US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS1134

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 001134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: EFIN, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AFTER MADRID 
 
REF: USEU TODAY 02/06/04 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------------------------ 
Summary: Europe Wakes Up 
------------------------ 
 
1. (SBU) The EU is re-examining its role in the war against 
terrorism following the March 11 attack in Madrid.  Many EU 
efforts to improve its counter-terrorism (CT) effectiveness 
-- for instance by revising the EU CT Action Plan and 
creating and streamlining the Clearinghouse -- were in the 
works before Madrid but are now being pushed along with 
greater urgency.  Others, such as establishing a CT 
Coordinator, were not yet considered ripe for adoption just a 
week ago.  European Council President Bertie Ahern announced 
on March 12 that he would seek a raft of agreements on 
counter-terrorism at the March 25-26 European Council 
(Summit). 
 
2. (C) A Council press release later detailed Ahern's 
proposals, saying he would seek agreement by EU Heads of 
State and Government to: adopt an EU solidarity clause; adopt 
a revised CT Action Plan; appoint an EU CT coordinator; 
enhance security and intelligence cooperation among member 
states; adopt a long-dormant "guidelines" document to provide 
strategic guidance to EU CT activities; endorse the draft UN 
Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism; enhance the 
"efficiency and effectiveness" of EU efforts to combat 
terrorist finance; reinforce cooperation with Europol, 
Eurojust and the Police Chief's Task Force; speed up 
implementation of existing agreements on border and document 
security; and adopt a program for enhancing EU-third country 
CT cooperation.  EU staffers are working round the clock to 
elaborate these proposals for policymakers, who will begin 
debating them in marathon sessions between March 18 and March 
26.  While many of the proposals put forward by the Irish 
Presidency are presentational, and intended to respond to 
political demands in the wake of the Madrid bombings, the 
shock of Madrid and a strong new mandate from heads of 
government at the March 25-26 Council session may help the EU 
move ahead where progress heretofore has been stymied.  This 
cable discusses the timeline and likely outcome of these 
debates.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Timeline: From Now to the Summit 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) PM Ahern's proposals will be discussed first by the EU 
PermReps (COREPER II) on March 18, then by Justice and 
Interior Ministers at a special session of the Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) Council on March 19, then by FMs at the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 
March 22, and finally by Presidents and PMs at the European 
Council March 25-26.  Not all of the proposals will make it 
through the guantlet of EU preparatory bodies in time for the 
European Council, but some will; those that don't will be 
sent back to the preparatory bodies for further elaboration 
and negotiation.  The three high-profile measures -- the 
creation of an EU CT Coordinator, the adoption of a revised 
EU Action Plan, and the adoption of an EU Solidarity Clause 
-- will almost certainly be adopted in some form. 
 
----------------------------- 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (C) PM Ahern said that the EU "will consider the 
appointment of a security coordinator to enhance cooperation 
between EU bodies and third countries and streamline 
activities in the fight against terrorism."   Commission 
security policy expert Patricia Holland told us the 
Coordinator would work in the Council Secretariat under HiRep 
Solana in an arrangement similar to that of WMD Rep Annalisa 
Giannella.  Unlike Giannella, however, the CT Coordinator 
will, if mandated as expected by the European Council, be 
vested with the explicit endorsement of EU leaders (Giannella 
was appointed by Solana unilaterally, as a "Personal 
Representative" for WMD).  The move to create a Coordinator 
has been pushing slowly forward since January (ref), but has 
taken on new urgency in the wake of last week's Madrid 
bombings. 
 
5. (C) The Coordinator post is envisaged as tasking one 
person with facilitating cooperation among EU institutions -- 
which jealously guard their stovepiped competencies, often 
leading to inconsistent policy and ineffective activities -- 
and with interfacing with third countries on behalf of the 
EU's CT machinery.  To a limited degree, and when asked, the 
Coordinator would assist EU Member States with their CT 
obligations under the revised EU Action Plan.  The 
Coordinator would have no direct authority over member state 
ministries, but would instead serve both as a clearinghouse 
for member state CT activities and as a facilitator for those 
seeking greater coordination and assistance.  Many in 
Brussels also hope that the Coordinator will acquire the 
moral authority to "name and shame" when Member States fail 
to live up to their Action Plan commitments. 
 
