five to six each for the two directly opposing 
groups, and two observers each from the U.S. and EU.  At this 
point, plans are for the EU to be represented by the French 
head of delegation in N'djamena (who manages EU interests in 
Chad) and perhaps by his Dutch counterpart in Khartoum (who 
manages EU interests in Sudan).  No decision regarding EU 
participation has been finalized; a Brussels-based official 
might attend in place of the Dutch representative. 
 
6. (C) In terms of substance, the EU agrees with the 
principal focus of the talks centering on a humanitarian 
ceasefire and the issue of humanitarian access.  Manahl 
stated that the military discussions needed to be solid and 
substantive in order to result in long-term objectives.  He 
agreed that both sides need to come prepared to provide a 
rough breakout of the forces, the number of armed combatants 
and where they are located, and to where they would be 
withdrawn.  He added that the Janjaweed issue needed to be 
addressed.  Manahl expressed caution about "self policing" of 
the ceasefire, noting such might prove ineffective.  He 
preferred using the Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) that 
is already in-country to ensure that the ceasefire 
stabilizes.  Manahl reported that the GoS prefers the use of 
the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team for this purpose, but 
felt that this group did not have the technical capabilities. 
 (He noted that perhaps the VMT could be used after the 
ceasefire was firmly in place.)  Manahl stated that funding 
and/or resources would be required from the international 
community if either of these monitoring teams were employed 
to support the ceasefire. 
 
7. (C) In response to the talking point on "the mandate to 
negotiate," Manahl expressed concern that no formal request 
has yet been made to anyone to organize or hold the Chad 
meeting nor have formal invitations been extended to anyone. 
He said that yesterday the GoS had requested the GoC to 
mediate, but there was disagreement between the two 
governments as to whom would be invited.  Manahl said he 
understood the GoS favored inviting only the SLM, while the 
GoC felt the JEM should also attend.  Another contentious 
factor relating to attendance, according to Manahl, is the 
role of Darfur exilees.  Manahl suggested that perhaps some 
should be included. 
 
8. (C) In closing, Moore and Manahl both said it was 
important to keep sight of two related issues -- the local 
disputes over pasture and land which need to be addressed, as 
well as the political demands of the regions within the 
overall constitutional review process.  Manahl said that 
Darfur might set a bad precedent for other restive regions 
and could encourage violence in order to obtain concessions 
from the central government. 
 
9.  Minimized Considered. 
 
FOSTER