US embassy cable - 04AMMAN2004

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PHUM, KPAL, IZ, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH TO CODEL STEVENS ON HIS CONCERN 
ABOUT THE IRAQ TRANSITION, PEACE PROCESS 
 
Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  King Abdullah told CODEL Stevens that Iraqi security 
forces will not be ready for a July 1 handover of authority, 
and expressed continuing concern over what he sees as Iranian 
influence among the Shia in southern Iraq.  He was 
pessimistic about prospects for progress on the MEPP before 
the U.S. elections, but thought Israel could find competent 
Palestinians to run Gaza after an Israeli withdrawal.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
TOO LITTLE, TOO SOON IN IRAQ 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  In a meeting with visiting Senators Ted Stevens, 
John Warner, and Fritz Hollings March 14, King Abdullah 
expressed his concern that the Coalition may be moving too 
fast to turn over power to Iraqis by July 1.  The King fears 
that Iraqi security forces will not be ready by that date to 
carry out their responsibilities.  Some in the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), the King asserted, are pressing for 
a fast transfer of authority to assure that they keep a share 
of power.  Other Iraqis want to delay the departure of the 
U.S. to ensure the continued flow of U.S. money to Iraq and 
their organizations.  He cited the de-Baathification process 
and the dissolution of the Iraqi military as Coalition moves 
that had unnecessarily alienated the Sunni population, and 
recommended that the Coalition revisit both of these 
decisions. 
 
3.  (C)  The King argued that the U.S. should not be "lulled" 
into a false sense of security in the south of Iraq. 
According to Jordan's assessment, many Iraqi Shia "take 
orders from Iran," and Iranian influence is strong and 
growing, and is potentially destabilizing.  The King told the 
Senators that the U.S. must do more to counter Iranian 
influence in the south and to "reconnect" the Sunni and Shia 
communities. 
 
4.  (C)  Asked about Iraqi WMD, the King responded that the 
public perception is that Saddam Hussein did not have any 
before the war.  In his opinion, the King said, Saddam had 
the intent to develop WMD, but it is unclear whether he 
actually achieved that goal (although the King entertained 
the possibility that some weapons might still remain hidden, 
or have been moved to another country). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
LITTLE BUT "DAMAGE CONTROL" ON THE MEPP 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  The King expressed pessimism about short-term 
prospects for the Middle East peace process, commenting that 
he expected only "damage control" from the major parties 
until after the U.S. elections in November.  Israeli PM 
Sharon claims that there is no Palestinian partner for peace 
and, in fact, the Palestinian Authority is in trouble and 
"disintegrating."  The King thought that an Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza could push the roadmap forward if done 
correctly, saying that there are competent PA officials -- 
like Finance Minister Salam Fayyad -- to whom Israel could 
turn over authority in Gaza. 
 
6.  (U)  CODEL Stevens did not have an opportunity to review 
this message. 
 
7.  (U)  CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
GNEHM