6. (C) In a meeting with visiting EUR/DAS Bradtke on March 
16, Council External Affairs DG Robert Cooper said he hoped 
the Coordinator would not only coordinate ongoing efforts, 
but help to drive them forward.  To do that, the office would 
need to have a certain amount of Member State acquiescence, 
which will be difficult to obtain even after Madrid. 
According to a British-national Commission contact who was 
part of an EU delegation sent to London to pulse its views of 
enhanced CT coordination, UK Home Secretary Blunkett has 
staked out an over-my-dead-body position on the idea of a 
Coordinator whose influence might extend beyond the halls of 
Brussels.  If that's the case, he asked, "How can we expect 
smaller countries to cooperate if the British won't?" 
 
7. (C) According to our interlocutors, the name most often 
mentioned as the first EU CT Coordinator is retiring Council 
Secretariat DG for Justice and Home Affairs Charles Elsen, a 
 
SIPDIS 
choice which would reflect the EU preference for a low-key 
senior bureaucrat to fill the post rather that a political 
figure.  But it is unclear how Elsen's front-runner status 
will be affected by the March 14 Socialist electoral victory 
in Spain.  After the Madrid bombings, Solana will not be able 
to name a Coordinator who does not have the fullest support 
of Spain. 
 
8. (C) While the Coordinator will probably be tasked with 
enhancing inter-institutional coordination, it is unlikely 
that the Commission will be any more inclined to cooperate 
than some of the Member States.  This is because CT policy in 
the Commission is divided among several (often competitive 
and mutually jealous) Directorates-General.  They have been 
reluctant to coordinate more with each other let alone with 
outsiders such as the envisaged EU Coordinator.  Recognizing 
this shortcoming, the Commission is separately debating how 
to improve its own internal "cross-pillar" coordination, with 
ideas ranging from the creation of a single executive-level 
Commission Coordinator, perhaps as a junior counterpart to 
the Council's Coordinator, to a coordination group that would 
bring together experts from the relevant Directorates-General 
on a standing or as-needed basis.  We believe the latter 
option is more likely, as that would allow each DG to have 
its own seat at the collective coordinating "table." 
Commission Chiefs of Cabinet discussed the issue March 15 and 
the College of Commissioners discussed it March 16.  We do 
not yet have a readout of those discussions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Adoption of a revised Action Plan on Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9. (C) The Irish Presidency was tasked with revising the 2001 
CT Action Plan in time for the June European Council.  PM 
Ahern surprised everyone by announcing on March 12 that he 
would seek its completion in time for adoption at the March 
25-26 gathering.  EU interlocutors involved in the revision 
process tell us that the new Action Plan will still not 
provide the kind of actionable detail that many would like. 
Instead, in the words of one Commission contact, it will 
mostly be "motherhood and apple pie."  Among other things, it 
will call on Member States to do more in regard to terrorism 
finance, cooperation with third countries and organizations 
(U.S., CTC, ASEAN, etc.), law enforcement and intelligence 
cooperation, securing borders and international transport, 
addressing root causes of terrorism, and targeting assistance 
to countries in greatest need. 
 
10. (SBU) As a follow-on initiative, PM Ahern will seek 
support for the creation of a more detailed implementation 
plan to guide EU and Member State implementation of the 
Action Plan.  The March 25-26 Council will be just the 
beginning of that process.  Weeks or months will likely be 
required for the kind of detailed (yet consensual) 
articulation of steps and benchmarks desired by the Irish 
Presidency (and by the UK, the most notable and credible 
supporter of a strong implementation plan). 
 
----------------- 
Solidarity Clause 
----------------- 
 
11. (C) The draft EU Solidarity Clause was agreed late last 
year during the EU Constitution negotiations in the 
Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC).  But failure to agree on 
other constitutional items prevented the clause from being 
adopted at that time.  The clause (Article I-42 of the draft 
Constitution) states that the EU shall act "in a spirit of 
solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist 
attack or natural or man-made disaster."  The idea is for the 
EU to be involved, as the EU, in terrorist and disaster 
response efforts, whether these responses include public 
health, law enforcement, or military resources. 
 
