US embassy cable - 04HARARE461

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECRET NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, ZI, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: GOZ SEALING COUNTRY AHEAD OF ELECTIONS? 
 
REF: A. HARARE 456 
 
     B. HARARE 350 
     C. HARARE 349 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Zimbabwe appears to be 
setting the stage for a considerably reduced international 
presence in Zimbabwe in the run-up to and during the March 
2005 parliamentary elections.  Withdrawing its request for 
UNDP elections assistance (Ref B) and suggesting it does not 
plan to request food relief (Ref C) evince GOZ intent to 
reduce foreign access to the country and to maximize ruling 
party control of key electoral levers.  The crackdown on the 
independent press and harassment of NGOs also play into this 
effort to close off the electoral process to outsiders. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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FOOD "SELF-SUFFICIENCY" INCREASES RISK OF FOOD POLITICIZATION 
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2. (SBU) Maize distribution could be solely in the hands of 
the GOZ during an important election period if Zimbabwe 
significantly reduces or even eliminates its appeal for food 
aid this year.  In the past, ZANU-PF has used food as a 
political tool and a Grain Marketing Board (GMB) monopoly on 
maize distribution would work to the party's advantage.  As 
suggested in ref B and confirmed at a UN/donor meeting on 
March 15, the GOZ requested that this year's Consolidated 
Appeal include no reference to food assistance beyond June 
2004. 
 
3. (U) The December 2003/2004 FOSENET food security 
monitoring report noted an increase in allegations of 
political bias in accessing GMB food stocks over the last few 
months, particularly in Mashonaland East.  The report 
identified the following districts as having problems with 
political bias in food access: Chikomba, Marondera rural and 
urban, Mudzi, Hwedza, Bindura rural, Guruve, Mazowe, Chegutu 
urban, Norton, Zvimba, Bikita, Chiredzi, and Chivi.  Of these 
districts, Marondera, Bindura, Chegutu, Bikita, and Chiredzi 
had constituencies almost evenly split between the MDC and 
ZANU-PF during the 2000 elections. 
 
4. (SBU) Prior to many parliamentary and urban/rural council 
elections over the last two years, ZANU-PF candidates and 
officials were accused of bribing voters with food. 
Typically, the ZANU-PF district office received bags of maize 
which only card-carrying ZANU-PF members were able to 
purchase.  In some places, showing cards was not enough and 
prospective buyers had to produce letters from community 
leaders or local party officials attesting to long-standing 
party loyalty and activity.  Throughout the food crisis, 
FOSENET, a coalition of 54 local NGOs that monitors the food 
situation in Zimbabwe, has reported that ZANU-PF party 
members were favored in GMB food sales and international food 
relief distributions, although the latter allegations were 
infrequent and swiftly dealt with by international NGOs.  For 
its part, the GOZ has ignored such complaints and counter 
claimed that some NGOs were selectively distributing to 
opposition elements. 
 
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IS SELF-SUFFICIENCY POSSIBLE? 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (U) A GOZ claim that Zimbabwe will be self-sufficient in 
maize depends on the country's final production and ability 
to secure the foreign exchange to import the remainder of its 
need.  Fueling prospects for maize production are improved 
rainfall--although for crops planted in February the rains 
must continue through April--and increased hectarage planted 
to maize(Ref C).   PolOff spoke with the Famine Early Warning 
System (FEWS) on February 26 about likely production.  FEWS 
said preliminary Agricultural Research and Extension Services 
(AREX) maize estimates based on likely area planted and yield 
suggest production in 2004 of between 780,000 and 1,170,000 
MT (area at 1.3 million hectares and yields between .6 and .9 
MT/ha).  These estimates are based primarily on communal area 
planting, as data about the resettled areas is generally 
unavailable.  According to FEWS, AREX estimates are generally 
within 20 percent of the final Central Statistical Office 
statistics.  Other estimates for the 2004 season range from 
600,000 MT to 1.2 million MT, with total maize consumption 
needs at approximately 1.8 million MT. 
 
6. (U) President Robert Mugabe has directed his ministries 
and the Reserve Bank to import 800,000 metric tons of grain 
this year at a cost of USD$240 million (Ref C).  Such a 
procurement will challenge the GOZ's budget given the other 
urgent demands on foreign exchange such as electricity and 
fuel imports, and seems to rely on unrealistic expectations 
of economic turnaround.  Last year, GOZ efforts to import 
maize were stymied by foreign exchange shortages.  Although 
negative growth may slow modestly this year, most local UN, 
IMF and World Bank economists expect the economy to contract 
5-10 percent, which does not bode well for increased foreign 
exchange earnings.  Furthermore, the punitive nature of the 
auction system is a disincentive for exporters and will not 
stimulate export revenue (Ref A).  We are estimating that 
exports fell to US$1.4 billion in 2003, of which the GOZ kept 
only US$350 million by withholding the mandatory 25 percent 
of revenue from exporters.  This year's tobacco crop--the 
major foreign exchange earner--could be as low as 45 million 
kilograms.  Last year, Zimbabwe exported between 80 and 103 
million kilograms worth US$248 to US$318 million. 
 
7. (SBU) PolOff asked a FEWS representative about the GMB,s 
purported 240,000-300,000 metric tons of maize stock.  The 
representative had acquired a GMB spreadsheet showing GMB 
sales and stock drawdowns, which showed that the GMB had sold 
about 100,000 tons of the 300,000 tons it had in January. 
The representative suggested that the GMB was continuing to 
sell its stocks and was not hoarding the stash for future 
political benefit.  He also stated that the GMB would not be 
able to retain grain stored now until February 2005. 
 
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INDEPENDENT MEDIA CONTRACTING 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (U) With the apparent demise of the nation's only 
independent daily and growing regulatory constraints against 
the few surviving weekly independent newspapers, independent 
coverage of news events in Zimbabwe is limited.  Absent 
unexpected changes in the media environment, the vast 
majority of Zimbabweans will receive coverage of election 
candidates and issues through the prism of ZANU-PF editors at 
heavily biased official media organs.  The GOZ can be 
expected to continue its exclusion of foreign reporters, who 
for the most part have been expelled or systematically denied 
visas.  The ongoing saga of the Associated Newspapers of 
Zimbabwe court case and the dismissal of three Herald 
newspaper journalists who freelanced for Voice of America 
also play into this effort to close off observation of the 
electoral process to Zimbabweans and outsiders alike. 
Statements by the Media and Information Commission that the 
conduct of the journalists is a threat to national security 
further evince GOZ intent to tighten control of all media 
sources for the foreseeable future--controlling information 
flow into and out of the country. 
 
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NGOS TARGETED 
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9. (SBU) Over the last few years, the GOZ has become 
increasingly suspicious and hostile towards nongovernmental 
organizations.  In 2002, the GOZ tried to enforce elements of 
the Private Voluntary Organizations Act that restricts the 
activities of some PVOs and NGOs.  As several loopholes 
within the law allowed some of the GOZ's most ardent critics 
to still operate, the GOZ is threatening to limit the 
remaining organizations, movements with the NGO Bill, which 
is in the draft stages. 
 
10. (C) More recently, the GOZ has threatened to step up 
harassment of local NGOs.  Within the last few weeks, an NGO 
working on democracy and governance issues received three 
visits from police and a call from the Central Bank warning 
of increased scrutiny, and a director of one of the local 
human rights NGOs recently told PolOff that the organization 
had been tipped that they would be raided soon.  The human 
rights NGO was habitually harassed before, during, and after 
the 2002 presidential elections.  In addition, GOZ officials 
have accused several international NGOs of being anti-state 
and thus against the Zimbabwe people.  Indeed, such 
accusations against food-related NGOs at the recent UN-GOZ 
meeting in Victoria Falls highlights the nexus between food 
and politics in the GOZ's world view.  Also at the Victoria 
Falls meeting, the GOZ targeted the International 
Organization for Migration, which provides assistance to 
displaced ex-farm workers. 
 
11. (S/NF) Indications in sensitive reporting that the GOZ 
intends again to embark on an effort to dismantle the NGO's 
"parallel structures" of food distribution manifest the depth 
of GOZ suspicions and desire for control. 
 
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COMMENT: ELECTORAL PROCESS TO REMAIN INSULATED AND ISOLATED 
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12. (SBU) The GOZ seems poised to keep the electoral 
environment restrictive in preparation for the March 2005 
parliamentary elections.  Its continued mistrust of NGOs and 
priority on controlling the election environment are most 
likely the principal reasons behind GOZ reluctance to accept 
international assistance with the elections and to entertain 
the continued need for emergency food aid.  Scaling down the 
international relief effort would reduce the international 
presence in Zimbabwe enhancing GOZ control of food 
distributions for electoral advantage and reducing the 
international window to aspects of election administration. 
Eliminating the independent press and firing or expelling 
journalists who work with international news agencies would 
advance the same purpose.  That said, the GOZ is cognizant of 
its need for international aid as administered by NGOs though 
and will often act more gingerly than its truculent words 
might suggest.  Late last year, for example, the GOZ backed 
down from threats to require that all food assistance go 
through official channels.  The extent to which it will go 
beyond harassment and regulatory constraint of NGOs and the 
media will hinge largely on how confident the party 
leadership feels toward elections--they will do what they 
feel they have to in order to come out on top.  END COMMENT. 
SULLIVAN