US embassy cable - 04ABUJA445

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, LI, SL, NI 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT OBASANJO ON CHARLES TAYLOR 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA RICK ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  President Obasanjo told Ambassador at Large 
Prosper March 12 that Charles Taylor's stay in Nigeria was 
temporary, and would end when a "democratically elected 
Liberian Government" asked publicly for Taylor to go to the 
Special Court in Sierra Leone, or to Liberia, or anywhere 
else.  Obasanjo said it was a matter of integrity that he and 
the other ECOWAS leaders keep their word to Taylor when he 
agreed to leave Liberia, and Obasanjo expected a 
democratically elected government in Liberia in February or 
March 2005.  When that government asked, Obasanjo would tell 
Taylor he must go.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Nigeria's National Security Advisor, Aliyu Muhammed 
Gusau, arranged the meeting with President Obasanjo after 
meeting with Amb. Prosper, CDA Roberts, Counselor Maxstadt 
and Special Assistant Sagor in the morning of March 12. 
Originally, the meeting was to be with Aliyu's assistant, 
Garrick Kayode, but Aliyu dropped in and took over the 
meeting.  Aliyu said he that he wanted to convince Obasanjo 
to change his mind on not meeting, and that he had also asked 
the Foreign Minister to meet with Amb. Prosper.  Amb. Prosper 
briefly made the case for working with Nigeria on bringing 
Taylor to the Special Court, and Aliyu declined to get 
involved on substance past declaring that "I personally 
believe now is not the time to move Taylor to the Special 
Court."  Aliyu said he was happy to hear that we wanted to 
work with the GON, and reiterated that he would ask Obasanjo 
to meet with the delegation.  Somewhat over an hour later, 
Aliyu called and said the meeting with the President was on. 
 
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OBASANJO: WHEN AN ELECTED GOL ASKS, I WILL TELL TAYLOR TO GO 
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3. (S) Amb. Prosper expressed the USG's appreciation for the 
leadership role Nigeria has taken in the region.  He told 
President Obasanjo that the USG sees Nigeria as a friend and 
is willing to do whatever is appropriate in working with the 
GON on bringing Taylor before the Special Court.  If the GON 
wished, Taylor could be brought to Sierra Leone for a court 
appearance and then returned to Nigeria, or moved to the 
Hague during the trial, or some other arrangement.  Obasanjo 
said he appreciated the Secretary's concern, and wanted to 
continue the dialogue on Taylor. 
 
4. (S) Obasanjo said he appreciated Secretary Powell's desire 
for dialogue on Taylor.  For Obasanjo, the issue was a matter 
of his integrity, and timing.  He had agreed with ECOWAS 
leaders to bring Taylor to Nigeria, and told Taylor that the 
offer to bring him to Nigeria was not a ruse.  If Nigeria 
sent Taylor on now, it would appear to Africans, Obasanjo 
said, that he had deceived Taylor.  Not only would this hurt 
Obasanjo's reputation and standing, but it would also make it 
more difficult for African leaders to convince other 
dictators in similar situations to leave instead of fighting 
it out in the bush.  Certainly there will be more such 
occasions in Africa's future.  The Special Court's prosecutor 
had already insulted Obasanjo and the other ECOWAS leaders in 
this regard when he brought charges against Taylor, without 
prior consultation or even warning, on the same day the 
ECOWAS leaders were meeting to get Taylor to leave Liberia 
for Nigeria. 
 
5. (S) Now, Obasanjo continued, we should take time until the 
Liberian elections.  When there is a democratically elected 
government in Liberia, and it asks for Charles Taylor to be 
moved on, Obasanjo would tell him to go.  If the 
democratically elected GOL asked that he be sent to Sierra 
Leone, or to the Hague, or to Liberia, Obasanjo could defend 
his telling Taylor to leave.  It would not be deceiving 
Taylor, by that point, but rather treating a Liberian 
according to the wishes of a democratically elected Liberian 
government.  If he told Taylor to go, Taylor would have to 
either go where the GOL wished, or at least leave Nigeria. 
 
6. (S) Amb. Prosper explained the reasons for Taylor to be 
brought before the Special Court.  Obasanjo said he would be 
willing to come to Washington and address the Congress to 
explain the matter.  Amb. Prosper said that the USG 
understood the need for a proper environment for moving 
Taylor to the Special Court.  Amb. Prosper said he would 
report to the Secretary Obasanjo's view that that environment 
was a democratically elected government in Liberia, and asked 
when Obasanjo thought that would be.  Obasanjo asked his 
counselors, and responded that they expected an election 
would occur on schedule, in February or March of 2005, and he 
also expected that he would need to consult with ECOWAS 
chairman Kufuor and incoming AU chairman Konare. 
 
7. (S) Amb. Prosper asked if the Administration could share 
Obasanjo's thoughts with interested members of Congress. 
Obasanjo asked that this wait until he had met with Kufuor at 
an ECOWAS meeting the next week.  If Obasanjo had not 
responded negatively by March 20, the USG could use the 
information with Congress. 
 
-=------------------------ 
FOREIGN MINISTER:  NO SHOW 
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8. (C) The delegation went from the Presidency to a meeting 
with Foreign Minister Adeniji at the Foreign Ministry.  They 
were escorted to the Minister's office, only to be informed 
that the Minister felt no need to see them after they had 
"already talked with the top echelon." 
 
9. (U) Ambassador Prosper has cleared on this cable. 
ROBERTS