US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1611

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UNUSUAL FACTORS IN ASHDOD BOMBINGS INVITE SPECULATION ABOUT NEW TURN IN INTIFADA

Identifier: 04TELAVIV1611
Wikileaks: View 04TELAVIV1611 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2004-03-15 15:14:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER KWBG ASEC PREL PGOV IS ISRAELI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DS FOR IP/ITA AND IP/NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2014 
TAGS: PTER, KWBG, ASEC, PREL, PGOV, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, COUNTERTERRORISM 
SUBJECT: UNUSUAL FACTORS IN ASHDOD BOMBINGS INVITE 
SPECULATION ABOUT NEW TURN IN INTIFADA 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Several atypical elements of Sunday's dual 
suicide bombing at the Ashdod port have led Israelis to worry 
that Hamas and Fatah meant what they said when they announced 
that the attack, for which the two groups claimed 
responsibility, signalled a new phase in the Intifada.  The 
attack appeared to be the first in Israel during the current 
Intifada carried out by Palestinian attackers who entered the 
country from Gaza.  That the attackers targeted economic 
infrastructure was also unusual for this Intifada.  A DAO 
source at the port confirmed police speculation in the media 
that the explosives were more powerful and of better quality 
than those usually deployed in Palestinian terror attacks, 
thus suggesting a possible foreign origin of the explosives. 
The source cast doubts, however, on speculation that the 
attackers could have ruptured or ignited chemical tanks at 
the port, reporting that the nearest "chemical storage" was 
at least half a mile from the bombing site.  In retaliation 
for the bombings, the IAF fired missiles at two metal shops 
in Gaza City overnight, lightly wounding one Palestinian. 
Critics of Sharon's Gaza disengagement plan will view this 
attack as evidence that the terror groups are set on creating 
the impression that Israel is withdrawing from Gaza under 
fire.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Two Palestinian teenagers from the Jabalya refugee 
camp in Gaza killed ten Israelis March 14 in a dual suicide 
bombing at the port of Ashdod.  IDF and port sources told DAO 
that one of the bombers detonated inside, and one outside, 
the port facility.  According to these sources, port 
authorities believe that the bomber who detonated outside the 
facility boosted the other bomber over the fence surrounding 
the facility at a place where the wire netting on top of the 
fence had sagged.  Each of the bombers then entered, and 
detonated in, the nearest sites with people inside: a 
forklift maintenance facility inside the port, and a 
refrigeration warehouse outside. 
 
3. (C) Hamas and Fatah jointly claimed responsibility for the 
attack in a message claiming that the attack signalled the 
"next stage of the armed Intifada."  Several apparently 
unusual or even unprecedented aspects of the attack lent 
weight to GOI concerns that the attack might indeed represent 
a qualitatively new turn in terrorist tactics: 
 
-- Whereas attacks on Israeli civilians typically take place 
against soft targets with the primary goal of killing as many 
Israelis as possible, the attack in Ashdod, while still 
murderous in intent, took place at a well-guarded facility of 
strategic economic value.  In attacking, however, the first 
buildings in which they encountered Israelis, the terrorists 
did not appear intent on causing maximum economic damage. 
The symbolic value of hitting a sensitive, economically 
important target appeared sufficient in this case.  (A 
similar attack that did not succeed was directed in May 2002 
at the Pi Glilot fuel storage facility just north of Tel 
Aviv.  In that attack, a bomb surreptitiously placed under a 
fuel truck exploded insided the storage facility, but failed 
to detonate any fuel in the truck or the storage tanks.) 
 
-- If in fact the two bombers entered Israel from Gaza, the 
attack would represent the first time in the current Intifada 
that any Gazans succeeded in crossing the border fence to 
carry out an attack within Israel.  The Embassy had no 
indication from the IDF as of mid-day March 15 about the 
route the bombers might have taken to enter Israel.  (Besides 
getting through or over the Gaza fence, other possible exit 
routes from Gaza would include being admitted to Israel at 
the Erez crossing, or entering Israel from the Sinai after 
crossing from Gaza to Egypt via a tunnel.) 
 
-- A port official told DAO that the bombers used explosives 
of greater potency and quality than the bombs usually 
detonated by Palestinian terrorists.  He assessed that the 
explosives were not homemade, thus giving credence to media 
speculation that the explosives might have come from 
Hizballah or other sources from outside the territories. 
 
-- Media speculated that the attackers might have sought to 
rupture storage tanks of bromide or ammonia, or to ignite 
fuel tanks, thus causing mass casualties in a wide area 
around the port.  According to DAO sources, however, the 
bombers detonated in the first buildings they encountered 
with Israelis inside.  These sources said that the nearest 
"chemical storage" to the site of the bombings was at least 
half a mile away. 
 
4. (SBU) In response to the Ashdod attack, IAF helicopters 
fired about ten missiles overnight into two Gaza City metal 
shops that the GOI alleged were used for producing and 
storing rockets and other munitions.  UNRWA reported that one 
Palestinian, the owner of one of the shops, was lightly 
wounded. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: This atypical attack by Gazans in Israel, 
coupled with the recent string of attacks at the Erez 
Crossing, will likely be used to support the case made by 
those like Military Intelligence Chief Farkash who argue that 
Sharon's Gaza disengagement plan will provoke intensified 
terrorism in the run-up to withdrawal.  Farkash reportedly 
assesses that terrorist groups are anxious to duplicate the 
image from Lebanon in May 2000 of Israel retreating under 
fire. 
 
 
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KURTZER 

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