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| Identifier: | 04HANOI738 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04HANOI738 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Hanoi |
| Created: | 2004-03-12 08:00:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | ASEC PTER SNAR KCRM VM CTERR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000738 SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED STATE FOR DS, S/CT, AND EAP/BCLTV E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC, PTER, SNAR, KCRM, VM, CTERR SUBJECT: A/S TAYLOR DISCUSSES SECURITY AND COOPERATION WITH MPS VICE MINISTER 1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting March 10 with visiting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Frank Taylor, Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Vice Minister Nguyen Van Huong said he wanted to see closer cooperation between MPS and the Embassy, including formal communication channels for CT and law enforcement information. He repeatedly praised U.S.-Vietnam intelligence and information exchanges, noting that the GVN had carefully reviewed all U.S.-provided threat information and found it to be useful. Huong noted U.S.- Vietnam cooperation on law enforcement issues and said that it was time to lay out a mechanism to make cooperation better and more effective. A/S Taylor and Huong also discussed the surveillance detection (SD) program and the security of Vietnamese diplomats and official visitors in the U.S. End summary. COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE ------------------------------------ 2. (SBU) In response to Ambassador Taylor's statement that the U.S. appreciated the greater cooperation demonstrated by the exchange of information on security issues, MPS VM Huong said that, until now, the exchanges of information had been unofficial, or else had been sent through "excessively bureaucratic" channels. Huong said the U.S. normally sent the information under the cover of a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then sent it to MPS. This was inefficient, Huong complained, noting that MPS "usually" received untimely, incomplete information by this method. When the information was late, he noted, it was impossible to act on, which was unfortunate because some of the information was "interesting and important." For example, he said, the GVN greatly appreciated information on Islamic organizations that had transferred money into Vietnam. In response, Huong said he had directed MPS to share information directly with the Embassy, especially when the information related to threats to U.S. or other diplomatic interests. [Note: Embassy already has a direct channel to MPS for counterterrorism/threat information. RSO frequently passes information directly to MPS' Counterterrorism office, and RSO and the MPS CT office have a "hotline" established to exchange urgent information. It is unclear what deficiencies Huong was referring to, since very little information of this nature, except concerning financial activities of terrorists, has actually been passed through MFA since 2002. End note.] 3. (SBU) Huong suggested establishing a direct, official channel between the Embassy and MPS, and proposed that the conduits for information be the RSO office in the Embassy and the General Criminal Department at MPS. One way in particular MPS would like to work with the U.S. was on checking up on companies transferring large amounts of money into Vietnam, Huong added. As a second step after establishing a formal channel between MPS and the Embassy, Huong said it was essential for the Embassy and MPS to work together on contingencies involving an attack on U.S. facilities in Vietnam. Huong noted that he thought the prospect of an attack on U.S. facilities in Vietnam unlikely, but said it would be valuable to determine specifically what the U.S. would need from MPS in various attack scenarios and what roles the U.S. and MPS would play in responding to an attack. 4. (SBU) Ambassador Taylor noted that the meeting itself demonstrated the growing strength of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. He added that he appreciated the "excellent security" MPS provided to U.S. diplomatic properties and persons in Vietnam, and hoped the U.S. and Vietnam would be able to develop the relationship further. Terrorism, he said, is a phenomenon greater than just two nations, and the exchange of information was important to the U.S. and all its partners in the war on terrorism. Huong agreed, and added that in the area of counterterrorism, "the U.S. and Vietnam speak the same language." He praised "the United States' important role in the fight against terrorism" and rejected any possible suggestion that Vietnam did not actively support the U.S. in the war on terrorism. 5. (SBU) VM Huong noted that Ambassador Taylor's visit was "well timed" to occur when there was such an improvement in bilateral relations. Huong said that while the U.S. and Vietnam had many areas of active ongoing cooperation, law enforcement cooperation was a "special domain." He added that the U.S. and Vietnam have "much to do to gain mutual understanding" on law enforcement cooperation, and said the two nations should "map out a direction" to improve cooperation in this area. Ambassador Taylor said relations between the U.S. and Vietnam were developing, and both sides were learning how best to work together on counterterrorism and transnational crime. He said he was "pleased to see the exchange of information flowing more freely" and hoped to see that exchange develop more fully between the two countries. SPIRITED EXCHANGE ON U.S. SD TEAMS ---------------------------------- 6. (SBU) Ambassador Taylor thanked VM Huong for the cooperation on security both in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City. An important part of the relationship, he stressed, was full transparency as both sides worked together on security and combating criminal activity. Ambassador Taylor acknowledged that MPS had primary responsibility for security, and that the U.S. must work with MPS in security situations, but added that the U.S. had a great deal of experience to share on these issues. He identified the SD program as one that existed around the world, and said he wanted to see the program in Vietnam operating transparently with the cooperation of MPS. 7. (SBU) Huong stated that the GVN took its security responsibilities extremely seriously, and that when it came to the security of foreign missions, MPS was experienced and capable. For years, Huong noted, there had been no incidents and no threats on diplomats from any source. Huong said that in 1995, he himself had worked with U.S. security personnel to secure the new U.S. chancery, and had worked with U.S. officers again in 2001 to strengthen security after September 11. Vietnam, he said, had a different, but still effective, approach to security. Vietnam is a peaceful place, and putting too many uniformed guards in front of Embassies paints a "false picture" of the security situation, he added. MPS attaches importance to identifying terrorists or anyone else posing a threat to U.S. interests, and watches over U.S. properties carefully, he said. One example of this was that when the U.S. deployed SD personnel in HCMC, they were arrested by MPS officers who "pay special attention" to U.S. facilities, he said. "They were easy to spot," he noted. 8. (SBU) MPS did not have any need for additional capacity in protecting U.S. facilities, Huong continued. Even while in this meeting, he said, he was in full control of the security situation at U.S. facilities. For example, he added, he knew that SD teams were deployed near the Embassy, even though MPS was in the area and in control. There was no need for the SD teams, Huong stated. If the situation were to require a higher level of alert, MPS would consider using the SD teams. The SD teams were a good idea, he said, but only when they were truly needed. He also noted that the Embassy's placement of sandbag-filled shipping containers in the street in front of the Chancery was "not in accordance with traffic laws, and unattractive" but MPS "tolerated" them. He suggested that the Embassy and MPS should work together to find an alternative to blocking the street. SECURITY OF VIETNAMESE CG IN SAN FRANCISCO ------------------------------------------ 9. (SBU) Ambassador Taylor said he appreciated the work MPS did to keep U.S. personnel and facilities safe, and noted that DS had the same responsibility for Vietnamese facilities in the U.S. Huong said he was very concerned about the situation in San Francisco, where the residence of a staff member of Vietnamese ConGen had been shot at twice. Huong said he had heard that the shootings had been classified as "random" but felt that the issue should be investigated more closely. Huong said that if the DCM in Hanoi had been shot at twice, he himself would be in "deep, deep trouble." Ambassador Taylor told Huong that he had been told that the shootings were in fact random, but that he would look into the case and provide a report personally. 10. (SBU) Huong also asked Ambassador Taylor to pay attention to the security of high-level GVN visitors to the U.S. In the past, he said, "undesirable groups had done things to GVN officials, including a deputy prime minister." Ambassador Taylor said that protecting official visitors was one of DS' top priorities, and that MPS could assist in that effort by providing information on potentially disruptive groups or individuals before the delegations arrived. A/S Taylor said he would meet with Ambassador Chien to discuss security issues any time. COMMENT ------- 11. (SBU) Comment: The atmospherics of the meeting were formal but friendly. Amb. Taylor and VM Huong both made much of their mutual law enforcement credentials, with Amb. Taylor saying they shared "the brotherhood of the badge" and Huong noting that they "spoke the same language." The extremely formal MPS main meeting hall format, with the two sides seated 25 feet apart and speaking through interpreters over microphones, somewhat limited the give and take. Despite this, Huong was frank and reiterated the GVN's desire to move forward on creating cooperation mechanisms both for security and law enforcement issues. His statement about wanting to "map out a direction" for how to improve law enforcement cooperation is another indicator that Vietnam may be open to creating a framework to allow some kind of real operational law enforcement cooperation. 12. (SBU) Huong's discussion of extra uniformed guards presenting a "false picture" of the security situation in Vietnam is indicative of another basic difference in Embassy's and MPS' views of security. The Embassy believes that a public, forceful security presence around U.S. facilities acts as a deterrent to any potential attack. MPS, in contrast, prefers a "softer" security presence because it reinforces their carefully cultivated image of Vietnam as a safe place to visit and do business. Further dialog is necessary for Embassy and MPS to resolve this difference of opinion. 13. (SBU) Huong's comments on the SD program as well as complaints about the traffic impact of sandbag-filled containers positioned in front of the Embassy to provide additional setback were repetitions of previously expressed MPS views. However, MPS has conspicuously avoided a confrontation over these issues, allowing them to continue but noting MPS' preference that they be eliminated. Embassy's (so far successful) strategy of continuing to try to raise MPS' comfort level with these necessary measures without making a formal request for approval is designed to avoid forcing MPS into a position where it would have to actively oppose these measures. End comment. BURGHARDT
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