US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1585

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: GG, PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: GEORGIA ASKS TURKEY TO CLOSE BORDER, FREEZE AJARAN 
ASSETS; TURKS BALKING 
 
REF: 16 MARCH PASCOE/TEZGOR TELCON 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Georgian Embassy says GOG asked Turkey 
March 15 to close its border crossing with Ajara and freeze 
Ajaran assets.  Turks have temporized and probably will not 
respond positively.  Turkish MFA Caucasus DDG Tezgor claims 
the GOT (1) supports Georgian territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; (2) hopes the confrontation can be resolved 
peacefully; (3) does not like Abashidze, but thinks Ajara 
should remain autonomous.  Tezgor asserts he has "no doubts" 
Russia supports Georgian territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, and thinks Russia should be consulted about how 
to resolve the confrontation.  End Summary. 
 
 
GOG Requests Border Closing, Asset Freeze; Turks Temporize 
 
 
2. (C) Georgian DCM Tabatadze told us March 16 the Georgians 
demarched Turkish MFA DirGen Akinci March 15 to request that 
Turkey close the Turkey-Ajara border crossing at Sarp.  While 
claiming Turkey fully supports the GOG, Akinci temporized, 
asking the GOG to send a formal written request to the MFA 
and merely undertaking to "discuss" the matter once the 
formal written request arrives.  Tabatadze said the formal 
GOG request is forthcoming.  Tabatadze "cannot rule out" the 
possibility the GOG will send a special envoy to Turkey to 
reiterate the GOG requests. 
 
 
3. (C) Tabatadze attributes what he characterizes as MFA 
reluctance on the GOG requests to concern over the possible 
Russian reaction and to the reaction of Turks in the area who 
depend on cross border trade.  In this regard, as of 
mid-morning March 16, Russian tanks were occupying the short 
stretch of road between Batumi and Sarp.  At the same time, 
even if the Turks move to freeze Ajaran assets, Tabatadze 
doubts they will find much in Turkey. 
 
 
4.  (C) Tabatadze said the GOG is having difficulty judging 
whether the Turkish Consul General in Batumi is playing a 
helpful role because "we see no results."  Turkish FM Gul and 
PM Zvania spoke by telephone late March 15; Gul asserted that 
the Batumi CG is "sending messages" that Turkey supports 
Georgian territorial integrity. 
 
 
5.  (C) Tabatadze is also concerned that "nationalist" 
elements in Turkey (he singled out the National Action Party) 
may urge Turkish support for Ajaran separatism. 
 
 
GOT Unlikely to Respond Positively to GOG Requests 
 
 
6.  (C) The GOT does not appear inclined to respond 
positively to the GOG requests.  Although he did not admit 
the GOG requests despite our repeated questions March 16, MFA 
Caucasus DDG Tezgor several times implied clearly that the 
GOT considers Saakashvili's call for an economic blockade 
rash.  He expressed concern that a blockade would provoke a 
chain of events similar to President Gamsakurdia's 1992 
blockade of Abkhazia. 
 
 
7.  (C) Tezgor claimed the GOT is satisfied the situation is 
"under control" and continues to observe events.  He said 
Turkey will use its "good offices" to help resolve the 
situation peacefully, but now is "not the right moment." 
Tezgor said the GOT will wait for the situation to calm down. 
 
 
GOT Supports Territorial Integrity and GOG Authority -- Sort 
Of 
 
 
8.  (C) Tezgor asserted the main focus of the GOT approach is 
to support Georgia's territorial integrity and central 
government authority.  Asked why the March 15 MFA statement 
was not more forceful on those points, Tezgor replied the 
statement is "sufficient for this time."  He claimed the GOT 
is privately "saying many things to both sides." 
 
 
9.  (C) Tezgor asserted the GOT does not want Russian troops 
to compromise Georgia's territorial integrity or sovereignty. 
 He claimed the GOT has not reiterated this message to the 
Russians since the confrontation started because the Russians 
already know the Turkish position.  Told of reports of 
Russian tanks astride roads near Batumi, Tezgor mused that 
this might have a "deterrent" effect on Saakashvili. 
10.  (C) Tezgor said the GOG and Ajara need to come to an 
understanding.  He criticized Abashidze for governing Ajara 
like a "kingdom."  He acknowledged Abashidze's possible links 
to criminal activity and said the GOT does not like 
Abashidze, but argued that Ajara historically has been 
autonomous.  Expressing what he called "pragmatic" concern 
about what would happen if the GOG tries to take autonomy 
away from the region, Tezgor averred that autonomy must be 
maintained.  He added that any understanding needs to take 
the Russian reaction "into consideration." 
 
 
11.  (C) Asked how the GOT position on Ajaran autonomy fits 
with supporting territorial integrity, Tezgor replied that 
each country is different.  Asked what Turkey would do if its 
President were prevented from entering a Turkish province, 
Tezgor agreed Saakashvili should be able to enter any part of 
Georgian territory but asserted that "we need to be patient." 
 
 
 
 
12.  (C) Although DCM Tabatadze said the GOG will try to 
enforce a blockade of the Batumi port, Tezgor is unconcerned 
about possible incidents between GOG vessels and Turkish 
merchant ships due to the small number of GOG maritime assets. 
 
 
MFA Requests Consultation, Elaboration of U.S. Plan 
 
 
13.  (C) Tezgor asked about the U.S. position on the 
standoff.  We said the U.S. is concerned that the situation 
not escalate into violence and that it be resolved consistent 
with Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Tezgor 
speculated the U.S. is planning "in secret"; we said no, we 
are openly consulting with all major actors to help foster 
resolution.  Tezgor made an "official request" that the U.S. 
brief him on its plans for resolving the standoff.    He also 
asked that the USG work with Turkey and consult before taking 
any "steps."  He worried that lack of "feedback" from the 
U.S. is leading Turkey to "take poor decisions."  (In ref 
telcon, DAS Pascoe subsequently discussed U.S. efforts with 
Tezgor and promised to stay in touch.) 
 
 
14.  (C) Tezgor urged the U.S. to cooperate with the Russians 
in finding a solution.  He asserted "no doubt" that Russia 
supports Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
 
 
15. (C) Comment: DCM Tabatadze has long expressed concern to 
us at what he sees as a pro-Russian slant in Turkey's Georgia 
policy.  From his side, Tezgor has long been complaining to 
us that he sees no comprehensive, muscular, long-term U.S. 
strategy for the Caucasus.  In the past six months he has 
become markedly cagier with us and, more in line with his 
Russophile colleagues DirGen Akinci and fellow DDG Seben 
(Russia portfolio), has begun to assert that Russia has an 
important role to play.  At the same time he has expressed 
keen interest in in-depth consultations on U.S. strategy 
either in Washington or Ankara.  End comment. 
EDELMAN