US embassy cable - 04SANAA622

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SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004

Identifier: 04SANAA622
Wikileaks: View 04SANAA622 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2004-03-17 14:51:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, 
NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, YM, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004 
 
REF: A. STATE 57476 
     B. SANAA 589 
 
Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  The Ambassador convened an EAC meeting 
on 3/16 to review security conditions for Embassy personnel 
and the general American community in light of the recent 
thwarted attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. 
EAC examined Post's already stringent and comprehensive 
security procedures and proposed additional security 
measures.  Key offices and personnel represented included: 
AID, AMB, CONS, DCM, FPD, MSG, MO, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, 
RSO, and SOCE-Yemen.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  DCM and ORCA briefed EAC on the details of the 
3/14 bombing attempt in Karachi, noting that security 
personnel observed small but significant details that led 
them to expose the attack in progress.  RSO gave an update to 
EAC on the recent review of security arrangements at other 
sites associated with the Embassy, particularly the Sheraton 
Hotel in Sanaa. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  EAC discussed the security measures in place and 
the potential threat posed to residences and other 
Embassy-related compounds by improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) concealed in large, high-capacity load vehicles such 
as water-tank trucks.  EAC outlined three areas for further 
planning: (1) to consult with the ROYG on plans and 
capabilities for defusing vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIEDs); (2) to reassess and address risk from 
residential water deliveries; and, (3) to explore if 
additional controls for the post-managed butane canister 
delivery system were necessary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
RAPID RESPONSE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4.  (S/NF)  EAC agreed that RSO would take the lead in 
working with the ROYG to identify and, as possible, 
strengthen current explosive ordnance disposal capabilities 
in the military and/or police forces.  Post will examine 
options for U.S. assistance in the training of rapid-response 
Yemeni EOD personnel.  RSO will also plan a drill or exercise 
based on the Karachi consulate attack scenario. 
 
------------------------------ 
WATER DELIVERIES TO RESIDENCES 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (S/NF)  EAC discussed residential water deliveries from 
outside contractors and ways to further minimize potential 
risk.  As a first step, the Embassy will adjust the schedule 
of water deliveries to weekday work hours to minimize 
exposure to embassy personnel.  Also, families, members of 
household and any personal household staff will be made aware 
of the water truck delivery schedule and will continue their 
vigilance of suspicious or out-of-schedule deliveries.  Post 
will also examine options for transferring water delivery 
services to Post management if deemed necessary. 
 
-------------- 
WARDEN MEETING 
-------------- 
 
6.  (S/NF)  EAC decided to hold a warden meeting to discuss 
the security situation with the wider community (scheduled 
for 3/22).  EAC noted nervousness among community members 
because of the Madrid attacks and the subsequent statement of 
the Abu-Hafs Al-Masri Brigades (ref b), although the 
much-publicized al-Qaeda videotape (ref a) contains 
references to seven other countries but not Yemen.  DCM 
concluded that these developments, as well as recent CT 
operations in Abyan, provided a powerful reminder of the 
importance of ongoing vigilance and sound personal security 
practices -- even though all available information contains 
no/no reports of specific threats or attack planning in Yemen. 
 
----------------- 
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 
----------------- 
7.  (U)  In addition to security, the DCM noted the 
continuing dangers of traffic accidents as the biggest risk 
faced by Embassy Sanaa personnel.  RSO briefed on details of 
a catastrophic traffic accident near the Embassy on 3/15, in 
which a large truck went out of control and caused multiple 
fatalities.  An embassy employee was in the car just behind 
the one demolished by the truck.  RSO reminded EAC members 
that all Embassy personnel should keep radios with them at 
all times for traffic warnings and alerts, in addition to 
security measures. 
 
HULL 

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