US embassy cable - 04MADRID864

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000864 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, SP, Spanish Election March 2004, PSOE - Socialist Party, Popular Party 
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTIONS: SCENARIOS FOR COALITION 
BUILDING AFTER MARCH 14 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Kathleen Fitzpatrick per 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
 
1.  (C) Before the March 11 terrorist attacks, the 
conservative Popular Party and its candidate Mariano Rajoy 
were slated to win the Spanish elections, but few confidently 
assessed the PP would win an absolute majority in Parliament. 
 As part of Embassy Madrid,s election reporting plan, we 
have been developing an alternative scenario analysis to 
provide Washington readers with some thoughts on what might 
transpire in Spanish coalition-building processes, including 
if voters turn months of polling statistics into a Dewey 
Defeats Truman headline.   These alternative scenarios could 
play themselves out even in the new context created by the 
terrorist attacks (septel).  By law, pollsters had to stop 
taking and reporting polling data on the elections on March 
8.  Thus, the polling snapshot on the elections does not take 
into account the impact of the terrorist attacks. 
 
2. (C) Depending on the election outcome March 14, the PP 
could form a strong absolute majority-backed government, or a 
weak, heavily-conditioned, minority government.  Should 
election results go much worse for the PP than polling has 
indicated, there is the chance of an "All Against the PP" 
coalition taking over, led by the Socialist party.    This 
"Government of the Left" would likely be unstable and would 
be strongly opposed to the PP's pro-US orientation and to US 
Iraq policy.   End Summary. 
 
Three Scenarios for a PP-Led Government 
 
3.  (C) According to a range of polls (conducted before the 
polling deadline of March 8) the Popular Party looks set to 
be the party that gets the most votes on March 14.   However, 
the race is not about a PP plurality, but about whether the 
PP can obtain a majority sufficient to govern.   PP 
strategists have consistently told us that they hope for, but 
are by no means sure of, an absolute majority.    Lack of an 
absolute majority means the PP would have to seek coalition 
partners, something it is in a far worse position that the 
Socialists to do.   Thus, winning the most seats may not be 
enough.   Following are three scenarios that would enable the 
PP to govern after March 14: 
 
-- Option One: An absolute majority of 176 seats or more. 
The PP received an absolute majority of 183 seats in 2000. 
This would give the PP a free hand (and was the main reason 
Aznar could make such unpopular policy choices as joining 
forces with the US on Iraq, and survive.) 
 
-- Option Two: Close to an absolute majority, 171-172 seats 
or more.   The PP is confident it can count on the Canary 
Coalition party for its estimated 4 or 5 seats should the PP 
fall just short of an absolute majority.  This would mean a 
virtual absolute majority for the PP. 
 
-- Option Three: 164 seats or more.   The situation becomes 
much more complicated.    This would require the PP to obtain 
the support of the moderate Catalan nationalist (CIU) party 
and its approximately 11 seats.   PP strategists believe the 
PP would be able to negotiate a deal for the CIU's support, 
but it would be difficult and the resulting PP government 
would be weak.   It might not last a full term.   PP 
strategists point out a fundamental divergence between the PP 
and CIU: CIU wants to revise the autonomy statute that 
governs division of powers between Madrid and Catalonia, and 
the PP believes this is unnecessary.    Other Spaniards 
support such an option and prefer a weak PP government that 
has to rely on negotiations with partners, rather than a PP 
with an absolute majority that can do what it wants. 
 
What if the PP Falls Short? 
 
4.  (SBU)  If the PP does significantly worse than expected 
on March 14, it would open up the possibility of an 
alternative scenario: an "all against the PP" coalition.   PP 
candidate Rajoy made a point of stressing this prospect on 
the campaign trail.   In refusing to debate Socialist leader 
Zapatero one-on-one, Rajoy said that he would only debate if 
it were against the totality of the anti-PP forces.   This 
includes, apart from the Socialists,  the Left 
Union/Communists (IU), the Catalan Republicans (ERC), and 
other regional parties, including possibly the Basque 
Nationalists (PNV).    CIU leaders have said publicly that 
they are leaving their options open and would not rule out 
support for such a government. 
 
5. (SBU) Gaspar Llamazares, the IU leader, has been most 
explicit in his call for a "Government of the Left" to unite 
to defeat the PP.    While Llamazares concedes that the PP 
appears likely to be the party most voted, he believes that a 
broad coalition can prevent the PP from forming the next 
government.    Indeed, Llamazares says the goal of the 
election is to deny the PP a governing majority. 
 
Zapatero's Pledge 
 
6.  (SBU) Socialist leader Zapatero has, to the consternation 
of the IU and others on the left, pledged he would not seek 
to form a governing coalition unless PSOE is the party most 
voted.   In making this declaration, Zapatero seeks to win 
over votes from IU and others on the left as he has by 
stressing that he is a "man of the left."  Former President 
Felipe Gonzalez, speaking in the Socialist heartland of 
Andalusia on February 29, called on voters from the left to 
vote for the PSOE, where each marginal vote, because of the 
seat distribution system, counts for more. 
 
7.  (C)  Zapatero has also appealed to voters' desire for 
change and has campaigned hard for the votes of the undecided 
and those who were thinking of staying home.   Polls have 
shown that about 58% of Spaniards want a change in 
government.   The challenge for Zapatero has been to 
translate this desire for change into votes for the PSOE. 
Prior to he cessation of the campaign following the March 11 
terrorist attacks, Zapatero appeared to be making inroads 
with this theme and narrowing his margin with Rajoy. 
 
An "All Against the PP" Coalition? 
 
8.  (C) Zapatero has made his pledge repeatedly, so he would 
find it difficult to break it, even if the opposition to the 
PP obtains more seats than the PP, and its few allies, can 
muster.   The core of the "All Against the PP" coalition 
would be a significantly strengthened PSOE, joined by IU 
(communists) as a junior partner.    If the PSOE were to get 
150 seats, 25 more than in 2000, and more than estimated in 
any poll, this would form a workable base.   The IU might get 
nine, the Catalan Republican Nationalist ERC as many as six 
seats, the Galician Nationalist BNG 3 seats.   The Basque 
Nationalist PNV might lend it support, adding another 7-8 
seats.    The CIU might, under the right terms, lend its 
support as well along with their roughly 11 seats. 
Political observers speculate that, if he could find a way to 
govern, Zapatero might find a way out of his pledge. 
Others speculate that Zapatero would keep to his pledge, 
allow the PP to form a weak minority government, and hope to 
see that PP government fall and PSOE take over in a much 
stronger position. 
 
Comment: Impact on US Interests 
 
9. (C)  An "All Against the PP" coalition would be inherently 
unstable.   It would also have a foreign policy orientation 
very different from that of Aznar, Rajoy and the PP. 
Zapatero has pledged to pull Spanish forces out of Iraq by 
June 30, 2004 if the mission is not under UN auspices by that 
date.    Zapatero has been relentlessly critical of US Iraq 
policy, of President Bush, and of Aznar's deepening of 
relations with the US, which he blames for having alienated 
Spain in Europe.   Zapatero's partners would be even more 
opposed to US policy, and thus hem in any natural Socialist 
tendency to moderate on US relations once in power. 
ARGYROS