US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI721

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SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE, MARCH 21

Identifier: 04ABUDHABI721
Wikileaks: View 04ABUDHABI721 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2004-03-14 13:48:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV ECON AF IR IS IZ TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  03/15/2007 03:06:30 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           March 14, 2004


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 721 - UNKNOWN)          

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, ECON                                       

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE, MARCH 21  

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 00721

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT ECON:OJOHN CG:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI717
OO RUEHC RUEHDE RUEHZM RUEHXK RUEHBUL RUEKJCS
RHEHNSC RHEFDIA RUEAIIA
DE RUEHAD #0721/01 0741348
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141348Z MAR 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3584
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3842
RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0158
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/DSCA-MEAN/ISA-NESA//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, INR/NESA AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, AF, IR, IS, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE, 
MARCH 21 
 
Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
Ref: (A) Abu Dhabi 629, (B) Abu Dhabi 571 
 
1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Burns: I look 
forward to welcoming you back to the UAE for your 
March 21 visit for the second U.S.-UAE Bilateral 
Strategic Partnership meeting.  Your Emirati 
interlocutors also are eager to see you.  We have 
requested meetings with Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Hamdan 
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince 
and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed 
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In addition, we are proposing a 
brief interview for you with Abu Dhabi TV, time 
permitting. 
 
2. (C) Summary continued: Your discussions with the 
Emirati leadership will revolve around the major 
current topics  raq, Middle East peace talks, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, and the new Greater Middle 
East initiative.  You will want to thank them for 
their assistance to Iraq, including their $215 million 
pledge for Iraq's reconstruction, for successfully 
hosting the follow-up donors conference on February 
 28-29, and for their commitment to forgive most of 
Iraq's $7 billion bilateral debt.  You should make a 
point of emphasizing to Shaykh Hamdan and Shaykh 
Mohammed the value we place in counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation cooperation.  A/S Wolf had 
fruitful discussions with Shaykh Hamdan March 13 and 
with Mohammed bin Rashid March 14 concerning the A.Q. 
Khan investigation.  Finally, you will want to 
underscore the important strides the U.S. and the UAE 
have taken in solidifying our Strategic Partnership, 
the fruits of which include an Article 98 agreement, a 
TIFA agreement, and a robust Export Controls action 
plan.  Your schedule will allow for a tour of the new 
Embassy compound, "The Dunes," which we occupied on 
February 7 and dedicated, with Shaykh Hamdan as our 
guest of honor, on March 2.  End summary. 
 
3. (S) We propose that you touch on the following key 
issues: 
 
-- Provide a readout of the recent developments in 
Iraq, including the new charter and the timetable for 
political transition, as well as a review of efforts 
to keep the Middle East peace talks on track; 
 
-- Be prepared to explain the Greater Middle East 
concept and the Administration's support for reform in 
the region; 
 
-- Explain the President's nonproliferation initiative 
and the role countries like the UAE can play;  express 
appreciation for UAE cooperation on the A.Q. Khan 
investigation and urge the UAE to tighten its export 
control regime so that others don't take advantage of 
it; 
 
-- Discuss our role in keeping pressure on Iran to 
prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons 
capability; 
 
-- Brief the UAE on the state of U.S.-Libya relations 
following Libya's disclosure that it would cease its 
nuclear weapons program; 
 
-- Emphasize our commitment to institutionalizing our 
bilateral relationship through our Strategic 
Partnership, and by holding the first JMC in Abu Dhabi 
on May 1-2; 
 
-- Express thanks for UAEG cooperation on achieving a 
bilateral ICC Article 98 agreement and a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement, and on agreeing to 
host a hawala conference in April. 
 
-- Thank the Emiratis for their tremendous 
humanitarian assistance throughout the Middle East, 
and for successfully hosting the Iraq donors' follow- 
up conference Feb. 28-29; 
 
-- With Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), congratulate 
him on his promotion last November to Deputy Crown 
Prince of Abu Dhabi, which we view as a sound decision 
that has resolved leadership succession questions for 
the foreseeable future; 
 
Iraq: Contributor to stabilization and reconstruction 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4. (C) Iraq remains high on the Emiratis' agenda.  A 
member of the Iraq Core Donors Group, the UAE has 
pledged $215 million in financial assistance toward 
Iraq's reconstruction.  In February, Abu Dhabi hosted 
a follow-up meeting for the October 2 and 3 Madrid 
Donors' Conference on Iraq, focusing on the operation 
and funding of the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq.  The UAE also committed to forgive 
most of Iraq's $7 billion bilateral debt. 
 
Middle East peace: Support for our engagement 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Arab-Israeli conflict is the other high- 
priority agenda item for the Emiratis (see ref A). 
The Emiratis want us to stay engaged, but they 
perceive that we are occupied by other crises.  There 
is concern over the continuing construction of the 
wall and deterioration of the situation in the West 
Bank and Gaza. 
 
UAE one of the largest donors to Palestinians 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The UAEG has maintained a robust assistance 
package to the Palestinians.  With $87 million in 
project and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza since September 2000, the UAE 
has been a major Arab donor to the Palestinians.  The 
efforts are carefully monitored and very much support 
our strategy to ensure that funds do not fall into the 
wrong hands.  In addition to the government aid, 
private donations of ruling family members to the 
Palestinians certainly total tens of millions of 
dollars.  At the request of his father, HBZ recently 
directed the RCA to help finance repairs of the Dome 
of the Rock mosque. 
 
Iran: Tension persists, but Bam quake aid appreciated 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
7. (C) Relations between the UAE and Iran remain 
strained after the effort to reach some compromise on 
the Abu Musa island issue came to a near halt in late 
spring/early summer of 2003.  The Emiratis have made 
clear to us that they are deeply suspicious of Iran's 
territorial/military ambitions in the Gulf, 
particularly with respect to Tehran's nuclear and WMD 
acquisition policy.  The Emiratis also remain worried 
about Iranian designs in Iraq.  In the immediate 
aftermath of the Bam earthquake it was Shaykh Zayed 
who ordered planes be sent to Iran to deliver 30 tons 
of relief supplies, making the UAE the first in the 
Arab region to arrive in Iran.  Iran appreciated the 
UAE's swift response, which was overseen by HBZ, the 
UAE Red Crescent Authority chairman. 
 
Afghanistan: UAE aid exceeds $150 million 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (S) The UAE continues to play a very helpful role 
in Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.  The UAE 
Armed Forces has deployed an Emirati Special 
Operations contingent to Bagram Air Base to work side- 
by-side with U.S. forces.  UAE humanitarian and 
military programs in Afghanistan are ongoing, and we 
expect the final price tag to far exceed the $150 
million already spent. 
 
Successes: Article 98, TIFA, MEPI, Export Controls 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
9. (C) Our Strategic Partnership deliverable is the 
March 15 TIFA signing in Washington.  Minister of 
State for Financial and Industrial Affairs Mohammed 
Khalfan Bin Kharbash is leading the UAE side, 
accompanied by MFA Assistant U/S for Political Affairs 
Abdullah Rashid.  They have a robust schedule of 
meetings in Washington, including Ambassador Zoellick, 
OPIC Executive VP Ross Connelly, U/S of Defense Dov 
Zakheim, EB A/S Wayne, and members of Congress.  The 
UAE deliverable was the Article 98 Agreement.  The 
Article 98 agreement went into force on February 15, 
and is our 82nd such agreement.  Other recent 
accomplishments to be highlighted are the 
implementation of our Export Controls Action Plan, and 
solid UAE participation at a number of MEPI regional 
programs, including the Judicial Forum in Bahrain, the 
Women and the Law seminar in Amman, and the Campaign 
School in Doha.  The MLAT text is with the UAE side 
and there is still work to be done. 
 
Domestic considerations: Shaykh Zayed and succession 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
10. (C) Since your last visit to the UAE in October, 
the domestic political situation has stayed about the 
same.  President Zayed's role in the day-to-day 
affairs of the state continues to diminish, although 
we continue to see photographs of him meeting with 
heads of state (Hosni Mubarak was here on February 18) 
and leaders of the other emirates.  We believe his 
sons shield him from situations where he may be 
embarrassed by a failure of memory or loss of train of 
thought.  His sons have taken over the substantive 
day-to-day operation of all the major portfolios of 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and key ministries.  That 
said, we continue to hear evidence that he is 
"consulted" on major issues that are likely to come to 
his attention or require his approval to gain support 
from other quarters. 
 
Democracy, human rights and TIP 
------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) You will want to explain the concept of a 
Greater Middle East (GME).  The UAEG has refrained 
from public comment on GME, although the media has 
stated that the US should not seek to impose reform 
from the outside. 
 
12. (C) On TIP, the UAE has made great strides on 
controlling the problem of underage camel jockeys. 
The next challenge for the UAE will be the problem of 
trafficking in women.  There are some differences in 
the way our two countries define the problem and 
discussions G/TIP Coordinator Mark Taylor had in mid- 
February with law enforcement officials provided the 
opportunity for our side to clarify some of these 
issues.  We hope to see more active involvement from 
the UAE law enforcement agencies in investigating and 
prosecuting the traffickers.  HBZ took this on board 
and said that combating trafficking in women was the 
UAEG's priority as well because it is detrimental to 
UAE society and its reputation.  We have discussed a 
short-term action plan with the UAEG that would enable 
them to take concrete steps against this traffic, and 
we believe a drop to Tier 2 in the next TIP report 
before they have sufficient time to make some 
significant progress would hurt HBZ's standing, given 
the political capital he spent on the camel jockey 
issue. 
 
New Embassy Compound 
-------------------- 
 
13. (U) We opened for business in our new Embassy in 
Abu Dhabi's Diplomatic Quarter on February 7.  Shaykh 
Hamdan was our guest of honor at the March 2 
dedication ceremony, along with a substantial 
delegation of shaykhs, ministers and business leaders 
(see ref B).  We look forward to showing you the new 
compound.  Our immediate neighbors include the KSA, 
India, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Yemen, and Pakistan. 
 
Dubai Crown Prince 
------------------ 
 
14. (S) Your schedule prohibits a meeting with UAE 
Minister of Defense and Dubai Crown Prince Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR).  Like most of our senior 
UAE interlocutors, MbR was caught off-guard by the 
President's NDU speech implicating Dubai in AQ Khan's 
vast proliferation network.  The Emiratis would have 
appreciated prior consultation on this issue and 
public acknowledgment of the UAE's excellent 
cooperation with the United States on counter- 
terrorism and non-proliferation matters. During a 
March 13-14 visit to the UAE, Assistant Secretary Wolf 
provided senior UAEG officials with additional 
information on companies and residents in Dubai that 
support the Khan network.  MbR in particular noted 
that these individuals have taken advantage of the 
openness and hospitality of Dubai, and undertook to 
commit significant resources to investigating and 
shutting down elements of AQ Khan's network here. 
In December, we launched the first two in a series of 
export control and related border security programs 
(EXBS) designed to help the UAEG develop an effect 
export controls and trade monitoring regime.  The 
December EXBS programs already have resulted in a 
draft export controls law that we hope the UAEG will 
promulgate by mid-2004; this law will become the basis 
for the next EXBS course (scheduled for late-April) to 
develop specific control lists of goods that will 
require declaration and registration to transit the 
UAE. 
 
15. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmConsul 
Dubai. 
 
Minimize considered. 
 
WAHBA 

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