US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1685

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, KWBG, IS, UK, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: JERICHO MONITORING MISSION:  STATUS REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. JERUSALEM 705 
     B. JERUSALEM 402 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Tel Aviv-ConGen Jerusalem 
message, coordinated with the British Embassy and British 
ConGen. 
 
2. (S) SUMMARY:  Following a detailed review of the situation 
at the Jericho prison, the U.S. and British Ambassadors and 
Consuls General agreed March 15 that Palestinian 
non-compliance with the prison regime is unsatisfactory. 
Based on the monitors' own assessment, and in the absence of 
information about specific threats against monitors or 
sustained Israeli pressure, meeting participants assessed 
that the current level of risk was low, but required careful 
monitoring.  The Jericho Monitoring Mission (JMM), in 
consultation with U.S. and UK DATTs and the U.S. ConGen 
Jerusalem RSO, will draw up enhanced contingency plans for 
monitors' emergency extraction.  Meanwhile, HMG will develop 
a longer-term exit strategy, and U.S. and British 
counterparts will conduct regular (biannual) reviews of JMM. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
JMM Sitrep 
---------- 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador Kurtzer on March 15 hosted a meeting with 
Jerusalem Consul General Pearce and the British Ambassador 
and CG to discuss the Jerusalem Monitoring Mission (JMM). 
JMM Chief Monitor LeMesurier and Embassy and ConGen poloffs 
also attended.  LeMesurier outlined the situation following 
the U.S./UK demarche to Abu Ala'a of February 5, noting that 
the JMM had improved seclusion by installing a metal detector 
portal (purchased by HMG).  In addition, the Palestinians had 
made progress on the easy measures laid out in the demarche, 
notably on recording visitors and limiting visiting hours (to 
16 hours a day).  They had not implemented any of the more 
difficult measures, however, such as cell searches or removal 
of computers or Shobaki's four aides.  Consequently, the JMM 
had been unable to verify seclusion of the unconvicted 
prisoners (Sa'adat, Shobaki and (later) Gholmi) since 
November 2002 and of the convicted PFLP prisoners since 
October 2003.  The monitors' day-to-day security situation 
inside the prison was stable and acceptable. 
 
------------------- 
What To Do About It 
------------------- 
 
4.  (S) There was consensus that Palestinian non-compliance 
with the Ramallah Agreement, and JMM's consequent inability 
to confirm seclusion of the six prisoners, caused serious 
concern about JMM's future.  The British representatives 
noted that the JMM monitors are the most vulnerable FCO staff 
(and virtually the only U.S. staff) in the West Bank, 
traveling the same route on a daily basis.  They also 
remarked on the high cost of maintaining the mission (Note: 
JMM costs the FCO approximately BPS 700,000 per year.  End 
Note.)  Israeli criticism of JMM (particularly PM COS Dov 
Weissglas's 9 December 2003 letter to the U.S. and UK 
Ambassadors) has reflected Israeli doubts that JMM was a 
successful example of international intervention.  The 
British CG also noted that continued tolerance of Palestinian 
non-compliance could undermine British credibility when 
trying to secure cooperation on other issues, including the 
UK's Palestinian security plan. 
 
5.  (S) Despite PA non-compliance with all aspects of the 
Ramallah agreement, participants agreed that JMM was 
sustainable for the immediate future.  The GOI had not 
repeated the concerns expressed in the January 9 Weissglas 
letter.  This suggested that the Israelis might accept the 
status quo, provided we continued to press for improvements 
in seclusion.  While monitor safety remained the top 
priority, there were no known specific threats.  As long as 
the JMM remained in Jericho, the vulnerability of the 
monitors would be a continuing concern.  It was agreed that 
extracting the monitors would have to be coordinated with 
capitals, but that this could be accomplished in relatively 
short order if necessary.  However, the method of extraction 
required careful advance thought, because it could also pose 
some risks monitor safety.  Moreover, the Israelis would 
probably respond to extraction by attempting to capture or 
kill the prisoners.  This would strain the U.S./UK 
relationships with the Palestinian Authority, increase 
Israeli/Palestinian tensions, and potentially generate PFLP 
threats against U.S. or UK targets, including diplomatic 
staff. 
 
6.  (C) It was agreed that prospects for agreement between 
the two parties remained poor for the time being.  The 
Israeli position has if anything hardened since the JMM 
started.  The GOI would be reluctant to accept anything other 
than an Israeli trial or a Palestinian trial in which they 
could have confidence.  Meanwhile, the Palestinians see 
little benefit from JMM, given Arafat's continued seclusion 
in the Muqata'a.  In preparatory discussions for the 
Sharon/Abu Ala'a meeting, the Palestinians indicated that 
they would seek, among other things, the release of Sa'adat 
and Shobaki to Ramallah and Gaza respectively, a move that 
would be unacceptable to Israel.  Indeed, as Weissglas told 
Ambassador Kurtzer, the GOI had been unhappy that the PA had 
proposed moving JMM from the "points to be raised" agenda of 
the Sharon/Abu Ala'a meeting to the "points to be agreed" 
section, a proposal Weissglas had taken to mean the 
Palestinians wanted to delay the summit -- even before the 
Ashdod bombing, which provided the pretext for the GOI to do 
so. 
 
--------- 
Follow-Up 
--------- 
 
7.  (S) Participants agreed on the following follow-up 
actions: 
 
-- UK Embassy will produce a draft exit strategy for 
discussion (including options such as exile or technical 
surveillance); 
 
-- JMM, in consultation with U.S. and UK DATTs and the ConGen 
Jerusalem RSO, will produce emergency extraction strategies, 
covering different scenarios and in different environments, 
and considering the need for coordination with the GOI and PA; 
 
-- At an appropriate time after the anticipated meeting 
between the Israeli and Palestinian PMs, the U.S. and UK 
Consuls General will discuss with the PA a prioritized list 
of outstanding measures required to improve seclusion, 
including phased implementation of some measures; 
 
-- The U.S. and UK Embassies will inform the GOI of progress 
to date in enhancing seclusion; 
 
-- The U.S. and UK will immediately review the situation with 
a view to extraction should there be threats to monitors' 
safety. 
 
-- U.S. and UK will encourage the two parties to pursue 
agreement, and take a constructive and realistic approach to 
JMM.  We would review progress made on JMM at a Sharon/Abu 
Ala'a meeting; 
 
-- U.S. and UK Embassies and CGs would provide capitals a 
progress report in May. 
 
8.  (C) Subsequent to the U.S. - UK meeting, PA Minister of 
Interior Hakam Bal'awi told DPO that he had sent a two-person 
delegation to Jericho on March 15 to investigate the problems 
at the prison which the U.S. Consul General had raised with 
him in their last meeting.  Bal'awi had instructed the 
delegation to go over the specific areas of non-compliance 
point by point with the prison officials.  Some progress had 
been made, Bal'awi reported, without precisely describing it, 
but more remained to be done.  Comment:  Bal'awi appears to 
understand the stakes in ensuring compliance but may be 
constrained by a lack of cooperation by the PA's prison 
service.  End Comment. 
 
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