US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1451

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, MOPS, PTER, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A GAZA PULL-OUT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: We assess that the threshold for IDF 
conventional ground force action in Gaza following a complete 
Israeli withdrawal, including from the Philadelphia Strip, 
would be substantially elevated.  The loss of IDF-secured 
roads, fortified bases and settlements, and diminished IDF 
tactical intelligence capabilities would create real 
obstacles that ground force commanders would be hesitant to 
confront.  Moreover, the IDF would have to count on facing 
better-armed Palestinians than at present.  In response to 
threats or provocations from Gaza, the IDF would almost 
certainly rely for as long as possible on standoff action, 
especially airstrikes.  Special forces operations would be an 
intermediate step between standoff and ground force actions, 
but they would be hindered by many of the same obstacles as a 
ground invasion.  (This judgment does not necessarily apply 
to Shin Bet operations, which would continue.)  Events that 
would almost certainly trigger some form of IDF strike on 
Gaza include mega-terror attacks by Gaza-based Hamas or PIJ, 
or with some other clear connection to Gaza; the deployment 
from Gaza of standoff weapons with professional 
characteristics (e.g., Katyushas, SAMs, military-quality 
mortars) against targets in Israel; and, the revelation of a 
Karine-A-like smuggling operation. 
 
Note: This is one of three messages by Embassy Tel Aviv with 
initial thinking about the implications of an Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza.  The other two cables address the 
political/institutional and economic implications of 
withdrawal.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S) Should the IDF withdraw completely from Gaza, 
including from the Philadelphia Strip along the Gaza-Egypt 
border, it would subsequently face significant obstacles to 
sending back ground forces.  Ground force commanders would be 
highly reluctant to lead troops into Gaza without the assets 
they currently enjoy, notably pre-cleared routes of movement 
for attack and withdrawal, and fortified safe areas on bases 
and settlements within Gaza.  Moreover, the good tactical 
intelligence that the IDF currently enjoys by virtue of its 
own eyes on the ground in Gaza would almost certainly be much 
weaker after a full withdrawal.  Ground forces would also 
likely be inhibited by the prospect of facing opponents who, 
after a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, would likely 
be better armed and organized. 
 
3. (S) Based on these factors, the Embassy assesses that the 
threshold for IDF conventional ground operations in Gaza 
would be signficantly elevated after withdrawal.  Any 
conventional ground operation would almost certainly ensue 
only after repeated IDF attempts to deal with threats by 
standoff means, notably fixed wing and helicopter attacks. 
Another possible alternative to a ground campaign would be 
the use of IDF special operations units, but their deployment 
would be inhibited by the same factors militating against 
large-scale ground force operations.  (This judgment does not 
necessarily apply to Shin Bet operations.)  Nevertheless, the 
IDF would be likely to turn to special forces, perhaps 
inserted by sea, before resorting to any larger-scale ground 
operation. 
 
4. (S) A full withdrawal from Gaza would remove, or at least 
significantly reduce, the stigma of occupation associated 
with IDF actions in Gaza.  With a greater feeling of 
legitimacy to respond militarily to provocations from Gaza, 
the IDF will probably show less inhibition about undertaking 
operations likely to cause significant civilian casualties 
and other unintended effects.  The effect of taking more 
risks of killing non-combatants would be compounded by the 
possible greater tendency of the IDF to resort to less 
precise air power following a full withdrawal from Gaza. 
 
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Reverse Tripwires 
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5. (S) The Embassy has identified the following events that 
would almost certainly trigger conventional (air or land) IDF 
action in Gaza.  As noted above, we do not assess that a 
conventional land forces operation would be the first 
response in any case, except perhaps in the event of a 
Palestinian attack that far exceeded the number of casualties 
in any previous attack, or that employed nonconventional 
means.  This list, like those that follow, should not be 
considered exhaustive. 
 
-- A mega-terror attack (at least 50-100 deaths) within the 
Green Line committed by Hamas, PIJ or other Gaza-based group, 
or with some other clear Gaza connection. 
 
-- An attack into Israel, or against an Israeli plane, 
whether successful or not, from Gaza using standoff weapons 
with professional characteristics, e.g., Katyushas or similar 
SSMs, SAMs or (not homemade) mortars.  The launch of such 
weapons into Israel, or against an Israeli plane, would 
likely provoke an IDF response, even without, or with few, 
Israeli casualties.  An attack using unsophisticated standoff 
weapons of the kind already in use (Qassams, home-made 
mortars) would be unlikely to provoke an IDF response if it 
causes no fatalities.  A "lucky hit" that causes fatalities 
with these imprecise weapons would probably trigger a 
standoff response, but not more. 
 
-- The exposure of a large-scale arms smuggling operation, 
similar to the Karine-A, involving standoff weapons of 
professional characteristics. 
 
6. (S) Actions more likely to provoke an IDF response would 
include: 
 
-- A significant increase in the presence of Hizballah 
fighters, Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces, or 
al-Qaeda-associated operatives in Gaza. 
 
-- Continuous, small-scale smuggling of the sorts of weapons 
described in para 5 above, as revealed by intelligence 
sources.  Whether the IDF would respond to the presence, but 
non-use, of such weapons is uncertain.  However, we assess 
the probability as very low that Palestinian groups would 
maintain Hizballah-like capabilities with Hizballah-like 
restraint.  In other words, Palestinian groups would almost 
certainly not refrain from trying to deploy a new capability 
almost immediately against targets in Israel. 
 
7. (S) Actions unlikely to provoke an IDF response, but that 
plausibly might do so, include: 
 
-- The political ascent of Hamas. 
 
-- A significant increase in terrorist penetration of the 
fence separating Gaza from Israel. 
 
-- A series of attacks in Israel carried out by terrorists 
smuggled into Israel from Gaza via Egypt. 
 
8. (S) Any combination of events from paras 6 and 7 would 
probably have an increased chance of provoking an Israeli 
response. 
 
 
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