12. (C) The clause does not describe the kinds of actions the 
EU might take to "assist" Spain (assuming Spain asked for 
assistance).  Unlike many other aspects of the draft 
Constitution, the Solidarity Clause would not require a new 
treaty to adopt.  Nothing in the existing EU treaties forbids 
such steps, and a "legal basis" could be found under the 
current CFSP and JHA provisions.  Political agreement by EU 
member states is all that is required to put the clause in 
force.  Council, Commission and Member State interlocutors 
tell us that in the wake of Madrid, the clause should adopted 
with little debate.  While a few EU member states (most 
notably Sweden) reportedly retabled some of their original 
objections to the clause, we don't expect any -- after Madrid 
-- to stand in the way of consensus.  At the very least, says 
Solana Senior Advisor Niall Burgess, Member States will step 
over themselves to declare their full support for the spirit 
of the clause, if not the text. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Enhanced Intelligence Cooperation 
--------------------------------- 
 
13. (U) PM Ahern said the EU "will strive to improve 
mechanisms for cooperation between police and security 
services and promote effective, systematic collaboration in 
intelligence services between Member States."  Two options 
are on the table: 
 
-- Creating a new "European Information Bureau to bring 
together information analysis inside and outside the EU" 
-- Strengthening Member State support for Europol. 
 
14. (C) The first option was proposed by Austria at the last 
JHA Council on February 19 but was not well received. 
Belgian PM Verhofstadt renewed the proposal over the weekend 
in light of Madrid.  The second option would seem easiest -- 
to give Europol the means required to make it effective. 
However, Member States have been reluctant to give Europol 
information, despite the fact that the fight against 
terrorism has been one of its central objectives since its 
creation in July 1999.  Our money is on Europol.  If Madrid 
doesn't empower this organization, nothing ever will. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
The "Guidelines" for Fighting Terrorism 
--------------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) PM Ahern is calling for "speedy and final agreement 
on the draft Guidelines for a Common Approach to the Fight 
against Terrorism."  The Guidelines document -- intended as a 
sort of strategic umbrella for EU CT policy -- has been 
blocked in draft for the past six months.  According to Ken 
O'Flaherty of the UK Mission, the Guidelines have become 
mired in theological debates over the definition and taxonomy 
of terrorism.  It is doubtful that these debates can become 
unblocked in time for the document's adoption on March 26. 
But it may not really matter.  The declaratory statement 
released my EU leaders at the European Council will likely be 
of sufficient depth and breadth -- in the context of a large 
consensual union -- that it could serve as the strategic 
umbrella that the EU has thus far lacked.  Solana Advisor 
Burgess predicts exactly that, and suggests that without 
agreement on the Guidelines, the EU could simply build upon 
whatever declaration emerges on March 26 in order to 
articulate strategic guidance for CT policy. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Increased EU-UN Coordination on Terrorism 
----------------------------------------- 
16. (SBU) PM Ahern wants to refocus EU efforts to achieve 
support for the draft comprehensive Convention on Terrorism 
currently under discussion at the UN.  This was originally 
endorsed by the EU in September 2001, when leaders adopted 
the CT Action Plan.  Yet to date -- after almost three years 
of declared EU support for a single comprehensive UN CT 
Convention -- only six of the twelve existing international 
CT conventions have been signed and ratified by all EU member 
states.  Therefore, any move to renew attention to this issue 
has as much to do with pressuring the EU's own Member States 
to speed up the process as it does with signaling support to 
outsiders. 
 
17. (C) Under the Italian Presidency, the EU began a 
concerted effort to strengthen ties between the CTC and the 
EU's third-pillar (i.e. external affairs) Counter-Terrorism 
Working Group (COTER).  Between October and December 2003, 
COTER members met with the Chairmen of the CTC, UNODC, 
Sanction's Committee, and other UN groups to discuss 
enhancing EU-UN CT cooperation.  The EU wants to strengthen 
these new ties and push the relationships even closer.  In 
particular, the EU wants to support the "revitalization" of 
the CTC in order to give it a more active role in global CT 
efforts, according to Irish COTER Chair Patricia O'Grady.  In 
addition, the EU wants to coordinate more with the CTC, UNODC 
and CTAG in designing and implementing EU assistance programs 
to third countries.  These two efforts represent what we 
understand to be the focus of the "new initiatives" in EU-UN 
coordination mentioned by PM Ahern. 
 
---------------------- 
Financing of Terrorism 
---------------------- 
 
18. (C) PM Ahern is calling on the EU "to enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the EU,s mechanisms for the 
freezing of terrorist assets and to identify the movement of 
terrorist finances."  He said also that the Irish will "give 
priority to taking forward work on the expected Communication 
on the prevention of terrorist financing..."  According to 
Irish RELEX Counselor Kyle O'Sullivan, the proposal for a 
"Communication" will come out of the Commission's JHA 
Directorate-General.  It has been in the works for some time 
and was expected to be issued later this spring.  Its release 
is being accelerated as a result of the Madrid bombings. 
O'Sullivan has not seen a draft, but understands that it 
focuses on the creation of a network for the exchange of 
information among member states, while preserving the system 
of contact points between Financial Intelligence Units and 
Central Banks. 
 
19. (C) Beyond that, the statement refers generally to 
ongoing efforts, conducted under the leadership of the Irish 
Presidency, to improve Clearinghouse working methods.  The 
proposal being prepared for COREPER March 18 is made up of a 
"modest" list of areas where Clearinghouse practices could be 
improved, including: 
 
-- focusing on individuals associated with designated groups; 
-- member states providing more substantial background 
information when they present proposals for designations; 
-- the Clearinghouse renewing its focus on long-standing but 
essentially "dormant" proposals, with an eye toward resolving 
them one way on another;-- setting agendas for Clearinghouse 
meetings that would direct the focus toward specific groups 
rather than invite comment on all outstanding proposals at 
any given meeting; 
-- participation (albeit non-voting) by other services such 
as Europol in the meetings; 
-- taking a more active approach to renewing the list, as 
required every six months (e.g., taking a more rigorous look 
at the designated individuals to ensure that they have not 
died in the period since their designation). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Measures to Reinforce Practical Cooperation 
------------------------------------------- 
 
20. (C) PM Ahern's reference to reinforcing "practical 
cooperation with... the Police Chiefs Task Force, Europol and 
Eurojust" is a recognition of the underutilized character of 
these organizations.  Of the three, Europol, which is still 
trying to find its way and earn the respect of Member States, 
is garnering the most attention and probably holds the 
greatest promise.  Although terrorism has been in its mandate 
since it was created in 1999, its work in this area to date 
has been limited to writing threat assessments.  It has no 
operational capacity.  In December, France unveiled an 
initiative designed to make Europol operationally capable of 
carrying out investigations.  The French proposal also calls 
for it to have the technical information required to provide 
more aid to Member States in specific investigations, and to 
have greater powers.  The French Interior minister claimed to 
have the support of the Commission, Austria, Spain and 
Germany.  The Irish proposal is to reinforce this initiative 
with a focus on counter-terrorism. 
 
21. (C) The Police Chiefs Task Force is a police-to-police 
network that bypasses central government ministries (in hopes 
of making it faster and more efficient than other 
coordinating bodies).  It is unclear how the EU could 
interface more effectively with this organization, or indeed 
whether it should.  Eurojust is a new organization still 
finding its feet.  The Irish Presidency wants to give it a 
boost, and is perhaps using the raft of CT proposals for the 
March 25-26 European Council as a way of doing so.  Yet it is 
hard for us to see how it could help in counter-terrorism. 
 
------------------------------ 
Implementing Existing Measures 
------------------------------ 
 
22. (C) The Irish proposal to "take forward work on the 
Framework Decision on the Mutual recognition of Confiscation 
Orders" refers to a draft decision that was alomost agreed at 
the February 19 JHA Council.  Under the proposal each Member 
State will have to recognize and execute on its territory 
confiscation orders issued by judicial authorities of another 
Member State.  The Framework Decision is based on the 
principle of "mutual recognition of judgments" throughout the 
EU and forms part of a series of such decisions:  After the 
Council Meeting Feb. 19th Irish Justice Minister Mc Dowell 
said he was aiming for political agreement on the draft at 
the next JHA Council on March 30th.  He noted that this 
Framework decision was closely linked to the already adopted 
Framework Decision on the Mutual recognition of orders 
freezing property or evidence.  It was also linked to the 
draft Framework Decision on confiscation of crime-related 
proceeds, instrumentalities and property on which the JHA 
Council adopted a general approach in December 2002.  In 
light of Madrid, the confiscations agreement will probably be 
endorsed at the Special JHA Council on March 19. 
 
23. (U) PM Ahern also called for "the development of the 
second generation Schengen Information System and the new 
Visa Information System and the proposed European Borders 
Agency."  The SIS is a lookout database that keeps on file 
names of individuals who are barred from entering the 
Schengen area, as well as well as other individuals and 
stolen objects wanted by the authorities.  The proposed 
upgrades will include a biometric function to assist in the 
identification of listed individuals and will also support 
automatic transliteration capabilities for names from 
non-Latin alphabets (such as Chinese, Russian, Arabic, etc.). 
 Other upgrades include more data displayed on user terminals 
and the capability to query results and link searches between 
people and objects.  In this regard, the current SIS will 
evolve from a hit/no-hit name-checking system to one that 
could be of increased value to law enforcement entities.  The 
EC has also proposed that 
EUROPOL and EUROJUST should also be connected to SIS-II. 
 
24. (U) Similarly, the proposed Visa Information System (VIS) 
will contain a biometric function and will tie all EU 
consular posts abroad with ports of entry.  Neither the 
upgraded SIS nor VIS is expected to become operational before 
2007.  The Border Agency will help Member States coordinate 
policy, training and equipment acquisitions and could be 
established as early as 2005. 
 
---------------- 
External aspects 
---------------- 
 
25. (C) The EU wants to make CT a more central and actionable 
item in its relations with third countries, according to 
COTER Chair O'Grady.  In terms of technical assistance, the 
EU will seek to better coordinate Member State and Commission 
programs to ensure maximum impact and to avoid duplication. 
The COTER working group is creating a matrix of existing 
programs in order to assist this effort (much as WMD Rep 
Giannella has done in relation to Member State and Commission 
nonproliferation assistance programs).  Under COTER lead, the 
EU is also looking for ways to design and implement these 
programs by drawing on the expertise of international (e.g. 
CTC, CTAG) and regional (e.g. ASEAN, GCC) organizations. 
 
26. (C) The EU also says it wants to "operationalize" its 
political- and expert-level dialogues with third countries on 
CT issues.  Taking a page from the revised work program of 
the U.S.-EU COTER troika consultations agreed under the 
Italian Presidency in 2003, the EU is likely to seek 
specific, achievable objectives in its dialogues with 
countries such as Russia, China, India and Canada.  In a 
confidential report on EU CT activities presented to FMs at 
 
SIPDIS 
the GAERC in December (please protect), the Presidency and 
Council Secretariat recommended that the EU "focus COTER 
Troika meetings with third countries, whenever possible, on a 
more operational perspective... One objective of this 
exercise should be to devise, where appropriate common lines 
of action toward certain countries and/or regional 
organizations.  A specific priority should be given to the 
implementation of the revised mechanism for dialogue with the 
United States." 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
27. (C) Many of the proposals put forward by the Irish 
Presidency are presentational, and intended to respond to 
political demands in the wake of the Madrid bombings rather 
than move the EU forward in significant ways in their 
counter-terrorism activities.  Still, the creation of a 
"Counterterror Czar" and a new political impetus from the 
Council session could help improve EU implementation of 
decisions taken in the wake of the September 11 attacks in 
the US.  Since then, some of the initial EU elan became 
bogged down in legal debates and differing legal practices in 
member states.  The shock of Madrid and a strong new mandate 
from heads of government at the March 25-26 Council session 
may help the EU move ahead where progress heretofore has been 
stymied. 
 
Foster