US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO440

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, S/CT, SA/INS, INR/NESA 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03/11/14 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka:  Can rebel Tamil Tiger commander in 
the east survive? 
 
Refs:  Colombo 435, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
SUMMARY 
======= 
1.  (C) A week after he split from the main LTTE 
organization in the north, rebel commander Karuna 
appears to be gradually consolidating his position in 
the east.  With many loyal troops in strong defensive 
redoubts, his military position seems relatively strong. 
There are also signs that he is picking up popular 
support among eastern Tamils.  All that said, the main 
LTTE organization has considerable assets (an 
intelligence apparatus, suicide teams, etc.) that it 
will not hesitate to use against Karuna.  While the 
overall balance of forces within the LTTE does not favor 
Karuna, he seems, at this point, to have a clear chance 
at longer-term survival.  END SUMMARY. 
 
================================= 
Karuna's strong military position 
================================= 
 
2.  (C) Rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
commander Karuna appears to be consolidating his 
position in the east, a week after he split from the 
main organization in the north (see Reftels).  At this 
point, his military position seems relatively strong. 
Karuna himself is known to be a tough, effective 
military commander, who has led LTTE forces into battle 
with GSL forces many times in the past.  While several 
of his military and political commanders defected to the 
north right after he announced that he was leaving the 
group, Karuna appears to have retained many of his top 
officers and virtually all of his troop strength.  It is 
not precisely clear how many forces he has under his 
command, but he may have as many as 6,000 men and women. 
In a March 10 meeting with the DCM (see Reftel), Indian 
Deputy High Commissioner Mohan Kumar said the GoI 
estimated that, of this number, about 2,500 - 3,500 
troops were armed and combat ready.  These forces were 
divided into eight regiments of 350 each, according to 
Kumar. 
 
3.  (C) Karuna's exact logistical situation is unclear, 
but Kumar estimated that he may be able to sustain his 
forces for up to six months.  The exact details of 
Karuna's financial situation also are not known.  He 
will probably be able to rely, to some extent, on the 
"taxation" of the Tamil populace in the east and other 
extortion activities (as we reported in early 2003, the 
LTTE "tax" machine was becoming more sophisticated and 
beginning to produce a steady flow of revenue).  There 
is, however, no firm information available as to whether 
Karuna has allies in the international Tamil community, 
a major source of  LTTE funds.  Kumar said Karuna has a 
brother who is a businessman in the east who might be 
able to help him. 
 
4.  (C) Karuna's forces have the advantage of holding 
strong defensive positions in the east.  For over 20 
years the LTTE has maintained fortified bases in the 
Thoppigalla jungle, a large area located to the west of 
Batticaloa city.  Other than the Vanni region in the 
north where the main LTTE organization is based, the 
Thoppigalla jungle has been the LTTE's strongest 
military bastion in Sri Lanka.  GSL forces had an 
extremely difficult time when they tried to clear this 
rugged area of LTTE forces during the conflict and 
ultimately gave up on the effort.  Karuna controls all 
of this area now.  With control of the jungle, Karuna's 
forces have wide latitude to move in and around 
Batticaloa and Ampara Districts.  (Trincomalee, the 
third district in the east, appears to be under control 
of the main LTTE organization at this time, with the 
LTTE Trincomalee leader Pathuman, reportedly friendly to 
Karuna, apparently being detained in the Vanni.) 
 
=========================== 
Picking up Popular Support? 
=========================== 
 
5.  (C) There are also signs that Karuna is picking up 
popular support in the east.  Indications of such 
support come, for example, from the several pro-Karuna 
rallies that were held in Batticaloa and Ampara last 
week.  Some of these rallies were quite large, with at 
least several thousand Tamils participating.  The 
rallies were especially notable for the burning of 
photos and effigies of LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran and 
other LTTE officials.  While Karuna and his forces could 
have cooked up these rallies via coercion or otherwise, 
large anti-LTTE demonstrations are virtually without 
precedent among the Tamil populace in the east and the 
fact they took place at all was quite noteworthy. 
 
6.  (C) In addition to the public rallies, Mission has 
also been picking up other broader hints from contacts 
that many easterners are fed up with the main LTTE 
organization and may be turning to Karuna.  There has 
been a long history of eastern "Batticaloa" Tamil 
resentment against northern "Jaffna" Tamils.  Many 
easterners feel that northerners have tried "to lord it 
over them" and treat them as subordinates.  Caste 
differences also run deep.  Karuna has given voice to 
these feelings toward the north by stating in a March 9 
AFP interview, for example, that:  "The Vanni 
administration should think of being forgiven by our 
people and soldiers for being thankless for the deeds we 
(in the east) have done to protect the Vanni and its 
people."  In his public remarks, Karuna's secretary, 
Varathan, has also noted the thousands of easterners who 
have been killed in past fighting with the Sri Lankan 
security forces, while pointedly noting that there are 
no eastern Tamils on the LTTE's 30-member ruling 
committee.  These assertions may be exaggerated: 
Karuna, an easterner, was known to be one of the top 
five in the LTTE hierarchy and was included on the 
group's peace negotiation team, for example. 
Nonetheless, according to contacts, Karuna's enunciation 
of eastern grievances against the north appears to have 
struck a chord with the populace in the east. 
 
7.  (C) Although Karuna seems to have netted some 
popular support at this time, it is not clear whether 
his eastern supporters will remain with him through 
thick and thin, or choose to throw their support back to 
the Vanni LTTE down the road.  On the plus side for 
Karuna is the fact that he appears charismatic and 
articulate, and clearly knows how to use the press (as 
illustrated by his BBC TV interview which aired 
yesterday).  On the minus side, the skill and breadth of 
his political network is a question mark.  Much of the 
LTTE's political network in Batticaloa and Ampara 
appears to have shut down when Karuna launched his 
rebellion with some of the  political cadre assigned to 
the area departing for the Vanni.  If Karuna's rebellion 
is to be sustained, he will have to rebuild this 
political organization and make sure it is effective. 
 
====================================== 
Main LTTE Organization has assets, too 
====================================== 
 
8.  (C) Despite Karuna's clear strengths in the east, 
the main LTTE organization has considerable assets that 
it will not hesitate to deploy against Karuna. 
Prabhakaran is a battle-tested leader, who has dealt 
fiercely and decisively with all previous challenges 
(real and imagined) to his one-man rule of the LTTE. 
There have been numerous cases of LTTE figures being 
executed by Prabhakaran for alleged treason.  One of the 
most notorious cases was that of Mahattaya, 
Prabhakaran's deputy, who was executed in 1990.  In 
trying to defeat Karuna, there is little doubt that 
Prabhakaran will deploy all of his considerable assets. 
These include an intelligence apparatus, which is 
considered highly effective (although it appears to have 
missed Karuna's rebellion).  There are also the "Black 
Tiger" suicide squads.  These squads have not been used 
in some time in actual operations, but they reportedly 
remain at the ready.  With respect to armed forces, 
Karuna appears to have a slight edge.  Indian Deputy 
High Commissioner Kumar told the DCM that the GoI 
thought that Prabhakaran had about 500 fewer combat 
ready troops at his disposal than Karuna.  We have been 
told by Sri Lanka Army sources that the discrepancy 
between Prabhakaran's and Karuna's forces is even larger 
in Karuna's advantage.  With respect to logistics, the 
Vanni has a decided edge, with large supply depots and 
the ability to bring in more supplies via the sea, and 
effective domestic "taxation" plus international 
fundraising efforts. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
9.  (C) The overall balance of forces within the LTTE 
does not favor Karuna.  The main LTTE organization has 
much more money, is used to tough infighting, and has 
tentacles stretching throughout Sri Lanka's Tamil 
community.  It would not be a surprise, for example, if 
the group, which is calculating in the extreme, has 
supporters in Karuna's camp ready to knock him off. 
That said, if Karuna can avoid being assassinated, it 
would appear that his faction of the LTTE has a clear 
chance at longer-term survival.  Much will depend on 
whether Karuna's faction can quickly develop a separate 
logistics base now that it has split off from the main 
LTTE organization.  Karuna will need arms and 
ammunition, and food and money in the coming months for 
his forces.  If he does not come up with these items, 
his forces could melt away.  In addition, as noted 
above, Karuna will also have to move quickly to develop 
a political organization in the east to match his strong 
military position.  With a strong political 
organization, his position in the east would be further 
consolidated, making efforts to replace him by the main 
LTTE that much more difficult.  Developing a logistics 
base and a political organization is tough to do, but 
Karuna needs to do so and in short order.  He should not 
be underestimated, however:  In surviving for even a 
week, Karuna has already surpassed many observers' 
expectations. 
 
10.  (C) If Karuna makes it into the spring, there could 
well be implications for the peace process.  It is easy 
(and disturbing) to construct a scenario in which the 
post-election GSL returns to the peace table, across 
from LTTE representatives who no longer represent both 
the North and the East.  Moreover, Karuna would 
undoubtedly be quite vocal in his displeasure at not 
having a place at the table.  END COMMENT. 
 
11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD