US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1507

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE MARCH 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL 
MEHMET ILKER BASBUG, DEPUTY CHIEF, TURKISH GENERAL STAFF 
 
REF: A. A) ANKARA 1230 
     B. B) ANKARA 1259 
     C. C) ANKARA 1360 
 
 
 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  General Basbug comes to Washington at a 
time when the US-TU relationship is generally on the mend. 
It has been one year since the 1 March vote and 5 months 
since the 7 October vote and the "soft landing".  Once again, 
generally, the US-TU relationship is approached from a 
multi-faceted perspective, not just a one issue 
relationship-Iraq.  TGS thinks important issues for the visit 
will be GME, Med Dialogue and enhanced NATO engagement in the 
region, the Global Posture Review, Iraq, TAL, and 
Afghanistan.  At the same time, General Basbug will come 
looking for specific answers on when the U.S. will take 
direct action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel and expecting to be 
able to lay out in detail TGS concerns about the implications 
of the Transitional Administrative Law in Iraq for northern 
Iraq. He is scheduled to travel to Louisiana, Florida, and 
Washington, DC.  Meetings are scheduled with U/Ss Feith, D 
Armitage and NSA Deputy Hadley (with a drop-in from Dr. 
Rice).  End Summary. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Greater Middle East Initiative (GME) 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
2. (C) Turkey wants to know what GME means in the region and 
what the US is looking for from Turkey in the way of 
support/assistance; how do we intend to work this with 
countries of the region and NATO.  Recently in Turkey, GME 
has been the subject of considerable press commentary, mostly 
negative and reflecting chronic suspicions about U.S. motives 
and paranoia that the U.S.'s real aim is to turn GME against 
Turkey and remove the Kemalist State structure. Few Turks 
understand GME's methods or aims.  This issue will likely be 
raised in most of the DCHOD's meetings. 
 
 
 
 
3. (C) While recognizing that Turkey's democratization and 
economic reforms have a way to go, Turks are proud of their 
achievements, especially over the last two years, and many 
are willing to play a regional role.  Several GOT officials 
have encouraged us to consult closely with Ankara on GME, 
believing that Turks' long association with the region can be 
useful in refining the initiative. Turkey has for decades 
seen itself and been seen as an east-west bridge, although 
Turks have not examined closely the implications of what it 
means to be a bridge or how one fulfills one's alliance 
obligations while being a bridge.  Turkey's experiences in 
integrating itself into NATO and the EU are consistent with 
core GME objectives.  Moreover, Ankara might welcome 
opportunities to share its experiences with others in the 
region -- experiences in making laws more democratic, 
training military and police to respect civilian rule and 
human rights, opening up markets.  Turks may be able to 
deliver some messages about the nee 
d for Middle East societies to face up to their problems more 
easily than the U.S., although Turkey's unique history, 
including memories of the Ottoman Empire means it is not a 
"model". 
 
 
4. (C) Therefore, in helping the Turks to fashion their 
regional GME role, we must be aware of the Turks' historical 
baggage in the region and the problematical question of Islam 
in Turkey, and we must avoid a perception of Turkey as the 
U.S.'s regional gendarme. 
 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Edelman and Basbug discussed GME March 9, 
and the Ambassador has provided the general with speeches and 
statements by the President and others on the initiative. 
Further, the Turkish General Staff J-5 posed a range of 
questions concerning the Greater Middle East Initiative (see 
ref A for more details.)  The following are a sampling of the 
questions: 
 
 
-- Which countries are included in the GME?  And why. 
 
 
-- What if any relationship is there between GME and the 
Global Force Posture Review?  (TGS suspects that they are 
related:  perhaps the reason that the US has so many forces 
in the region -- and wants to move more of them to the east 
as part of the posture review -- is to be able to have the 
capability to use mil force to further the objectives of the 
GME.) 
 
 
-- What if any expectations does the US have for Turkey as 
far as the GME is concerned? 
 
 
-- Beyond policy pronouncements, is there programmatic 
content to the GME? 
 
 
-- Will the GME continue to be a high priority if President 
Bush loses in November? 
 
 
------ 
CYPRUS 
------ 
 
 
6. (C) We expect several interlocutors to raise this with 
Basbug in Washington. TGS only cautiously agreed to the 
government's wish to move Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and 
the Turkish Cypriots back to the bargaining table and it 
appears TGS insisted on only a narrow field of maneuver on 
the part of the government.  TGS is being careful not to 
comment in public on the course of Cyprus negotiations. 
However, TGS remains concerned lest a settlement (1) draw a 
line between the two communities which TGS considers 
militarily indefensible; (2) lead to a reduction of Turkish 
troops below 6,000; and (3) impose what TGS considers onerous 
reporting requirements for troop movements.  Basbug's 
interlocutors should emphasize (1) the credit redounding to 
Turkey broadly (not just the government) from its initiative 
to re-open negotiations; (2) the crucial importance to 
Turkey's success overall (well beyond the question of a start 
date for EU accession negotiations) of a settlement in 
Cyprus; and (3) the importance of Tu 
rkey's maintaining its constructive, common sense, 
cool-handed line in the negotiations, i.e., to avoid being 
provoked by the Greek Cypriots into abandoning the 
negotiations. 
 
 
------------ 
EU Accession 
------------ 
 
 
7. (C) Turkey's current focus on EU accession has been a 
ready vehicle for the internal changes Turkey needs to be 
successful.  Turkey's focus on getting a date to begin EU 
accession talks has translated into an effective impetus for 
reform.  Although the Copenhagen Criteria are a de facto 
external discipline, there is widespread sentiment that these 
are things Turkey needs to do for its own good. 
 
 
8. (C) Turkey's success is not a given.  The Turks have done 
well in passing laws, but now need to implement them. 
Everyday life  across Turkey  yields examples where the basic 
elements of individual rights and rule of law are not 
respected.  Turkey's EU supporters stress that complacency 
now will jeopardize Turkey's chances of getting a date in 
December.  Even if Turkey does begin accession talks, the 
road to accession will be arduous and could take 10 years. 
Faced with a long haul, the current political focus and burst 
of energy for reforms 
could fail. 
 
 
9. (C) The Turkish economy has improved significantly over 
the past year, greatly reducing fears of renewed financial 
crisis and generating hope for sustained, low-inflation 
growth.  However, this improvement has generated complacency 
among government leaders, who fail to understand that the 
economy's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it 
vulnerable.  Unless Turkey implements reforms systematically, 
it will miss the opportunity to move toward sustainable 
prosperity and away from the boom-and-bust cycles that have 
haunted it. 
 
 
--------------- 
Istanbul Summit 
--------------- 
 
 
10. (C) The President is scheduled for a bilateral visit in 
late June as well as the NATO Summit June 27-29.  NRF has 
been recommended as a good option to augment civilian 
security forces.  As Turkey would provide the preponderance 
of the ground troops, TU would be in the forefront.  Turkey 
has not presented any requests to the US for additional 
security assistance for the summit, although there has been 
some discussion at NATO about AWACS support.. 
 
 
11. (C) The image of the Summit's occurring in Istanbul 
provides an opportunity to showcase Turkey and its role in 
both the institutions of Europe and the GME initiative. 
Turkey's geographic and historc role as a bridge between 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will provide an appropriate 
backdrop to the Summit's emphasis on GME, Med Dialogue, 
expanding PfP opportunities with the Caucasus and Central 
Asia.  Turkey's active support for these initiatives would 
further underscore the important role Turkey plays in NATO 
and its neighboring regions. 
 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
 
12. (C) PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL: Turkey is anxious for action to 
be taken against the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. Many in TGS feel 
Turkey has provided the US with a range of information for 
use in combating the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL and have seen 
little in return.  Many in TGS see the need for a 
well-thought-out comprehensive plan to eliminate the 
PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL.  They also realize this is a long-term 
and laborious effort.  However, they also see the need to 
take immediate tangible action. 
 
 
13. (S) Further, TGS feels they are waiting for several 
deliverables or responses from the US, some of which, Basbug 
may ask about. The following are a sample of the issues: (For 
further details see ref B) 
-- briefing by CENTCOM on anti-PKK/KADEK/KHK CONOPS planning; 
(Basbug expected from VCJCS comment in December that U.S. 
actions might commence in that time period.  He will probably 
raise the issue of his perception of the delay.) 
-- action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK in northern Iraq, 
including closing down its front organization offices such as 
those of the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party; (note: per 
CPA talks in Ankara on 10 Mar, a law was passed o/a 7 Mar 
placing all border operations under the authority of the 
Iraqi Central Government.  This should decrease the 
opportunity for KDP influence in the north.) 
-- placing officials representing the Baghdad authority on 
the Iraqi side of the Habur-Ibrahim Khalil crossing under 
Baghdad's sole authority, rather solely those representing 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) or the KDP; 
-- accepting Turkish offers of training for Iraqi civil 
servants and others in Turkey; 
-- a response to TGS D/CHOD Basbug's question about how else 
Turkey could contribute to efforts in Iraq; 
 
 
14. (C) Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC): The EUCOM J2 
initiated IFC, which is intended to facilitate the exchange 
of intelligence information and fused analyses between the US 
and Turkey in order to provide actionable intelligence to 
CJTF-7 against PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL, is active.  Currently, 
there are two JAC Molesworth personnel at the IFC in Ankara. 
Several exchanges have already occurred.  TGS J2 described 
the IFC as the first step in fighting terrorism and will 
improve the TU-US relationship in the process.  Additionally, 
TGS J2 expressed considerable interest in acquiring U2 
imagery via the IFC.  U2 overflights have been approved by 
POTUS; pending DOS demarche to MFA, the flights could 
commence. 
 
 
15. (C) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL): GOT has 
reacted harshly to the terms of the TAL. It views the process 
as undemocratic; the result as a pure ethnic federation 
dividing Iraq; and the treatment of the Turkomen as 
belittling.  The result, it believes is inconsistent with the 
presentation to date by the U.S. including in the recent 
letter from the President to PM Erdogan.  Turkey believes it 
has been frozen out of US Iraq operations and treated in a 
manner unbecoming an ally.  It is not yet clear how far our 
explanations of the process so far and in perspective have 
gone to put aside those concerns.  (See ref C. for further 
details.) 
 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
 
16. (C) Basbug could be mostly in the listening mode here. 
 Afghanistan Coordinator Taylor will meet on March 12 with 
GOT officials in Ankara.  A Turkish offer to provide a PRT in 
northern Afghanistan has prompted a renewed discussion within 
the USG as to what additional contributions to reconstruction 
and stabilization efforts the US should solicit from the GOT 
to support US and NATO interests in Afghanistan. 
 
 
17. (C) The following are snapshots of where the Turks are on 
key issues: 
--PRT: The Turks have proposed establishing a PRT in northern 
Afghanistan and are in discussions with SHAPE about an 
alternate location as the one the Turks proposed is already 
being covered by the UK.  The Turks have a strong preference 
for establishing a PRT in the north -- a preference driven 
more by a familiarity withthe region and the players (and 
thus a greater chance of success) than by a desire to somehow 
influence domestic political developments. From our vantage 
point, the Turkish position is clear:  a PRT in the north or 
no PRT at all. 
 
 
--OEF:  CENTCOM has asked the Turkish General Staff on at 
least two different occasions during the past year (spring 
and fall 2003) to contribute troops to Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  In both instances, the Turkish General Staff 
replied "no."  There is no reason to believe that TGS's 
position has or will change, particularly if Turkey's offer 
to establish a PRT in the north is not accepted.  TGS 
believes the Turkish military is overstretched globally and 
is reluctant to do more in Afghanistan.  They are also 
watching closely the discussion of NATO taking on a 
significant role in Iraq where, being much closer to home, 
they will want to have forces ready to contribute.  The MFA 
experienced considerable difficulties in persuading TGS to 
contribute a small number of forces to a TU-led PRT; they 
assess the chances of persuading the TU military to 
contribute forces to OEF operations as "next to zero." 
Finally, the Turkish Parliament is highly unlikely to approve 
combat forces to OEF (as opposed to troops for PRTs, where 
the MFA has indicated that further Parliamentary approval 
would not be needed). 
 
 
--ISAF:  The Turks believe they already have done more than 
their fair share in terms of contributing to ISAF operations 
(i.e. 267 personnel to ISAF I, leadership of ISAF II from 
June 2002-February 2003 and a contribution of approximately 
1,400 troops, on-going contributions to ISAF III, and an 
offer of three helicopters) and are not inclined to do more. 
The Turks rebuffed requests from former NATO SYG Robertson to 
contribute an 1,000 additional troops to ISAF.  Their 
position remains unchanged. 
 
 
--Afghan National Army (ANA):  The Turkish military has 
expressed an interest in the past in contributing to US-led 
training efforts.  They participated in the early stages of 
training the ANA and were considering participating in the 
CENTCOM-led training program in early 2002 before deciding to 
take over command of ISAF II.  We suspect some within the 
Turkish military may be receptive to proposals to participate 
in future training.  During a recent MFA-TGS meeting on PRTs, 
TGS reportedly expressed an interest in participating in 
training the ANA, on the condition that Turkey had a PRT that 
could serve as a "base" for training efforts. 
 
 
--Police Training:  The GOT is inclined to provide police 
training if Turkey stands up a PRT in the north and if the US 
provides the facilities (reftel). 
 
 
--Reconstruction:  The GOT already has contributed more than 
$5M to Afghanistan reconstruction efforts and is considering 
making significant contributions (including establishing 
schools and agriculture centers) in the north later this year. 
 
 
------------ 
Incirlik AFB 
------------ 
 
 
18. (C) The Turks are still awaiting a second round of 
consultations on global force posture.  Basbug may have heard 
rumblings about different potential operational needs or 
developments.  None of these have been taken to the political 
leadership at this point and it would not be useful to get 
the TGS significantly out in front in trying to obtain 
continuous changes to approved operations.  The authority for 
OIF II concludes on April 30, and there has been no sustained 
engagement with the GOT/TGS on other operational 
requirements.  Turkish interpretations of our general 
arrangements form a relatively high political bar for 
establishing different operational requirements at Incirlik. 
EDELMAN