US embassy cable - 04PANAMA586

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PANAMA 000586 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2009 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PINS, EWWT, MOPS, PM, LABOR, HUMAN RIGHTS,POLMIL 
SUBJECT: PANAMA OFFERS BETTER HIGH-VALUE TRANSIT GUARANTEE 
 
REF: A. 03 PANAMA 2201 
     B. 03 PANAMA 470 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Christopher J. McMullen for reason 1.5 (d) 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Panama's unilateral alternative to the USG's 
bilateral MOU proposal may be a better force protection 
guarantee for US military high-value transits (HVTs).  After 
Embassy receives actual GOP language, probably in one to two 
months, we will analyze it and report our conclusions and 
recommendations for further action.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (C) After successfully implementing a US-Panama MOU for 
USG vessels visiting Panamanian ports (ref B), Embassy 
cleared with USG agencies a second force protection MOU to 
cover HVTs (ref A), to be signed under chief of mission (COM) 
authority.  This MOU was presented on November 13, 2003, to 
the GOP's Public Security and National Defense Council 
(Consejo) Executive Secretary Ramiro Jarvis and Senior 
Advisor for Maritime Security Marta Achurra, who are 
coordinating the many GOP agencies with equities in this 
issue.  (Note: Unlike the port visits MOU, for which Panama's 
Maritime Service (SMN) was the only GOP negotiator and is the 
sole point of contact for implementation, HVT force 
protection involves all GOP security-related agencies 
(Consejo, Police (PNP), Air Service (SAN), Maritime Service 
(SMN) and Institutional Protection Service (SPI)), as well as 
the Foreign Ministry (MFA) and the Canal Authority (ACP), 
which is not under the Consejo's chain of command).  End 
note.) 
 
 
3. (C) On January 27, EmbOffs met with GOP agency 
representatives led by Consejo's Achurra, who now says that a 
separate bilateral HVT MOU would be slow to conclude and more 
cumbersome to implement.  Furthermore, the ACP is loath to be 
included in what would be a primarily security-specific 
document, wanting to avoid any charges of "mission creep." 
Instead, the GOP has countered with two unilateral documents, 
first floated at the January 27 meeting.  Consejo plans to 
present to Embassy by mid-April (1) currently applicable ACP 
regulations, amended to include USG requirements that are 
directly under the ACP's operational control and (2) a new 
GOP interagency MOU, codifying relevant portions of Consejo's 
threat matrix security SOP.  Alternatively, the latter may be 
codified via an executive decree, though the process would be 
lengthy and may not be completed by the September 1 change in 
government. 
 
 
4. (C) The GOP has also raised other concerns regarding USG 
force protection requests.  First, USG armed "escort units" 
are illegal under Panama's Constitution; only the PPF can 
provide security within Panamanian territory.  If security 
procedures are guaranteed in a unilateral instrument, as the 
GOP proposes, determination of USG responsibilities is moot. 
Such units become "auxiliary vessels," which will arrive with 
the high value vessel and will be granted expeditious transit 
per the Neutrality Treaty.  Auxiliary vessels have the right 
to transit with their personnel and weapons and have the 
international right of self-defense, which concurrently 
provides force protection for the high-value vessel.  Second, 
the GOP noted that the level of force protection requested in 
our draft MOU is more than currently provided for US military 
HVTs, e.g., the USG would like to see water, land and air 
patrols commence earlier and have GOP quick reaction forces 
on alert.  These services will increase the cost of a 
transit.  (Note: Though not yet mentioned by the GOP, the PPF 
services may also need equipment, training and other 
assistance to be able to guarantee force protection.  End 
note.)  Embassy requested that the GOP inform the USG of the 
cost of each component of the force protection procedures to 
be considered along with other factors for our determination 
of services the USG needs.  Third, the ACP noted that it has 
no authority to order another GOP agency to take action 
during an HVT; its jurisdiction over the transit does not 
extend to security for the transit.  Embassy does not expect 
a military-like chain-of-command and understands competing 
jurisdictions, but does expect the ACP to take full 
responsibility for an HVT, coordinating with PPF services, 
possibly with the bureaucratic assistance of the Consejo. 
Such services are provided to all other ACP customers, 
including high interest vessels that create similar security 
concerns. 
 
 
5. (C) Embassy accepts the GOP's counterproposal to guarantee 
force protection for US military HVTs with two unilateral 
Panamanian commitments vice a bilateral MOU.  In many 
respects, because our proposed MOU would have been negotiated 
under COM authority and therefore legally unenforceable, the 
counterproposal is a better guarantee.  The ACP operational 
regulations can only be changed by its Board of Directors, a 
group concerned about its business relationship with valued 
clients and its global reputation as a premier service 
provider.  These regulations, once approved, are unlikely to 
be altered capriciously.  The GOP interagency security MOU 
will be based on Consejo threat analyses and planning, which 
has already been vetted and agreed upon.  This MOU, once 
approved, is unlikely to be altered easily.  Both documents 
will be given to Embassy for its concurrence.  Embassy has 
been clear with the GOP about our principal goals in these 
negotiations: (1) The USG wants force protection procedures 
to be regularized and verifiable; (2) As many protections as 
possible requested in the original USG proposal should be 
provided; and (3) Embassy's Force Protection Officer, who is 
Embassy's Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) as 
US Defense Representative in-country, is to have one GOP 
point of contact to coordinate both operational and security 
issues of an HVT. 
 
 
 
 
WATT