US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO446

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03/12/14 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, Elections, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  In meeting, senior MP from President's party 
discusses campaign, expresses worries re LTTE situation 
 
Refs:  Colombo 440, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Polchief met March 10 with Dinesh 
Gunawardena, a senior MP in President Kumaratunga's 
People's Alliance (PA) party.  Queried about the April 2 
parliamentary election, he stated that he thought the 
alliance between the SLFP and radical JVP was having "a 
very good" campaign and would win a majority of seats. 
He allowed that the UNP campaign machine was just 
getting warmed up after a slow start, however.  Re the 
LTTE split, he worried that it might hurt the peace 
process.  Gunawardena's views tended to reflect the 
widespread sense that the SLFP-JVP alliance started out 
fast, but that the UNP may be set to stage a strong 
comeback.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) MEETING WITH SENIOR MP:  Polchief met March 10 
with Dinesh Gunawardena, a longtime MP for President 
Kumaratunga's PA political grouping.  (Gunawardena, 55, 
comes from a prominent political family that holds 
diverse views.  One of his brothers, Prasanna, is the 
UNP mayor of Colombo and another brother, Indika, is a 
leader of the Communist Party.)  Asked about the April 2 
parliamentary election campaign, Gunawardena responded 
that the alliance between President Kumaratunga's Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the radical Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was having "a very good" 
campaign.  (The SLFP is the main constituent element in 
the PA.  Most elements of the PA are supporting the 
SLFP-JVP alliance, including Gunawardena's small 
Mahajama Eksath Peramuna, "MEP," party.  FYI:  The MEP, 
a Trotskyite party, was founded by Gunawardena's father, 
Philip, and was very strong in the 1940s and 1950s.) 
Rallies had gone well and party members seemed "highly 
enthusiastic" about the campaign.  The SLFP-JVP planned 
to make a big push during the final three weeks of the 
campaign.  This would involve many large rallies in the 
big cities and hundreds of smaller rallies at the 
village level.  He also noted that the election 
manifesto of the United People's Freedom Alliance, 
"UPFA," (the technical name of the SLFP-JVP alliance) 
would be issued shortly.  (FYI:  The manifesto, covering 
UPFA stands on the peace process and economic matters, 
was issued on March 11.) 
 
3.  (C) UNP WILL TRY HARD:  Gunawardena noted that the 
campaign of the United National Party (UNP) led by Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe was just getting warmed up after 
a slow start.  The UNP appeared to have a lot of money 
and was clearly preparing to launch a large-scale, all- 
out campaign during the last two weeks or so of the 
campaign.  That said, the UNP campaign was starting up 
late in the cycle and it would be difficult for it to 
recover lost ground.  Asked for his prediction for the 
April 2 election, Gunawardena replied that much hinged 
on the final weeks of the campaign as "many things could 
happen."   All things being equal, however, he thought 
that the SLFP-JVP alliance would win an outright 
majority in Parliament (113 seats or more).  If it came 
just below that target, he thought the alliance would 
almost certainly be able to attract smaller parties, or 
perhaps defectors from the UNP, that would allow it to 
form the majority in Parliament. 
 
4.  (C) WORRIES ABOUT LTTE SPLIT:  Asked about the 
recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) organization between northern and eastern 
elements (see Reftels), Gunawardena responded that he 
worried that it might hurt the peace process.  Fighting 
between the LTTE factions seemed likely and it could 
easily spill over in the Eastern Province.  Non- 
combatants could be caught in the crossfire, which in 
turn might lead to Sri Lankan military intervention of 
some sort.  Gunawardena noted that some elements in the 
SLFP-JVP alliance wanted the GSL to get involved on the 
side of Karuna, so as to ensure that the split in the 
LTTE was a permanent one.  Gunawardena was of two minds 
about this.  On the one hand, it appeared a good idea 
for the GSL to try to undermine "one of the world's most 
dangerous terrorist groups."  On the other hand, the 
situation in the east seemed very fluid and it might be 
best for the government to act with restraint.  All in 
all, he thought that President Kumaratunga's current 
"hands-off" policy toward the LTTE split was the best 
choice for the moment. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  Gunawardena's views on the campaign 
tended to reflect the widespread sense that the SLFP-JVP 
alliance started out fast, but that the UNP may be set 
to stage a strong comeback.  UNP officials we have 
recently met with appear much more confident now than 
they did when the election was called in early February. 
It is not clear why the UNP campaign was originally so 
moribund, but the party clearly did not want elections 
and seemed a bit shell-shocked in the aftermath of 
President Kumaratunga's November 2003 takeover of three 
key ministries.  All that said, the SLFP-JVP alliance 
remains highly active and is also set to make a strong 
push in the next several weeks.  It is still too early 
to really predict, but most observers continue to 
believe -- contrary to Gunawardena's view that the SLFP- 
JVP will win an outright majority -- that Sri Lanka is 
headed toward a tight election and possibly a hung 
Parliament.  END COMMENT. 
 
6.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD