US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1661

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SHARON TELLS CODEL LEVIN THAT SYRIA TRACK CAN WAIT

Identifier: 04TELAVIV1661
Wikileaks: View 04TELAVIV1661 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2004-03-17 14:07:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER SY IS GOI EXTERNAL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001661 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SY, IS, GOI EXTERNAL 
SUBJECT: SHARON TELLS CODEL LEVIN THAT SYRIA TRACK CAN WAIT 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 1638 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Sharon told Codel Levin that Israel should 
"finish negotiations" with the Palestinians before turning to 
the Syrian track.  While expressing a willingness to 
negotiate without preconditions with Bashar, the PM said 
Syria would first have to dismantle terrorist organizations 
and bases.  NSA Eiland assessed that Bashar's offer to 
negotiate with Israel was not serious in any event, and 
commented that the Golan Heights was only the SARG's third or 
fourth priority after regime survival, control of Lebanon, 
and, maybe, preservation of strategic capabilities.  Eiland 
and DMI Chief Farkash pointed to what they called Hizballah's 
unremitting support for Palestinian terrorism, with Eiland 
charging that Hizballah turned to "private people" to keep up 
attacks during last summer's "hudna."  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Members of Codel Levin raised Syrian President Assad's 
offer to open negotiations with Israel in separate March 14 
meetings with PM Sharon, FM Shalom, NSA Eiland, and IDF 
Intelligence Chief Gen. Farkash.  (Codel members were 
Senators Carl Levin, Jay Rockefeller, Jeff Bingaman, Jack 
Reed and Frank Lautenberg.  Ambassador and emboffs 
accompanied them to all meetings.  Codel discussions about 
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza were reported reftel.) 
 
----------------------- 
First, the Palestinians 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) After expressing his hope that U.S. pressure on Syria 
will not diminish, Sharon said he was willing to negotiate 
with the SARG.  First, though, the SARG would have to 
dismantle terrorist organizations and bases and expel 
"several hundred" members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) from Lebanon.  He pointed to the threat 
Hizballah represents on Israel's northern border and charged 
that the IRGC and Hizballah are responsible for terrorist 
operations in Israel conducted by the Tanzim.  He noted that 
Israel still has outstanding humanitarian cases to resolve 
with Syria, i.e., Ron Arad and the MIAs from Sultan Yaqub. 
 
4. (C) Sharon stressed that the GOI would not accept SARG 
preconditions for the negotiations, including Bashar's 
suggestion that negotiations begin where they left off 
previously.  FM Shalom also rejected SARG preconditions, but 
stated that he was "encouraged" by Bashar's offer and wished 
to begin negotiations immediately.  Senator Levin asked 
Sharon whether the GOI has any preconditions.  The PM replied 
that a return to the previous negotiations would be 
unacceptable.  In any event, he added, the GOI would not give 
first priority to the Syria track: "Let's first finish 
negotiations with the Palestinians." 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Hizballah Supporting Palestinian Terrorism 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) National Security Adviser Giora Eiland hinted at the 
one-track-at-a-time approach, commenting that "some" in the 
GOI believe that Israel cannot simultaneously negotiate with 
the Palestinians and Syrians.  He assessed that President 
Assad's offer was not serious, in any case.  Assad made the 
offer just to deflect U.S. pressure, he said.  He also judged 
that the return of the Golan Heights is only the third or 
fourth priority for Assad, after regime survival, control of 
Lebanon ("much more important than the Golan"), and, 
possibly, retention of WMD and other strategic capabilities. 
 
6. (C) Gen. Farkash posited that support for terrorism is 
essential for Syria, as "Syria without terror is an 
unimportant country."  Eiland asserted that Syrian-backed 
Hizballah keeps pressing for terrorism against Israel to 
continue, even when Hamas does not agree.  He claimed that 
Hizballah sent funds to the territories last summer so that 
"private people"  could carry out attacks during the Hamas 
cease-fire.  He said these people had been trained either 
directly by Hizballah, by trainers sent to the territories, 
or by Internet (e.g., for the production of explosives). 
 
7. (C) Gen. Farkash claimed that Hizballah is now providing 
the funding and/or weapons for 95% of the attacks carried out 
by Fatah-related groups.  He charged that Iran is stepping up 
its support for terrorism via Syria, pointing to the 
allegation that Iran used Bam earthquake relief flights 
returning to Syria to ship arms. 
 
8. (U) The Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04