US embassy cable - 04ROME927

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000927 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, IT, NATO, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: ITALY/AFGHANISTAN:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISAF EXPANSION 
 
REF: STATE 50477 
 
Classified By: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Italy remains fully on board with ISAF 
expansion.  Although no formal policy decision has yet been 
made, the GOI (reportedly working closely with SHAPE) is 
focused on Herat, with the only apparent question being 
whether Italy will lead only a PRT, or that and a Forward 
Support Base (FSB), as well.  (A letter from DSACEUR to 
Italy's CHOD evidently requests both.)  Both MOD and MFA 
interlocutors emphasized concerns about equipment support 
needed to lead an FSB.  They indicate that there is an 
informal understanding with SHAPE that they would not be 
expected to offer a concrete "pledge" at the March 11 Force 
Generation conference, which, they explained, would focus on 
Stage 1; Italy's contributions would come into play in Stage 
2.  Italy is no longer interested in a Ghazni PRT.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Pol-Mil Couns, accompanied by Poloff, delivered 
reftel points to MFA Special Envoy for Afghanistan, 
Ambassador Enrico De Maio, and to NATO Office Director, Cons. 
Giovanni Brauzzi, on March 8.  Pol-Mil Couns also raised them 
in a separate conversation with the Defense Minister's 
Diplomatic Adviser, Minister Francesco Trupiano.  Our 
interlocutors cautioned that no final GOI decision has yet 
been made, but both discussions found Italian planning for 
GOI contributions to ISAF expansion well underway, focusing 
on a PRT in Herat, with serious attention being given also to 
leading a Forward Support Base there. 
 
3.  (C)  GOI representatives are in close contact with SHAPE; 
Trupiano and Brauzzi said DSACEUR sent a written request to 
Italy's CHOD requesting Italy lead a "PRT and FSB" in Herat. 
(Although the NATO request was reportedly straightforward, 
some confusion remained in the MFA as to whether the U.S. 
specifically sought a PRT, an FSB, or both.)  Irritation at 
the USG's abrupt turn-around on Italy's Ghazni PRT seems to 
have diminished, if not disappeared completely; some 
nervousness about the possibility of another about-face 
remains.  De Maio and Brauzzi requested specific USG 
confirmation that Italian leadership in Herat was in line 
with USG planning.  All/all interlocutors indicated that the 
GOI is no longer considering Ghazni as a potential PRT 
location.  Italy fully shares the USG's sense of urgency for 
expanding ISAF as quickly as possible, for the host of 
political and security reasons applicable. 
 
4.  (C)  MFA interlocutors confided that there are concerns 
in the Italian military that an FSB might be too large and 
difficult a task, and suggested that the U.S. might help 
allay those concerns.  They told us MFA Secretary General 
Vattani chaired a March 8 meeting and directed that the GOI 
would move "in a new direction," apparently in reference to 
supporting an FSB.  Both our MFA and MOD interlocutors raised 
specific concerns about the full range of assets needed for 
an FSB, mentioning specifically helicopters and close air 
support, and suggesting it would be most helpful if U.S. 
assets could be added to the mix.  They underscored that 
Italy would also need support from other countries.  The 
comments of our interlocutors, however, did not suggest 
unwillingness, but rather reasonably advanced planning which 
was revealing the challenges of the task Italy hopes to take 
on. 
 
5.  (C)  De Maio and Brauzzi mused about the difference 
between a "logistical hub" and a full FSB, noting that 
smaller footprints sometimes might be preferable.  Brauzzi 
and De Maio fully concurred, however, that an FSB would need 
logistical support and medical evacuation capabilities, among 
others. 
 
6.  (C)  MFA representatives highlighted the political 
sensitivity of an FSB, particularly one in Herat.  They 
underscored the need for flexibility in planning the 
operation, including by military planners.  Would Ismail Khan 
welcome a large military organization "establishing security" 
on his turf?  Could such an operation potentially destabilize 
 
a currently-stable area?  De Maio emphasized the history of 
GOI cultural contributions in Herat as a strong plus for 
Italian leadership there.  Italy is well and favorably known 
in Herat, he said.  He added that Italy's positive relations 
with neighboring Iran could also be a plus. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Trupiano said Italy's newly-appointed Vice CHOD, 
General Castegnetti, would likely lead Italy's delegation to 
the March 11 Force Generation conference.  In any event, 
"senior Italian officers" will attend.  Both he and the MFA 
representatives clearly understood that Italy's contributions 
were being sought for Stage 2, and suggested an understanding 
already exists with SHAPE that Italy will not play a large 
role in the Thursday conference. 
 
8.  (U)  Kabul Minimize considered. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME00927 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL