US embassy cable - 04LAGOS540

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON PASS AFRICA WATCHERS 
DIA/J2 PASS GHAYES 
ENERGY PASS CGUY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014 
TAGS: KDEM, PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ASEC, EPET, NI 
SUBJECT: DELTA VIOLENCE ON RISE, ELECTIONS SUSPENDED 
 
REF: (A) LAGOS 523 (B) LAGOS 192 (C) 2003 LAGOS 2535 
 
Classified By: Classified by: Political Chief Diane Shelby for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The rate and level of violence in the 
Niger Delta has been increasing in recent weeks (ref A). 
Plans for March 27 elections in several key Local Government 
Areas (LGA) have been suspended, fueling tension between 
ethnic groups in the region.  Meanwhile, thousands of 
internally displaced Itsekiri are agitating for a return to 
their homes as their living conditions steadily worsen. 
Signs of preparations for renewed conflict between Ijaw and 
Itsekiri in the riverine areas are reported.  If ethnic 
conflict erupts, the military's reaction is unpredictable as 
troops are increasingly weary of their Delta deployment and 
pressure for a solution is mounting on all sides.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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ITSEKIRIS TO RESIST ELECTION POSTPONEMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Local Government Area (LGA) elections are scheduled 
nationwide for March 27.  The Delta State Government has 
postponed elections in Warri North, Warri South, and Warri 
Southwest LGAs, which have seen several spates of violence in 
the last seven years between rival Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic 
groups contesting land access, oil revenues, and political 
power.  Attempts to improve relations through peace dialogues 
have produced mixed results.  Although support for 
NGO-organized peace dialogues is strong (ref B), ethnic 
groups recently pulled out of the Delta State Government's 
Inter-Ethnic Dialogue. Delta State Governor James Ibori, 
whose oft-trumpeted "peace plan" to quell violence in the 
state is fizzling, championed the dialogue.  The dialogue 
ended when the state government, claiming that all parties 
were in agreement, unilaterally postponed LGA elections in 
and around Warri to prevent violence. 
 
3.  (C) Daniel Reyenieju, President of the Itsekiri National 
Youth Congress, on March 8 told POLOFF the Itsekiri oppose 
the election postponement and will fight the decision in the 
courts.  (Note: In the Nigerian context, youths are young and 
middle-aged men. End Note.)  Reyenieju, along with other 
prominent Ijaw and Itsekiri elders and youth leaders, had 
participated in the Inter-Ethnic Dialogue. According to 
Reyenieju, a discussion about local elections never took 
place nor was agreed upon by the Itsekiri.  Talks broke down 
and the Itsekiri walked out. 
 
4.  (C) Reyenieju was dismayed, frustrated, and angry over 
the postponement of elections.  He fears that when elections 
do take place, Ijaws will flood the LGAs with non-residents 
in a bid to rig the outcome.  Moreover, he is at odds with 
the state government's reasoning to postpone elections to 
avoid an escalation of violence.  Violence always accompanies 
elections in Nigeria, he explained, and stressed that 
tensions were much greater and violence more commonplace when 
Ibori and President Olusegun Obasanjo were up for election in 
April 2003.  Ibori, a member of the President's ruling 
People's Democratic Party (PDP), received Itsekiri support in 
his election bid despite, Reyenieju emphatically said, the 
displacement of thousands from the Benin River and the 
burning of Koko, one of the most heavily populated Itsekiri 
villages, the day before the election.  Since March 2003, 
Reyenieju pointed out that several Ijaw militant youths have 
been appointed as Special Assistants to the Governor -- a 
position that brings access to the governor and money. 
 
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IJAW SUPPORT ELECTION POSTPONEMENT 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Daniel Ekpide, Secretar of the Federated Niger Delta 
Ijaw Communities (FDIC), told POLOFF on March 4 that the 
election pstponement showed a "serious desire by the state 
government 
 resolve issues."  The Ijaw have beenagitating 
for greater political representation wthin the LGAs since 
1997.  In 1997, the Warri Southwest LGA seat was transferred 
from an Ijaw villge to an Itsekiri village by the state 
governmen, sparking intense violence.  Each of the three 
GAs is divided into 10 wards.  In each of these LGAs, the 
Itsekiri hold the plurality of wards and, therefore, control 
the LGA chairman and chancelorships.  As a result, claims of 
political disenfranchisement have fueled Ijaw demands for 
ward redistricting and an increase in the number of wards 
within the LGA.  Ekpide has called for ward redistricting 
based on the most recent 1991 population census, which, he 
contends, shows the Ijaw are more populous in the region. 
 
6.  (C) Contrary to reports on March 10 (refA), Ekpide 
characterized Warri as calm, claiming there was no tension 
within the riverine Ijaw areas.  He stated the Ijaw were 
keeping "hush," despite recent attacks by the Itsekiri -- 
attacks that each group has blamed on the other.  Relations 
with the JTF and police were also categorized as good, 
despite sporadic skirmishes.  He said the Ijaw were 
cooperating with state government- and NGO-led peace 
dialogues and blamed the slowing progress on the Itsekiri. 
Ekpide further described the distressed state of the Ijaw 
within the riverine area and found fault with the state 
government for the lack of basic health and education 
services. 
 
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THE DELTA'S INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) The Nigerian Commission for Refugees reports that 
800,000 Nigerians are internally displaced nation-wide due to 
communal violence, creating volatile pockets throughout 
Nigeria.  In Delta State, 9,000 Itsekiri have been displaced 
from their homes along the Benin River, and 1,000 Ijaw have 
fled their homes in Warri Southwest LGA.  Internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in Delta State have not received 
humanitarian aid from the GON, but have instead relied on a 
$50,000 grant from the USG implemented by the International 
Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH).  Displaced 
for almost a year and with living conditions steadily 
deteriorating, the IDPs are frustrated and edgy.  Donor 
fatigue has set in among their financial supporters.  The 
most acute is the 9,000 Itsekiri IDPs living in and around 
the Urhobo city of Sapele.  Reyenieju reports that children 
have not been attending school, young girls are forced into 
prostitution, young men have become criminals, and the weak 
and elderly are dying (ref C). 
 
8.  (SBU) Reyenieju claims the USG has been "lazy" in 
comparison to its previous aid efforts in the region. 
Appreciative of past support, he advocates for continued aid, 
but prefers a longer-term solution and requested that the USG 
petition the GON to enable IDPs to return to their homes. 
Ekpide also stated conditions were worsening for Ijaw IDPs in 
the region.  (Note: The USG has been active in the Delta 
through its initial aid to the IDPs, the funding of two peace 
dialogues implemented by NGOs, and the recent agreement by 
Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum and USAID to begin a cassava 
production program.  POLOFF emphasized these programs to 
Reyenieju, but with the exception of the joint Shell-USAID 
program, the others are nearing completion and future funding 
has not yet been identified.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
IMMINENT VIOLENCE NEAR ESCRAVOS? 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) David Beddow, Security Coordinator for Chevron 
Nigeria Ltd's (CNL) Escravos transfer terminal and tank farm, 
told ECONOFF on March 8 that "an offensive by the Itsekiri 
could be imminent."  Beddow believes attacks will only be 
delayed due to lack of fuel and boats.  In mid-February, CNL 
security staff reported to ECONOFF that a group of Ijaw 
youths in speedboats harassed nearby Itsekiri villages within 
sight of Escravos.  The youths dressed in warrior white, 
waved white flags and placed one on an oil jetty farther up 
the Escravos River. During the wave of violence that spread 
through the Delta swamps in March 2003, workers at the 
Escravos terminal noted that Ijaw attack parties wore white 
and displayed white flags during their attacks on Itsekiri 
villages. 
 
10. (C) Reyenieju confirmed the incident to POLOFF and said 
the flag staking was symbolic to show that the Ijaw were now 
claiming the land. When asked if the Itsekiri were readying 
themselves for defense or attack, Reyenieju claimed that the 
Itsekiri would only defend themselves.  He stated he did not 
see any signs of renewed violence in the creeks, claiming 
that the Itsekiri had been chased from their homes and now 
only existed in large numbers in and around Escravos. 
 
11.  (C) The Escravos terminal, a joint venture of 
ChevronTexaco and the GON, is protected by approximately 200 
soldiers of the Joint Task Force, "Operation Restore Hope," 
which was sent to the region in August 2003 to restore order 
in the Warri area.  Beddow told ECONOFF that CNL is not 
taking any action as a result of their concerns of increased 
violence; nor does he anticipate that JTF forces would engage 
in "inter-community battles."  CNL has recently started a 
slow return to their production facilities in the surrounding 
riverine area, receiving JTF escorts and protection for their 
flow stations and their supply transports (septel). 
 
12.  (C) Brigadier General Elias Zamani, Commanding Officer 
of the JTF, told POLOFF on March 8 that rumors of increased 
violence exist, but the JTF is prepared to maintain the 
"fragile peace" and implement the decision of the Delta State 
Government to postpone LGA elections.  He stressed that the 
right of the people to participate in the electoral process 
should not be abridged, but contended the postponement was in 
the best interest of peace.  In general, Zamani characterized 
the situation in the Delta as suffering from "normal 
skirmishes," but that the JTF was containing violence, as 
opposed to controlling it.  Zamani said he had no fears of 
renewed kidnappings, referring to the common practice of 
abducting oil company employees and contractors for ransom. 
 
13. (C) As part of the Inter-Ethnic Dialogue, the Delta State 
Government promised to return the Itsekiri IDPs to their 
homes along the Benin River.  The Itsekiri welcome the 
initiative, pending a security guarantee.  BG Zamani told 
POLOFF that the JTF staff has drafted a security plan and 
will work together with the Delta State Government.  Yet, no 
movement on the plan has been seen.  Reyenieju has little 
confidence that either can produce what they have been 
promised.  Enraged, Reyenieju stated his only enemy was the 
Delta State Government whom he chided for not providing basic 
social services or showing a sincere desire to address the 
root causes of the conflict.  He renewed his claims that the 
Itsekiri would not go on the offensive or "transfer its anger 
with the government onto other groups," but would deal 
directly with the state government on these issues. 
 
14.  (C) COMMENT: The JTF does not have the capability to 
patrol and maintain security in the riverine area.  Instead 
it has focused on securing oil installations, selectively 
limiting illegal bunkering activity off its coast through the 
use of USG-gifted buoy tenders, and keeping peace in the city 
of Warri.  This situation on the ground makes it unlikely the 
Itsekiri will safely return to the Benin River in the near 
future.  The postponement of the LGA elections is a win for 
the Ijaw, and may signal concessions from the Delta State 
Government in their favor. Ijaw youths have been folded into 
the state government by Governor Ibori, from which they 
appear to have benefited financially.  Elsewhere in Delta 
State, people seem apathetic towards the LGA elections, as 
all have accepted that the PDP candidates will win. 
 
15.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED.  Ibori's motives, however, are 
unclear.  It is uncertain whether he is keeping troublemakers 
easily accessible and manipulated, or whether the youths, who 
acted as hired thugs during the previous elections and now 
facilitate illegal bunkering, are being rewarded for their 
past and current cooperation.  What cannot be ignored is the 
growing dissatisfaction with the status quo by the common 
Ijaw and Itsekiri living in the riverine area, who may not be 
easily controlled or manipulated from Warri.  Claims by both 
sides that neither will initiate attacks seem hollow, 
especially given reports of provision hoarding. 
 
16.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED.  The reaction of the JTF is 
another wildcard.  Even though stationed in large number at 
the Escravos Terminal, the JTF does not have a history of 
engaging unless their facilities are directly threatened. 
But recent clashes between military forces and residents of 
Warri suggest some troops have reached a breaking-point based 
on fatigue, impatience, or boredom (ref A).  Candid comments 
to ConGen Officers by commanders showing concern over the 
potential backlash from the international community for any 
collateral damage inflicted on civilians may be lessening in 
credibility as the stalemate in the Delta drags on. 
Commanders may be faced with increased pressure from Abuja to 
take more aggressive action, utilizing unruly, poorly 
trained, and ill-equipped troops who can become unmanageable 
when responding to a threat or crisis 
HINSON-JONES