US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO452

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03-15-14 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, PHUM, SOCI, CE, Political Parties, Elections, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  In visit, a tense, brooding Jaffna is 
preoccupied with election campaign, split in LTTE 
 
Refs:  Colombo 446, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Poloff visited Jaffna District in 
northern Sri Lanka, March 13-14.  Preparations for Sri 
Lanka's April 2 parliamentary elections were proceeding 
apace, and interest in the campaign seemed relatively 
high.  The pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
appears poised to do well.  Tamil contacts generally 
criticized eastern LTTE leader Karuna and his recent 
split with the main LTTE organization.  Overall, Jaffna 
seemed tense and brooding, with the Tigers clearly 
making their presence felt.  END SUMMARY. 
 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= 
VISIT TO JAFFNA 
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2.  (C) Poloff and Pol FSN traveled to Jaffna District 
in northern Sri Lanka, March 13-14.  In contrast to 
earlier Mission visits, the atmosphere in Jaffna 
appeared somewhat more tense and brooding.  Far fewer 
people were present on the streets, although conditions 
were outwardly calm.  (The only security incident that 
occurred during the visit was the apparent shooting 
death of a GSL soldier in Jaffna town on March 14.  It 
is not clear whether the shooting was an accident or was 
perpetrated by the LTTE.)  Campaign posters for Sri 
Lanka's upcoming parliamentary elections were in 
evidence, but far fewer than in past electoral 
campaigns, according to contacts.  (Sri Lanka's 
Elections Commissioner has cracked down on posters and 
other campaign paraphernalia which are banned under Sri 
Lanka's elections law -- See Reftels.)  The team also 
paid a brief visit to Kayts Island located to the west 
of Jaffna Peninsula.  Kayts was very quiet, with 
fishermen and vegetable farmers going about their 
business. 
 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= 
INTEREST IN CAMPAIGN HIGH 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= 
 
3.  (C) Preparations for the April 2 parliamentary 
elections were in full swing and interest in the 
campaign appeared relatively high.  The government 
elections office in Jaffna was a bustling hive of 
activity, even though it was a weekend.  Assistant 
Elections Commissioner (Jaffna) T. Nadarajah told poloff 
that he and his staff had been working "around the 
clock" in preparation for the elections.  Nadarajah said 
he expected an orderly and uneventful election, with "a 
good" voter turnout from Jaffna District's over 600,000 
voters.  Jaffna Municipal Commissioner E. Ramalingam 
noted that voter interest was on the increase in the 
district compared with the 2001 parliamentary elections. 
He added that there had not been too much campaign- 
related violence, thus far, and he was hoping that the 
situation remained largely peaceful in the leadup to 
election day.  On the subject of access to polling for 
voters from north/east areas controlled by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), both Nadarajah 
and Ramalingam felt confident that arrangements would be 
made to allow for such voting.  (Elections Commissioner 
Dananda Dissanayake has tentatively indicated that 
voting for those people from LTTE-controlled areas can 
take place in the "no-man's land" located on the fringes 
of LTTE-controlled areas.) 
 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= 
TNA SAID TO BE DOING WELL 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= 
 
4.  (C) Echoing comments made by many other 
interlocutors, M. Senathirajah, an MP and a TNA 
candidate, was extremely confident about the TNA's 
chances in the election.  He said that the TNA was 
benefiting from strong support from younger Tamil 
voters.  Other contacts noted that LTTE cadre in Jaffna 
were clearly backing the TNA (which is a pro-Tiger 
party), noting that such backing gave the party a big 
advantage in the race for support in the Tamil 
community.  Meanwhile, Douglas Devananda, head of the 
anti-LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and an 
MP, told poloff that his party had been actively 
campaigning in Jaffna District and the outlying islands. 
He thought the EPDP would do well despite what he 
characterized as "rampant intimidation" by the LTTE. 
Observers were not sure how V. Anandasangaree, a senior 
MP who is at odds with the LTTE, would fare in the 
election.  Some thought he might win, but many also 
noted that the LTTE was working hard against him. 
Opinion among contacts was divided as to the ultimate 
outcome of the election.  Conforming to the view of many 
observers in the south, most contacts felt that neither 
the President's United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) 
nor the Prime Minister's United National Party (UNP), 
would obtain a clear majority on April 2.  It would then 
fall to a minority party, most probably the TNA, to 
throw its weight behind one of the large parties so that 
it could form a government.  Observers were certain that 
the UNP would be the beneficiary of the TNA's support. 
 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- 
ANGER ABOUT LTTE SPLIT 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- 
 
5.  (C) Queried about the recent split in the LTTE 
between eastern and northern elements (see Reftels), 
most contacts criticized eastern leader Karuna for his 
decision to separate his forces from the main LTTE 
organization.  Government Agent for Kayts Island J.H. 
Selvanayagam said he was "highly worried" about the 
split in the Tiger ranks, fearing it would adversely 
affect the peace process.  Jaffna University Professor 
of History K. Sitrampalam characterized Karuna's 
decision to break with the LTTE as "a further, unneeded, 
unwanted, division among Tamils" which comes at an 
inopportune time.  Theories abounded as to the rationale 
behind Karuna's separation from the main LTTE 
organization.  Speculation that Karuna was receiving 
some type of outside support was rife.  Some contacts 
blamed India's intelligence apparatus, RAW, for example. 
(No evidence of any Indian government or other "hidden 
hand" involvement was provided, however.)  Some contacts 
thought that Karuna had acted on his own for the reasons 
he (Karuna) has announced to the press.  Jaffna's Roman 
Catholic Vicar-General Father Nicholas, for example, 
said he thought that Karuna had acted genuinely out of 
anger toward northern Tamils for their poor treatment of 
eastern Tamils.  In any case, Nicholas remarked that 
Karuna was now seen as a "spokesperson by disaffected 
Tamils in the east," which was a problem for the main 
LTTE organization. 
 
6.  (C) The only contact who actually spoke out in favor 
of Karuna's moves was Douglas Devananda, the EPDP 
leader.  Devananda -- a longtime leader of anti-LTTE 
Tamils -- was very happy with Karuna, indicating that 
the eastern commander had acted legitimately out of 
concern about the way eastern LTTE personnel had been 
treated by the main LTTE organization in the north.  He 
was confident that Karuna was in a strong military 
position in the east and would be able to hold out for 
some time.  When asked, he replied that the EPDP had not 
been in touch with Karuna. 
 
=-=-=-= 
COMMENT 
=-=-=-= 
 
7.  (C) As noted, Jaffna seemed tense and brooding.  It 
was not clear why.  There are two likely factors, 
however.  The first has to do with the campaign. 
Although there does seem to be a high degree of interest 
in the April 2 election, it appears that much of this 
may be due to the Tigers, who are making their presence 
felt.  The LTTE as an organization has indicated in 
public that it wants the TNA to do well and is clearly 
putting pressure on the Tamil community to get out the 
vote.  This pressure seems to be creating significant 
stress.  The second factor has to do with Karuna's 
rebellion:  Jaffna Tamils are a proud group and are 
taking his decision to split from the LTTE while blaming 
"northern Tamils" (i.e., those who are from Jaffna) very 
personally.  In making his move, Karuna appears not only 
to have identified a faultline within the LTTE, but also 
one in Sri Lanka's Tamil community at large.  The 
newfound public discussion of the societal split is 
bracing and a source of deep discomfort for Jaffna 
Tamils.  END COMMENT. 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD