US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO456

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03-15-14 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest 
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 446, and previous 
 
-      (B) Oslo 419 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a March 13 meeting with the four 
local co-chairs (Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and 
again to a wider donor group on March 15, Norwegian 
Special Envoy Erik Solheim discussed his latest visit to 
Sri Lanka.  Ambassador Lunstead participated in the 
meetings.  Most of Solheim's comments focused on the 
recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka's April 2 
parliamentary election.  Solheim's visit appears to have 
been mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new 
complexities and uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan 
situation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS:  In March 13 and 
March 15 meetings, which were attended by Ambassador 
Lunstead, Solheim said he had met with S.P. 
Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political chief, during a March 
11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the Vanni region. 
During the discussion, which centered around rebel 
eastern commander Karuna's recent break with the main 
LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam 
had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to 
"peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna.  Asserting 
that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern 
cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim 
that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from 
within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging 
defections from his ranks.  Thamilchelvam also blamed 
Karuna for the two recent election-related 
assassinations in the east (see Ref A).  (Karuna has 
placed blame for these killings on the LTTE's 
intelligence apparatus.)  The Tigers also told Solheim 
of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna 
situation.  The group was steadfast that it was an 
"internal matter" for the LTTE alone.  (Separately, 
during two meetings, Solheim said PM Wickremesinghe made 
clear that the GSL would not get involved in the 
situation between the LTTE and Karuna.  The PM also said 
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the 
situation.) 
 
3.  (C) While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he 
had met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander 
from Trincomalee District.  According to Solheim, 
Pathuman looked "okay" and stated that he (Pathuman) 
was still in command of the Trincomalee district. 
(Solheim's meeting with Pathuman effectively rebutted 
recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed" 
Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna -- 
see Ref A.) 
 
4.  (C) In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of 
Trincomalee, Solheim said that he had had a positive 
meeting with Sri Lanka Army Major General Sunil 
Tennekoon, the general in charge (GOC) of the 
district.  Tennekoon stated that the situation in 
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports 
to the contrary.  Local Tigers officials in 
Trincomalee, for their part, told Solheim they were 
happy that the Norwegian delegation was visiting 
Trincomalee.  According to the Tigers, the visit was 
an important signal that the international community 
remained engaged in Sri Lanka.  Separately, Solheim 
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) 
was continuing its work in the east, despite press 
reports to the contrary.  The only change was that 
the SLMM was not entering the eastern areas held by 
Karuna. 
 
5.  (C) Solheim told the co-chairs that the 
Norwegians saw three possible outcomes to the Karuna 
situation: 
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills 
Karuna; 
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with 
Karuna, giving the rebel commander autonomy over the 
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara; 
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord." 
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most 
unsettling for the peace process if it came to 
fruition.) 
 
6.  (C) Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed 
donor assistance and the need to resolve the issue of 
an assistance funds delivery mechanism.  To the co- 
chairs, Solheim stated that the Norwegians were 
considering a model similar to the Afghan Fund. 
 
7.  (C) PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN:  In discussing the 
April 2 parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that 
the LTTE hoped the government would approve polling 
sites either at the GSL's crossing points into Tiger- 
controlled area, or in the "no-man's land" between 
GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas.  On this point, it 
was not clear which alternative had been agreed to, 
although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army 
will not honor election plans and, in a repeat of the 
December 2001 parliamentary elections, would largely 
bar Tamils in Tiger-controlled areas from reaching 
polling sites.  If polling sites were approved for 
either of these areas, the LTTE expected that the 
Army would not be present, with the Sri Lanka police 
instead providing security.  According to Solheim, 
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated 
that the Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the 
GSL's crossing points.  (Mission has heard reports 
that the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner will 
support holding the polling in "no-man's land" 
areas.) 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT:  Solheim's visit appears to have been 
mainly devoted to fact gathering.  Karuna's decision to 
separate himself from the main LTTE organization has 
clearly made the overall situation that much more 
complex.  Moreover, there is great uncertainty over how 
the Karuna matter will play out and over the upcoming 
election.  That said, the Norwegians still appear firmly 
engaged, which is a significant positive.  Their mettle 
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile 
period, however.  END SUMMARY. 
 
9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD